## Election results

$\left.\left.\begin{array}{|c|c|}\hline \text { winner } & \text { method(s) } \\ \hline \hline \text { m } & \begin{array}{c}\text { Baldwin* } \\ \text { Black } \\ \text { Borda } \\ \text { Bucklin } \\ \text { Coombs* } \\ \text { Copeland } \\ \text { Dodgson } \\ \text { Nanson } \\ \text { Raynaud* } \\ \text { Schulze } \\ \text { Simpson } \\ \text { Small }\end{array} \\ \text { Tideman* }\end{array}\right] \begin{array}{c|c|}\hline \text { Carey } \\ \text { Hare* }\end{array}\right]$

* The ranking $y>z>v>w>x$ was used as a random-ballot tiebreaker.

The ranked ballots:
$1: w>v>x>y>z$
$1: x>v>y>w>z$
$1: z>v>w>x>y$
$1: y>v>z>x>w$
$1: y>z>v>w>x$
The pairwise matrix:

$v$ is the Condorcet winner.

