Sixty Years of European Governance, Glendon College, York University, September 2012

Ulrich Best (PhD Plymouth) is DAAD Visiting Professor in Geography at York University's Canadian Centre for German and European Studies and has held positions in Leicester, Chemnitz and at UBC Kelowna.

Alexander Caviedes (PhD Wisconsin) is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Fredonia, New York.

Michelle Cini (PhD) is Professor of European Politics at the University of Bristol, United Kingdom, and is co-editor of JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies and of the Oxford University textbook European Union Politics.

Roberto Dominguez (PhD Miami) is Associate Professor of Government, Suffolk University, and postdoctoral researcher (2012/13) at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

Carolyn Dudek (PhD Pittsburgh) is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of European Studies at Hofstra University, New York.

Sandra Eckert (PhD Free University Berlin) is currently Deputy Chair of Political Science and Contemporary History at University Mannheim, Germany, on leave from University Osnabrueck.

Jessica Guth (PhD Liverpool) is Lecturer in European and Employment Law, Bradford University Law School, United Kingdom.

Martijn Groenleer (PhD Leiden) is Assistant Professor of Public Administration at Delft University, the Netherlands.

Willem Maas (PhD Yale) is Jean Monnet Chair, Associate Professor, and Director of the EU Centre of Excellence at Glendon College, York University.

Neill Nugent is Emeritus Professor of Politics and Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration at Manchester Metropolitan University, and Honorary Professor at the University of Salford, United Kingdom.

Sharon Pardo (PhD Ghent) is Jean Monnet Chair, Associate Professor, and Director of the Centre for the Study of European Politics and Society, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel.

Paul Stephenson (PhD Cambridge) is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, and Director of Studies of the MA in European Studies, at the University of Maastricht, the Netherlands.

Ingeborg Toemmel (PhD Free University of Berlin) is Jean Monnet Professor, University Osnabrueck, Germany.

Maurits van der Veen (PhD Harvard) is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the College of William & Mary, Virginia.

Abstracts

Ulrich Best "European Border Policy: From Cold War Container Spaces to a Showcase of EU Governmentality?"

Borders within and at the edges of the EU have been at the centre of European politics since the conception of European integration. This paper will look at the shifts that characterize the construction of a European border regime. In particular, it will argue that while making border policies an essential part of the EU project, the EU was also successful in creating an academic discipline of its own, in its own image - a European border studies that is tied to the EU as its funding agency, its object of research, and as source of political relevance. The paper will analyse the following three elements of the EU border regime: (1) Reinventing border discourse. Starting in the 1970s, cross-border cooperation became a key term in European regional policy. The new discourse argued historically, envisioning the EU as a new chapter in European cooperation, and posited a break with previous stages which had been characterized more by conflict than by cooperation (so the argument). After 1990, the discourse bifurcated. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, it was supplemented with a second discourse on borders as crisis zones - threatened areas that needed protection and enforcement. (2) Creating border regions. Along with the shifting discourse, a policy of creating cross-border regions as actors of cooperation developed. As the border discourse, this policy also witnessed a bifurcation after 1990. It created on the one hand regions of cooperation, and on the other hand "secure" regions characterized by anti-migratory border enforcement policies. (3) Governing border actors. Border regions are also showcases of EU policies in their production of governance. First of all, with its coordination of innumerable small-scale actors, border policy is an outsourced policy that exemplifies governing from a distance, through outsourced agencies, competition, and self-governance. Second, EU border policy is a particular success story of governmentality in the creation of European border studies, a discipline that is to a considerable part reactive to the incentives set by the EU research framework, and itself exemplifies the creation of a European space of the transnational governance of the self (in this case: the academic self). To conclude, the paper will argue that the shifting construction of EU borders is characterized by contradictions - a finding that is not surprising -, and that it is exactly in these contradictions that the contours of the border regime emerge in what is not contradicted, but appears as automatic, accepted, self-evident, common-sense.

Alexander Caviedes "European Integration and the Governance of Mobility"

A central aspect of European Integration is the Single Market and its attendant four freedoms. While the free movement of goods has perhaps had the greatest impact upon European governance, the free movement of people - while certainly not perfect - has experienced significant change in scope since the initial plans of the 1950s. The piece aims to trace the development of both mobility (meaning the movement of EU nationals within its confines) and the migration of third-country nationals, arguing that the more supranational governance structures of the former reflects much of the logic and mechanisms of neo-functional theory. Mobility has expanded from an essentially employment-related concept to the free movement that all EU citizens now enjoy. The creation of the Schengen zone is a further aspect of mobility whose genesis can be explained by functional pressures. While the transition to greater supranational governance of movement in these areas has been largely uncontested by the member states - even with the recent unilateral actions of Denmark and France - mobility faces greater challenges with regard to the free movement of services and associated posted workers. Here, individual states have fought to retain control over access to domestic markets, with the Court of Justice sometimes condoning their efforts to regulate domestic labor markets, while at other times it has undermined them. The other side of the coin is immigration itself, where little authority was initially contemplated for, or conferred upon, the supranational actor. With these origins in mind, there is now a surprising degree of governance capacity at the European level, though the actual legislative output has been limited. A survey of different aspects of immigration policy includes not merely policy toward third-country nationals (whether based on residence, employment or asylum), but extends to a discussion of border control and the creation of a border control agency, Frontex. Integration theories such as neofunctional supranationalism and intergovernmentalism are generally posited as dichotomies, and discussions of governance often reproduce these broad lines of division. However, particularly in reference to migration, simply focusing on the EU or its member states is insufficient, so adequate consideration must be extended to non-state third party actors as well, who have become involved in, and at times largely responsible for, the implementation of migration policy. The expansion of mobility-related policies follows the traditional neofunctional path of explanation, with engaged subnational actors instrumental in advancing this project. Similarly, there have been aspects of spillover that have propelled the development of EU immigration policy, but here the drivers have certainly been the states themselves, far more than the subnational actors in Haas' original narrative of integration. Therefore, it is not surprising that while immigration policy has expanded beyond its initial parameters and expectations, this process has followed a more intergovernmental logic in which states have been able to retain great flexibility and autonomy in the level of governance transfer that is occurring, such that, particularly with regard to implementation, a more multi-level architecture of governance is evident. Beyond examining how policy has developed and the degree to which governance has shifted over time, the piece will also consider where contestation is currently greatest, and what are likely to be future obstacles to further integration.

Michelle Cini "Ethics and Culture in the European Commission's Services"

This paper examines the emergence and evolution of the European Commission's public ethics system. 'Ethics', is defined as the standards or principles which shape the behaviour of individuals and groups. Public ethics concerns the application of these standards and principles to politicians, office-holders and civil servants. Since the 1990s, many public organizations in Europe have begun to engage actively in ethics management. They have done this by adopting ethical principles, ethics rules or codes of conduct, by introducing ethics training, and by requiring staff to complete various kinds of declaration. Collectively these initiatives are often called ethics frameworks or infrastructures, though in this paper the term 'ethics system' is preferred as it better reflects the institutional focus of the research. An ethics system, from this perspective, is the universe of structures, policies, rules and norms, normally underpinned by explicit principles and standards that are designed to improve the conduct of individuals and groups as they perform specific roles. It was only in 1999 however that the European Commission began to address explicitly the ethics of its officials. Intense criticism around this time resulted in the resignation of the then twenty Members of the Commission's political executive. Since that time, the Commission has sought to reinvent itself as a modern organization. This ambition has been implemented by means of an 'historic' reform which, between 2000 and 2004, reconfigured the Commission's planning, human resources and financial management systems. One dimension of the reform concerned the ethics of Commission officials. This paper examines the emergence and evolution of this public ethics system. It does so from the perspective of the organisational culture of the European Commission, the presumption being that the construction of an ethics regime within a multi-national, multi-cultural organisation raises difficulties which are not apparent in more homogeneous organisational contexts. In so doing, the paper focuses on two critical time periods: 1999 to 2004, contiguous with the Prodi Commission, when the ethics system was constructed; and 2005 to 2011, which covers the Barroso I Commission and the first year of the Barroso II Commission. Informed by historical institutionalism the paper questions how particular sets of ideas came to be institutionalized during this period as the European Commission's public ethics system. This research is also informed by secondary sources on public ethics. Since the early 2000s a small academic literature has emerged dealing specifically with ethics and integrity in the EU institutions. These works form part of a more general growth of public ethics research across Europe. Notwithstanding the emergence of this secondary literature, the empirical section of the article draws primarily on qualitative documentary analysis and fifteen interviews conducted in two rounds in Brussels in 2006 and 2011.

Roberto Dominguez "The EU External Relations Governance System"

The analysis of the roots and development of the system of EU external relations has produced different styles or modes of governance in the past five decades. In order to explain such evolution, this paper argues that the stages of construction of the EU external relations has been directly affected by a) the emerge of international crises, b) the capacity of the integration process to develop decision-making mechanisms, and c) the political willingness of community and state actors to implement collective choices in the area of external relations. Based on this premise, the paper develops the argument in three sections. The first traces back the empowerment of EU institutions in the decision making process of the external relations of the integration process from the economic competences given to the Commission in the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the creation of the European Political Cooperation in the early 1970s to the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Lisbon (2009). Subsequently, the paper reviews the instruments that EU institutions have developed in order to implement collective policies and assesses its achievements and obstacles. The third part identifies the characteristics of the systems of governance in the EU foreign relations based on the greater or lesser empowerment of EU actors, which vary not only from the historical, chronological and linear standpoint, but also from the inherent features of different areas within EU foreign policy (economy, political-diplomatic, security). The preliminary conclusion of the paper considers that once an instrument of foreign policy is agreed upon and institutionalized among the member states, the preferences of the states are transformed. In other words, there is a policy feedback into the EU system of governance. As a result, the external relations of the EU are characterized by the creation of a European space as a system of governance, where a plurality of agents and networks have been created and in some cases their interest have converged at the European level. Thus, one can unsurprisingly observe that the different sectors of the external relations manifest distinct levels of governance: in the area of military security, agents and networks have been historically more cautious and reluctant to move beyond the Westphalian model; in the political-diplomatic sector there has a steady development of permanent communication, practices, formal and informal institutions that have endowed the EU with the External Service and the High Representative; finally, in the economic area the Commission has historically have a substantial leverage on the EU trade external relations.

Carolyn Dudek "Growing Pains, Reform and Changing Aim of Cohesion Policy"

Cohesion policy is one of the more expensive policy areas of the EU and has become a key component for enlargement. The underlying principle of cohesion policy assumes that the market alone cannot solve development problems and therefore government intervention is needed. This notion is in direct contrast to the underlying principle of EU competition policy, which asserts that the free market can solve economic development problems. How can these policies, which seemingly work at odds, achieve the goal of development in the EU? Moreover, cohesion policy also advocates a focus on regional economic development, which also presses the concern for subsidiarity and particularly increasing the role of regional governments, even in countries that historically had unitary systems. Examining the evolution of cohesion policy since its inception in 1975 can help us better understand how this seeming clash of ideals within the EU as well as the challenges to subsidiarity have been created and addressed within this policy area. Cohesion policy was created to allay British discontent over not receiving the benefits of Common Agricultural Policy as compared to more agricultural countries. Since then cohesion policy's purpose has shifted and has become integral to EU membership of poorer countries. In particular, the policy has been aimed at improving urban areas in decay, preserving and aiding rural communities, protecting the environment and improving infrastructure. Cohesion policy has also experienced several reforms in order to improve implementation of programs, re-define what areas qualify for funds and to extend the budget to an increasing number of newer members. In particular, the move from a EU of 15 to a EU of 27 shifted funding eastward. My paper will exam the history of the creation of cohesion policy, the various major reforms of the policy and the challenges the EU has had in overseeing such a vastly distributed policy. In particular I will examine the EU's attempt to include lower levels of government in the implementation and oversight of the policy and the limitations of that attempt that were the outcome of the 1988 major revision to include the "partnership principle". This principle was a way to include greater subsidiarity within the policy. Another major reform was enacted in 1999, which streamlined the categories of funding and was a way to make way for twelve prospective new members, several of which would qualify for funding. Part of the growing pains of enlargement and the need for more cohesion funds was the loss of funds to older members, which when their regions were compared to those of central Europe, no longer would qualify for funds; thus, a phasing out system was created in the 2007-2013 budget. Although cohesion policy remains a key component to enlargement, both new and old members have been found to misuse funds. In the cases of Romania and Bulgaria, misuse of cohesion funds became so prevalent that all funds were stopped. Although, these cases were extreme, throughout many parts of Europe the legacy of EU cohesion policy easily can be seen with improved infrastructure, cleaned beaches, improving rural conditions and many other positive changes. However, cohesion, which is the goal of the policy, has still not yet been achieved even as the EU celebrates its 60th anniversary.

Sandra Eckert "The Politics of European Regulatory Governance: An Evolutionary Perspective"

This paper examines the evolution of regulatory governance in the European Union from a politicization lens. Empirically the EU is a highly interesting case due to the speed and scope of regulatory expansion. While there is wide-spread consensus about the emergence of a so-called "regulatory state" or "regulatory capitalism" in the EU multilevel context, questions regarding the legitimacy implications of this process remain controversial. De-politicization is understood as a decoupling of policy-making from the political arena through delegation of regulatory competencies towards non-majoritarian and/or private actors. Delegation is usually seen as a strategy to improve output legitimacy by stabilizing policy-making in a longitudinal perspective, yet it may pose important questions in terms of input legitimacy. At the same time de-politicization is neither a guarantee for policy effectiveness, nor does it necessarily exclude certain types of input legitimacy. In order to analyse the dynamics inherent in processes of (de-)politicization, the paper tackles the following questions: Can we identify distinct phases of politicization and de-politicization of regulatory governance in the EU? What are the motives and effects of shifting regulatory competencies out of the political arena, and the reverse process? Conceptually the focus is on rule-setting by unelected public bodies and private actors as opposed to rule-setting in the political arena. The paper builds on governance concepts such as network governance and new modes of governance, which have emphasized the involvement of private actors, and links to the literature on the role of non-majoritarian institutions. By looking into politicization effects it discards conceptualizations with a technocratic touch to it such as "Experimental Governance," which is systematically biased towards administrative decision-making and largely overlooks the role of representative bodies in the process. Rather, the paper adopts a comprehensive perspective encompassing the whole spectrum of actor constellations and structural settings in order to analyse the dynamic relationship between the political arena on the one hand, and the non-majoritarian and private arena on the other hand. Empirically the paper illustrates the argument with examples related to the Single European Market and EMU. It shows that processes of de-politicization often go along with intended structural reforms such as liberalization or market integration, whereas processes of politicization are typically triggered by policy failure or instability such as the BSE scandal, a perceived lack of secure energy supply or the economic and financial crisis. Empirical evidence however shows that it would be inaccurate to attribute policy stability and output legitimacy to the apolitical realm, and rapid reaction and input legitimacy to the political realm: in the current context of crisis the ECB has become the key manager of short-term risks related to the volatile financial markets, and its output legitimacy has come under considerable stress; at the same time national governments intervene at the highest political level, yet time pressure undermines the democratic legitimacy of decisions taken. The paper concludes that after a relatively stable phase of incrementally evolving regulatory governance in the EU, we currently experience a phase of politicization at all levels.

Jessica Guth "Sixty Years of EU Law: Evolution or Transformation?"

R Daniel Kelemen claims that Europe is moving towards a legal system which is based on the sort of adversarial legalism dominant in the US. He argues that the advent and development of the European Union (EU) have resulted in a shift away from more cooperative and inquisitorial legal systems based on flexible and relatively informal ways of regulation and towards what he calls Eurolegalism. The term denotes a greater focus on detailed judicially enforceable regulation which is backed up by public and private litigation to ensure enforcement. This paper considers the development of EU law over the last 60 years in order to examine the claim that EU law has been transformed into something which may be quite different from the legal system envisaged by those founding the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community all those years ago. Rather than focusing on a particular area of law, policy or regulation as other contributors will do, this paper considers three key themes in the development of EU law as a whole: 1. The respective powers given to institutions in law making. 2. The vital role of the European Court of Justice in enforcing and developing EU Law and 3. The impact EU law has had on the legal systems of Member States. By considering these three areas from a historical perspective and focusing on how things have changed over the last 60 years, we can begin to understand the extent to which EU law as a system has been transformed into a coherent legal system in accordance with the development of the EU, the single market project and a greater focus on social as well as economic aims; or whether EU law has simply evolved, reacting to events as they unfold without a rationale or purpose underpinning its development. Whether it is Kelemen's Eurolegalism or indeed something else which characterizes EU law and the EU legal system, understanding how we got to where we are is likely to help us understand where we might (want to) to in the future.

Martijn L.P. Groenleer "Shared Governance through Agencies of the European Union: between Institutional Continuity and Change"

The past decades have seen the creation of a variety of institutions for the implementation of EU policies and the coordination of regulatory decisions in the EU. One of the most notable developments in this regard has been the establishment of a series of independent agencies of the EU. Especially in recent years the EU and its member states have delegated increasingly far-reaching powers to a quickly growing number of agencies in a wide variety of policy sector, including the financial sector. This development raises at least three puzzles. First, why were these agencies created? How can we account for (variation in) their formal design features? Second, why do agencies, once created, develop the way they do? How can we account for (variation in) the actual behavior that they display? And, third, what are the consequences of agency creation, design and development in terms of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU? Recent research on EU agencies has focused on the creation, design and development of these agencies, studying both their de jure as well as their de facto autonomy and accountability. So far, the consequences of this form of 'shared' governance have hardly been studied, for the EU, member states, and European publics. As a result, we do not know to what extent the creation of independent of agencies of the EU leads to increased effectiveness of EU policymaking and enhanced legitimacy of its governance. Or, put more generally, should shared governance through EU agencies be seen as an instance of fundamental change or is it 'merely' an example of continuity? In order to fill this gap, this paper adopts an institutional approach, going beyond functional imperatives. It considers the creation, design and development of EU agencies as the outcome of a process of institutionalization. This process, it is argued, is driven by a combination of historical pressures, political considerations, and organizational dynamics, which in turn affects policy implementation and regulatory coordination in the EU. The paper is based on empirical research on the entire population of EU agencies and structured, focused comparison of a selected number of agencies in for instance the areas of pharmaceuticals and food safety regulation, and police and judicial cooperation. Data is collected through document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The paper will demonstrate that, even though the creation and design of agencies is highly dependent on the particular circumstances under which they were created, the development of agencies cannot simply be explained by path dependencies or institutional stickiness. The creation of EU agencies is the result of the actions of a wide range of actors, public as well as private, and at both the European and (sub-)national level. Hence, the ultimate design of agencies is often a political compromise. Moreover, once created, organizational dynamics such as the reputation for expertise that agencies acquire and the networks of support they develop have an important effect on their perceived effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. Furthermore, the paper will show that the agency phenomenon at the EU level should not be seen as a fundamental institutional change in relation to pre-existing institutional arrangements. Existing institutions are supplemented rather than supplanted. Yet, even as it does not signify a fundamental shift away from pre-existing institutions, the creation of agencies has added to the emergence of a European administrative space, through the intermingling of European and national administrations. The creation, design and development of EU agencies can thus better be seen as part of the periodical 'renegotiation' of the Union's institutional set-up, gradually altering its form and functions. As such, the agencification of Europe is a sign of the EU's constant evolution.

Neill Nugent "Fifty Years of Enlargement Policy"

Since the first application to join the European Community was made - by the UK in July 1961 - enlargement has featured as a highly prominent policy issue on the EC/EU agenda. There has virtually never been a time when EC/EU policy-makers have not been addressing enlargements issues of some kind. As such, enlargement is best viewed not as a series of discrete events but rather as an ongoing process. This paper focuses on two key questions concerning enlargement. First, why have EC/EU policy-makers chosen to keep enlarging their organisation? The answer to this question is not immediately clear, for on most counts the EC/EU has been a successful organisation yet most of the states that have been permitted to join it, especially in more recent years, have been, at the time of their accessions, much less successful and have brought with them costs and risks of various kinds to the EC/EU. Second, in what main ways has enlargement impacted on EU governance? In particular, have pre-enlargement concerns that more member states would result in less efficient policy-making been validated or have institutional and other adjustments succeeded in this situation being avoided?

Sharon Pardo "Decades of European Foreign Policy and Governance in the Middle East Conflict"

The study of the European Union's relations with the Middle East reflects what has been faced by the EU in gradually establishing the Union's position in external relations and its foreign policy mechanism. The Middle East conflict was on the agenda of the first meeting of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and has remained there ever since. The Union's behaviour vis-á-vis the Middle East conflict reflects to a large degree the conditions under which the EU developed its actorness. In light of this, the paper serves as an analysis of the EU as an international actor, as well as an analysis, of the Union's relations to the Middle East. The paper analyses the relationships between the EU and the Middle East from the early 1970s to the present day, and reflects on some of the most central issues and challenges facing the EU's Foreign and Security Policy and the Union's global governance.

Paul Stephenson "Sixty Years of Auditing Europe"

In May 2012 the European Parliament held a public hearing on the reform of the European Court of Auditors. In the current economic climate, sound public policy audit and the rigorous financial control of EU funds is more crucial than ever. There is considerable political pressure upon the EU institutions, member states and national parliaments to be more accountable to the European taxpayer regarding how their money is spent. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) is increasingly focusing its activities on performance audit rather than compliance audit, in order to assess value for money rather than legality and regularity. It is being asked to measure the effectiveness of expenditure and the efficiency of financial management. Despite recent internal reorganisation in the ECA, with the creation of vertical chambers, there is pressure for more far-reaching reform. Enlargement has made the Court slower and more complicated with crucial resources diverted away from audit. This official EU institution – largely overlooked in European political studies - continues to define its role in line with the Treaties. Paradoxically, while the ECA is entrusted with external audit functions, it cannot be granted competences to audit the new European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which is not financed by the EU budget. New external audit bodies are being created instead, complicating the institutional architecture for financial. The article provides a broad overview of the institutionalisation of financial control in the European Union over 60 years, right up to establishment of OLAF and more recent audit bodies created to oversee the effectiveness of the ESM. In so doing, it looks at how the EU's audit function has developed, by examining inter-institutional relations over time, and the development of good governance in terms of audit practice. It pays particular attention to the beginnings of European governance in the area of financial control, focusing on the work of the Audit Board in the first 20 years of integration. As such, by looking into the archives of the European Union (Florence), it traces the evolution of the Audit Board, which met on a regular basis in Brussels prior to the establishment of an independent audit institution in Luxembourg. It identifies the beginnings of institutional conflict where the Audit Board began to scrutinise the institutional - and a few years later, policy expenditure - of the Commission and Council. The development of audit functions over time is highly relevant to current debates on accountability. Member states should be accountable and yet refuse to sign national declarations of assurance. Yet at the domestic level, national parliaments should be liaising with national audit offices to perform audit effectively. It is arguably unreasonable to expect the EP to sign off EU budgetary expenditure of the member states are unwilling to be themselves accountable. As such, the ECA backs basic political support, and must carry out its audit function with limited audit capacity, especially since more of its own institutional resources have been directed to management, and the cabinet staff of its 27 members, rather than to hiring and training auditors. The pressures for reform indicate the need for further Treaty change.

Ingeborg Toemmel" Governance in the EU: Flexible Modes of Steering Through Stable Institutions"

During the last decade, governance processes in the EU as well as the underlying institutional structures have drawn much scholarly attention. Particularly a lively debate has emerged on new modes of governance, roughly defined as non-hierarchical means of political steering. Such modes of governance are assumed to rely on voluntary cooperation or negotiations between a multitude of actors from both the public and the private or non-governmental sphere. The general idea is that a-hierarchical modes of governance emerged only recently, in particular in those policy areas where the Union lacks clearly defined competences to steer through legislation or other hierarchical means. Against this background, this paper posits that a-hierarchical modes of governance have accompanied European policy making from its inception. However, there have been changes over the years. First, actual modes of governance are much more differentiated than in the early years of integration, and we find more complex forms of governance and more complex combinations of governance modes. Second, EU governance is increasingly embedded into corresponding institutionalized procedures of decision-making and also into firmly organized institutions. Such processes of institution-building refer to both horizontal cooperation among the member states and vertical cooperation among government levels. The central thesis of this paper is that forms of institutionalized cooperation do not primarily emerge because of a lack of competences - although this plays a certain role, particularly in highly contested policy areas - but reflect the need to conciliate in every policy area the positions of the EU as a whole with those of the individual member states. The paper proceeds as follows. First, it gives a brief overview on the emergence and consolidation of European modes of governance, together with the unfolding of European policy-making. Second, it highlights the institutionalization of specific procedures of decision-making and corresponding organizational structures in the horizontal and vertical dimension of the EU. Two policy areas, cohesion policy and competition policy, serve as case studies. These policy areas, even though based on clearly defined competences of the European level, have increasingly incorporated non-hierarchical modes of governance and consolidated corresponding institutional structures. Third, the paper discusses these developments in the framework of a neo-institutionalist approach. It concludes that European governance and its specific characteristics ultimately emanate from the dependence of the political system of the EU on consensus-building among all actors and institutions involved in policy-making.

Maurits van der Veen "Fifty Years of Public (Dis-)satisfaction with European Governance"

The vast literature on public satisfaction with the European Union has demonstrated conclusively that economic interests as well as cultural or ideational factors have an important impact on support for the EU. Surprisingly, however, two crucial, and related, issues have remained largely unaddressed in this literature. First, the EU is generally treated as a single, unchanging, fairly abstract organization. Second, the stated preferences of respondents for EU-level governance are not usually taken into account as possible explanations of satisfaction or support. This paper aims to address both shortcomings. The European Union of 2012 is a vastly different institution from the EU of 1992, the EC of 1972, or the EEC of 1962: both its membership and its policy-making scope and authority have dramatically expanded. Indeed, a common complaint among British Euroskeptic groups is that today's EU barely resembles the much more limited Common Market they signed up for in the early 1970s. More generally, there is nothing inconsistent about the same respondent strongly disliking the EU today, but, when asked about the EU a generation ago, having expressed strong support. Nor, it is crucial to note, is the opposite (liking the EU today, disliking it a generation ago) irrational: after all, a person may value the EU solely for its contribution to harmonizing educational standards (for example), something it has only become seriously involved in over the past decade or two. Accordingly, the present paper takes a closer look at patterns in support for European integration over time. Surveys of EU citizens dating back as far as 1962 have inquired into their support for particular policy initiatives at the European level. By comparing this support to actual EU-level policy activity, we can shed light on both of the lacunae in the literature identified above. Specifically, I investigate whether general satisfaction with or support for European integration is driven by the degree to which a respondent's preferences for EU-level action match actual EU-level policy authority and activity at a particular point in time. In addition, fifty years of survey results also allow me to examine whether this relationship has strengthened or weakened over time. Finally, I will test whether the relationship is different in countries that have been participants in the European integration project since the beginning than it is in those that have joined more recently. The results will shed valuable light on factors that have contributed to the rise of Euroskepticism over the past two decades and, more generally, on the changing nature of Europeans' perceptions of European governance over time.

Conference registration / directions

All are welcome. The format of the conference is that everyone reads the papers in advance. The first discussant spends about five minutes summarizing the paper's main arguments and posing one or two questions. The second discussant spends the next five or so minutes offering suggestions and also posing questions. The author responds for at most five minutes, leaving fifteen minutes for general discussion. We stop promptly after thirty minutes and move on to the next paper.

To register, please contact euce@yorku.ca

Directions:

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venue: York Hall room 317 (Senior Common Room)