Gratz v
Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003)[1],
was a United
States Supreme Court case regarding the University of Michigan undergraduate affirmative action admissions policy. In a 6–3
decision announced on June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled the university's
point system (which automatically awarded points to underrepresented ethnic
groups) was too mechanistic in its use of race as a factor in admissions, and
was therefore unconstitutional.
The University of Michigan used a
150-point scale to rank applicants, with 100 points needed to guarantee
admission. The University gave underrepresented ethnic groups, including African-Americans,
Hispanics,
and Native Americans, an
automatic 20-point bonus on this scale, while a perfect
The petitioners, Jennifer Gratz
and Patrick Hamacher, both white residents of Michigan,
applied for admission to the University of Michigan's College of
Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA). Gratz applied for admission in the
fall of 1995 and
Hamacher in the fall of 1997.
Both were subsequently denied admission to the university. Gratz and Hamacher
were contacted by the Center for Individual Rights, which
filed a lawsuit on their behalf in October 1997. The case was filed in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the
University of Michigan, the LSA, James Duderstadt, and Lee Bollinger.
Duderstadt was president of the university while Gratz's application was under
consideration, and Bollinger while Hamacher's was under consideration. Their
class-action lawsuit alleged "violations and threatened violations of the
rights of the plaintiffs and the class they represent to equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment... and for racial discrimination."
Like Grutter, the case was heard in District
Court, appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
asked to be heard before the Supreme Court.
It has been argued by some that
Jennifer Gratz lacked standing to bring this action. Gratz applied in 1995,
three years before the University of Michigan adopted its points system. Gratz
could not claim injury as a result of the points system, and thus, under
traditional legal rules, Gratz lacked standing. Ms. Gratz chose not to attend
the University of Michigan by declining the university's offer to be placed on
a waiting list. Every Michigan student who agreed to go onto the waiting list
in the spring of 1995 was admitted to the University of Michigan for the fall
1995 semester.
The Court's majority found that
Gratz and co-plaintiff Hamacher had standing to seek declaratory and injunctive
relief, relying on Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of
America v. Jacksonville [2],
which held that the existence of a discriminatory barrier preventing a
petitioner from seeking a benefit on an equal basis sufficed to establish
injury, regardless of ultimate ability to obtain the benefit.
The Court's majority ruling,
authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, held that the United
States Constitution "does not prohibit the law school's narrowly tailored
use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in
obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body."
The Court held that the law school's interest in obtaining a "critical
mass" of minority students was indeed a "tailored use". O'Connor
noted that sometime in the future, perhaps twenty-five years hence, racial
affirmative action would no longer be necessary in order to promote diversity.
It implied that affirmative action should not be allowed
permanent status and that eventually a "colorblind" policy should be
implemented. The opinion read, "race-conscious admissions policies must be
limited in time." "The Court takes the Law School at its word that it
would like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula and
will terminate its use of racial preferences as soon as practicable. The Court
expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today." The phrase "25
years from now" was echoed by Justice Clarence
Thomas in his dissent. Justice Thomas, writing that the system was
"illegal now", concurred with the majority only on the point that he
agreed the system would still be illegal 25 years hence.
The decision largely upheld the
position asserted in Justice Powell's concurrence in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, which allowed race to be a
consideration in admissions policy, but held that quotas were illegal.
Public universities and other
public institutions of higher education across the nation are now allowed to
use race as a plus factor in determining whether a student should be admitted.
While race may not be the only factor, the decision allows admissions bodies to
take race into consideration along with other individualized factors in
reviewing a student's application. O'Connor's opinion answers the question for
the time being as to whether "diversity" in higher education is a
compelling governmental interest. As long as the program is "narrowly tailored"
to achieve that end, it seems likely that the Court will find it constitutional