Classics in the History of Psychology

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Christopher D. Green
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DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

JAMES MARK BALDWIN (1901)

Definitions Coo - Cz

Posted April 2000


Co-operation (in economics) [Lat. co + operari, to work]: Ger. Genossenschafts wesen; Fr. coopération; Ital. cooperazione (1) Profit-sharing: a system under which the labourer receives a dividend from profits, in addition to his wages, in case business results warrant it.

(2) Management of industry by the labourers themselves -- producers' co-operation.

(3) Management of industry by those who expect to use its product -- consumers' co-operation; frequently, but inaccurately, known as distributive co-operation.

(1) Conforms to popular usage, but is hardly countenanced by the best authorities at the present day; (2) is relatively unimportant. The advantages gained in the way of zeal rarely offset the loss in speculative foresight. (3) Seems by far the most promising in the way of future development. If the co-operators are really producing for themselves, they eliminate the speculative element altogether; so that the loss of foresight felt under (2) hardly counts in (3). Producing for themselves, they can educate themselves to use those things whose utility is great in proportion to their cost; and can subject themselves to rules which conserve the public interest, but which the consumers would not tolerate if imposed by any other authority than their own. It is this educational possibility which has most contributed to the success of co-operative banks, co-operative purchasing agencies, and other forms of successful consumers' enterprise. (A.T.H.)


Co-operation (social): Ger. Kooperation; Fr. coopération; Ital. cooperazione. Any grouping of individuals which is psychologically determined in the mind of each.

Social co-operation is characterized by what Ward calls 'inter-subjective intercourse'; it rests upon any sort of internal bond which is psychical -- from mere herding from instinct, or collecting guided by smell or touch, up to deliberate pursuit of common social ends. The term is suggested for the broad meaning indicated as somewhat current under the term ASSOCIATION (social), when the emphasis is laid on the psychological bond which holds the group in question together. As psychologically determined it is contrasted with AGGREGATION (q.v.), which characterizes groups considered as sociologically and biologically determined. The method of psychological determination is conveniently discussed under the headings: (1) 'instinctive co-operation,' giving the COMPANY (q.v.); (2) 'spontaneous or imitative co-operation, giving the CROWD (q.v.); and (3) 'intelligent or reflective co-operation,' giving the SOCIETY (q.v.).

Literature: see the terms referred to. (J.M.B.)


Co-ordinates: see CURVE.


Co-ordination (in logic) [Lat. co- + ordo, order]: Ger. Coordination; Fr. coordination; Ital. coordinazione. The relation between two notions which are contained within the sphere of a third notion, and are distinguished therefrom by difference in respect to one and the same feature, mark, or group of marks. The relation is that between constituent species of one and the same genus. (R.A.)


Co-ordination (of studies). The arrangement of studies as mutually related in their parts, yet essentially independent as branches of knowledge.

By concentration some studies are subordinated to others; by co-ordination they are put in relation to one another. It does not, however, forbid a grouping of subjects in accordance with their nature. Thus, the school studies may be grouped into humanistic, scientific, and economic. Cf. CORRELATION, and CONCENTRATION.

Literature: HARRIS, Five Co-ordinate Groups of Studies in Schools, Educ. Rev. (April, 1896). (C.DE.G.)


Cope, Edward Drinker. (1840-97.) An eminent American naturalist; educated in the University of Pennsylvania and in Europe. Professor of natural science in Haverford College, 1864-7. He entered the employ of the Geological Survey of Ohio in 1868, and conducted an expedition into Kansas in 1891. In 1872-3, he served in the field in Wyoming and Colorado, and in 1879 entered the employ of the U.S. Geological Survey. He became professor of geology and paleontology in the University of Pennsylvania in 1891. He was the leader of the Neo-Lamarckian school of biologists in America.


Copernican Theory (after Copernicus): Ger. Copernicanische Lehre; Fr. théorie de Copernic; Ital. teoria di Copernico. The theory that the apparent diurnal revolution of the heavenly bodies is due to a rotation of the earth, and that the apparent motion of the planets around circles on the celestial sphere is an actual motion round the sun, in which the earth itself participates. The two last propositions lead to the term 'heliocentric theory.'

So much of the theory as asserts the rotation of the earth was propounded by some of the ancients, as we know from Ptolemy's Almagest, but its attempted refutation by Ptolemy led to its being ignored by astronomers before Copernicus. It is alleged that the heliocentric theory was taught by Pythagoras, but on very vague evidence. (S.N.)

Ekphantos the Pythagorean taught the rotation of the earth on its axis, and Aristarchus of Samos, called the 'Copernicus of the ancient world,' taught the heliocentric theory (see Gomperz, Die griechischen Denker, i. 98 f.). (K.G.)


Copernicus (or Polish Kopernigk), Nicholas. (1493-1543.) A celebrated astronomer, born in Thorn, Poland, after whom the COPERNICAN THEORY (q.v.) is named.


Coprolalia [Gr. koproV, filth, + lalia, speech]: Ger. Koprolalie; Fr. coprolalie; Ital. coprolalia. The involuntary, and perhaps unconscious, use of obscene words, occurring as a symptom of mental disorder in hysteria and other diseases; it seems to be of the nature of a spasm or tic. Cf. HYSTERIA. (J.J.)


Copula [Lat.]: Ger. Copula; Fr. copule; Ital. copula. The term whereby the fundamental relation of assertion, as affirmation or negation, is expressed.

In the categorical proposition, the simplest form of assertion, the unit of judgment, this expression is given through the verbs is and is not, which are therefore defined as the copula, and viewed as connecting the subject and predicate terms. It is only for the convenience of technical analysis that the verbs is and is not are employed exclusively as copula, and, apart from the ambiguity attaching to the verb to be, an ambiguity of which Aristotle shows himself fully aware, the method of technical treatment tends to obscure the real nature of the thought expressed in a judgment or proposition.

The name copula, in its accepted sense, Prantl (Gesch. d. Logik, ii. 196) finds first in Abelard, though with traces of earlier usage. From Psellus and Petrus Hispanus, the name passed into the technical vocabulary of logic (Prantl, ibid., iii. 42).

Literature: recent discussions regarding its true function will be found in HAMILTON, Lects. on Logic, lect. xiv; SIGWART, Logik, § 17; LOTZE, Logik, §§ 50-5; B. ERDMANN, Logik, §§ 201, 250. See also the heading Judgment in the textbooks of psychology. (R.A.)


Copy [ME. copy]: Ger. (1, 2) Copie, Muster, (2) Exemplar; Fr. (1, 2) copie, (2) exemplaire; Ital. copia. (1) Anything imitated or liable to imitation, whether intentionally set for imitation or not. (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)

(2) Something made by imitation of something else; as a verb, to imitate.

(1) As in the expressions 'copy for imitation,' 'printer's copy,' 'copy-book,' &c. The ambiguity arising from the two usages makes it desirable to use (1) altogether as the proper psychological term in all discussions of the imitative functions, model being reserved for a copy which is consciously set or held up for imitation. Under usage (2) we have the further turn that the word sometimes means a sample or specimen, as a 'copy' of a book. This, however, need not be reflected in psychological terminology. To secure clearness, the phrases 'copy-made' and 'copy-result' are recommended when the result of imitation is intended. The phrase 'the original' is often used (in Eng., Ger., and Fr.) for what is imitated when a direct comparison is made with the imitative result. See IMITATION (also for Literature), and MODEL. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)


Cornu [Lat.]: Ger. Horn; Fr. corne; Ital. corno (pl. corna). A purely descriptive term, indicating the horn-like form of an organ or cavity; especially applied to the cornua of the lateral ventricles, the cornua of the grey matter in the spinal cord, and the protuberant curved portion of the hippocampus or cornu Ammonis. (H.H.)


Cornutus, L. Annaeus. Stoic philosopher of Septis, Africa, who lived in Rome under Nero; the teacher and friend of Persius, whose Satires he edited. Banished by Nero. A manual entitled De Natura Deorum is his only extant work.


Corollary [Lat. corollarium, from corolla, a little crown]: Ger. Corollar, Corollarium (math.); Fr. corollaire; Ital. corollario. A proposition, relatively of less scope or importance, seen to follow from, or to be implied in, a more extensively or important assertion which has already been established. (R.A.)


Corporation [Lat. corpus, through Fr.]: Ger. Körperschaft, Corporation; Fr. corporation, communauté, société anonyme; Ital. corporazione. An artificial person generally composed of an association of several natural persons, under a descriptive name, for certain particular purposes, who have or claim legal authority so to associate. It is its legal status as an artificial person which distinguishes it from an unincorporated association.

A public corporation is one formed for public purposes; a private corporation is one formed wholly or partly for private purposes.

Every independent sovereignty is a public corporation, and so is every corporation formed by its authority out of part of its citizens or subjects, or for part of its territory, for governmental purposes, e.g. a country, city, borough, town.

A private corporation may be formed partly for public purposes, e.g. a railroad company, a water company, a national bank. It may be formed by the association of public officers, e.g. an eleemosynary corporation, composed of the mayor, recorder, and other officers of a city, ex officio, to administer a charity.

The state grants authority for corporate associations, either by special charters or by the enactment of general laws, under which incorporation may be had by any who desire it, under specified conditions, and upon signing and filing certain papers for record.

Public corporations may exist independently of any agreement of association. They are agencies of governmental administration, and may be created and changed from time to time at the sole pleasure of the state, without the consent of the persons composing them.

Private corporations can only be formed by a voluntary agreement to associate. The state simply sanctions this agreement. It may, however, grant this sanction, or confer the corporate franchise, on such terms as it sees fit to impose. The acceptance of the franchise is an assent to its terms.

The state has also a certain control over private corporations, after their incorporation, by virtue of its general powers of government, to which all within its jurisdiction are subject. It cannot make any radical or fundamental change in the terms of the charter or nature of the franchise, without the consent of each of the individual corporators, for each can say: Non haec in foedera veni.

A corporation continues in an unbroken course of existence, notwithstanding the death of all its members, unless the charter be such as to make such continuance legally impossible. If a moneyed corporation, not of a charitable or public kind, the members have a property right in its assets, which each can transfer to another person at will, unless the charter otherwise provides.

A corporation can hold any property, real or personal, necessary for its corporate purposes, unless there are restrictions against this in the charter or general laws. Such restrictions are common, particularly as to real estate (by mortmain laws).

A corporation cannot legally act outside of the purposes of its incorporation: but, practically, it often may, and does.

A corporation de iure is one organized under and according to law.

A corporation de facto is one organized under a law, but not according to law; or organized without any legal authority, but under a claim of such authority, and during the existence of a law under which a similar kind of organization might have been effected.

The corporations above described are 'corporations aggregate,' being composed of several persons. A 'corporation sole' is one composed of a single person, e.g. the bishop of an English diocese.

Every corporation has a right to a common seal, but may exist without one.

A quasi-corporation in an association recognized by law as an artificial person, capable of suing and being sued as such, but not having the full powers ordinarily incident to corporations.

'Neque societas, neque collegium, neque huiusmedi corpus passim omnibus habere conceditur; nam et legibus et senatus consultis et principalibus constitutionibus ea res coercetur' (Dig., iii. 4, quod cuiuscumque universitatis nomine vel contra eam agatur, 1). (S.E.B.)

Literature: THOMPSON, Commentaries on the Law of Private Corporations (1895), chaps. i, ii, iii; DILLON, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations, chaps. i, ii; KYD, on Corporations, Introd.; TAYLOR, Private Corporations (1894), chaps. i, ii, iii; S. E. BALDWIN, Mod. Polit. Instit. (1898), chap. vi; MOMMSEN, De Collegiis et Sodaliciis Romanorum (1843).


Corporeal [Lat. corpus, body]. Pertaining to the BODY (q.v.). (J.M.B.)


Corpus [Lat.]: Ger. Körper; Fr. corps; Ital. corpo. Body or organ.

Used in combination in many anatomical terms (e.g. corpus callosum). See BRAIN (Glossary). Most American and many European neurologists drop the substantive in many such cases, and write e.g. callosum. Where various nouns are compounded with the same descriptive adjective (e.g. corpus fornicis as contrasted with crus fornicis), corpus must be retained; but it should never be applied to replace 'nucleus' for an histological aggregate, as it properly refers to a part anatomically discrete. (H.H.)


Corpus (in law): foreign equivalents the same. (1) The whole body of a certain thing, e.g. the corpus of the water in a lake, as distinguished from (a right to use) the power supplied by the outflow.

(2) The main body of a certain thing, as the corpus of the estate of an insolvent debtor. Corpus delicti; the body of, or most essential fact in, a crime, e.g. the slaying, upon a prosecution for murder. Corpus iuris: the Corpus Iuris Civilis. Cf. CODE. (S.E.B.)


Corpuscle [Lat. corpusculum, dim. of corpus, body]: Ger. Körperchen; Fr. corpuscule; Ital. corpuscolo. (1) A term applied to small units of structure in the body, often equivalent to CELL (q.v.). 'The cells, or bone corpuscules, are branched corpuscules' (Landois). See BLOOD, and LYMPH.

(2) Compound structures, the end-organs of certain sensory nerves. These are small oval or spherical bodies composed of connective tissue, in which end one or more nerve-fibres. Corpuscles of Vater and Pacini; touch, or tactile, or palpation corpuscles; corpuscles of Meissner, Krause, and Wagner. See SENSE ORGANS, and SKIN. (C.F.H.)


Correlation (in biology) [Lat. co- + relatus, related]: Ger. Correlation; Fr. corrélation; Ital. correlazione. (1) Physiological Correlation. The union of special organs and functions in a larger general function, e.g. the correlation of many functions with digestion, the rôle of internal secretions in many organic processes, &c. See Geoffroy-Saint-Hilaire, 'Balance des Organes,' Des Anomalies de l'Organisation.

(2) Developmental correlation. The development of organs and functions together for the accomplishment of a function which depends upon the union of them all, e.g. the development of the secondary sexual characters, with the mental changes of adolescence, &c. See Clouston, Neuroses of Development.

(3) Correlation of characters. The appearance of characters by variation, or growth, in vital connection with one another.

This form of correlation has separate statement in evolution theory, on account of the somewhat artificial conception of a character as something relatively independent in the organism, and so liable to separate variation and growth. So the need arises of accounting for the correlation or union of such characters. One of the most strongly urged objections to natural selection as a general law of evolution is that it requires simultaneous variation of many characters, in such a way that they support and further one another.

The difficulty is largely removed when we note that correlation, or functional and anatomical union, is the law, not the exception, and a character is a relative term; the character of any particular observation being an abstraction made for purposes of classification, statistics, or logic. See CO-ADAPTATION, and VARIATION. That is, characters do not vary as units separately. (J.M.B.)

Literature: see the analysis of literature under Correlation, by GLEY, in Année Biol., i. 13, and later vols. Also DELAGE, Structure du Protoplasma, in loc.; DARWIN, Origin of Species; K. PEARSON, Chances of Death, chaps. i, iii; and Math. Contrib. to the Theory of Evolution, in Proc. Roy. Soc. (1894 ff.); W.F.R. WELDON, Certain Correlated Variations in Crangon vulgaris, Proc. Roy. Soc., v. 51 (1892); On Certain Correlated Variations in Carcinus maenas, ibid. 54 (1893); F. GALTON, Co-relations and their Measurement, ibid. 45 (1888); ROMANES, Darwin and after Darwin, Pt. II; references under VARIATION. (J.M.B.- E.S.G.)


Correlation (in psychology). (1) The act of APPERCEPTION (q.v.) considered as resulting in the formation of explicit relationships among the parts of a mental whole.

(2) A law generalizing the special laws of ASSOCIATION (q.v.) in the statement that any relation between elements of content suffices to associate them in future experience.

It was used by McCosh (Cognitive Powers) to denote the more essential and necessary relationships, such as cause, logical ground, &c., in opposition to coexistence, contrast, &c., which are usually emphasized as acting in association. It proceeds upon an earlier act of correlation in sense (1). Cf. Baldwin, Senses and Intellect, 201. (J.M.B.)


Correlation (of studies). Primarily, the arrangement of studies and topics in accordance with their reciprocal relations; secondarily, the natural static relations that exist among the various branches of knowledge.

The correlation of topics in a given study naturally depends upon two things: (1) their relation to each other as component parts of a subject of instruction, as in mathematics; and (2) their relation to topics of other related subjects, as in geography and history. The sequence of topics in a given study. Cf. CONCENTRATION, and CO-ORDINATION.

Literature: HARRIS, Report of the Committee of Fifteen, Proc. of the Natnl. (U.S.) Educ. Assoc. for 1895, 87, 309, 343, 347, 349, 714; First Year-Book of the Herbart Society; McMURRY, Gen. Meth., 69-89; DE GARMO, Herbart and the Herbartians. (C.DE.G.)


Correspondence (in mathematics): see NUMBER.


Corresponding Points: Ger. correspondirende Punkte; Fr. points correspondants; Ital. punti corrispondenti. Corresponding points are retinal points whose impressions unite in the great majority of cases to give a single spatially undifferentiated perception, and which therefore normally give single vision.

According to Helmholtz (Physiol. Optik, 2nd ed., 844), corresponding points (or Deckpunkte) are the points of the two fields of vision which appear to occupy the same position relatively to the point of fixation, and therefore coincide in the common visual field (Wundt's CONGRUENT POINTS, q.v.). Points which do not correspond he calls disparate points, following Fechner, who distinguishes further between homogeneous and heterogeneous correspondents, according as the impressions are alike or different in character.

Literature: WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), ii. 173; FECHNER, Abhandl. d. kgl. sächs. Gesell, d. Wiss., vii. (1860), 340; HERING, Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., III. i. 351 (1879); HELMHOLTZ, as cited. (E.B.T.)


Cosmogony [Gr. kosmoV, the world, + gonh, generation]: Ger. Kosmogonie; Fr. cosmogonie; Ital. cosmogonia. A theory, or, as is more usual, a pictorial account of the genesis of the world (and often of living beings). Cf. CREATION, COSMOS, THEOGONY, and NATURE (philosophy of).

Among the most primitive civilizations known, nothing in the nature of a real cosmogony can be traced; and even when the scale of civilization rises a little higher, the myths are so simple and naïve that they can hardly be dignified with the name. But the great races of mankind -- the Semites, Egyptians, and Aryans -- all originated cosmogonies properly so called.

Literature: TYLOR, Early Hist. of Mankind; WAITZ and GERLAND, Anthropol. d. Naturvölker; GREY, Polynesian Mythol.; GILL, Myths and Songs of the South Pacific; BRINTON, Myths of the New World; BANCROFT, Native Races of North America; BASTIAN, Geographische Bilder; BAUDISSIN, Stud. z. semit. Religionsgeschichte; JENSEN, Die Kosmologie d. Babylonier; BUDGE, Egyptian Book of the Dead; WIEDEMANN, Religion of the Ancient Egyptians (Eng. trans.); BRUGSCH, Religion u. Mythol. d. alten Aegypter; SPIEGEL, Avesta; DARMSTETER, Ormazd et Ahriman; MUIR, Ancient Sanskrit Texts, iv; MAX MÜLLER, Ancient Sanskrit Literature; Sacred Books of the East; KRAUSE, Tuisko-Land, d. arischen Stämme u. Götter Urheimat; SHIVA SAMHITA, Esoteric Sci. and Philos. of Tantras; DEUSSEN, Allg. Gesch. d. Philos., I. i. Abth.; OLDENBERG, Die Religion d. Vedas; COX, Aryan Mythol.; WINDISCHMANN, Ursagen d. arischen Völker; POTT, Vedic and Orphic Cosmic Egg. in Kühn's Zeitsch. f. vergleichende Sprachforschung; v. BRADKE, in Zeitsch. d. Deutsch. Morgenländischen Gesell., xl. 347. (R.M.W.)


Cosmological Argument: see THEISM.


Cosmology: see COSMOS, NATURE (philosophy of), and METAPHYSICS.


Cosmos [Gr. kosmoV, world]. Used also in the other languages, as well as the equivalents for WORLD (q.v.). The universe conceived as an orderly system.

It is opposed in this sense to chaos, a mythological or hypothetical state of complete disorder, absolute lawlessness, or pure chance, against which the order and rationality which actually characterize the universe are thrown into relief. Frequently the term is used simply to denote the universe or the all of existence -- always, however, with the implication of order or system in the background (as in A. Humboldt's cosmos); at other times it is used predicatively to assert expressly the fact of orderliness. Thus the scientific belief in the uniformity of nature might be described as a faith that we are living in a cosmos, not a chaos. The term is also used occasionally in a more limited reference to emphasize the presence of order or system in some particular department of experience. Thus we find writers speaking of 'the ethical cosmos' or 'the cosmos of ethical experience.'

The term kosmoV originally means order, and according to tradition was first applied to 'the word' by Pythagoras, whose mathematical and musical studies impressed upon him the idea of order and regularity in natural phenomena. The term is used by Heraclitus also in the sense of the world order. Later, it took the place of the earlier term onranoV to signify the 'world'; but even in Xenophon's time it was not in current use in this sense, for Xenophon speaks (Memorabilia, I. i. II) of 'what the sophists call the Cosmos.' KosmoV was used, moreover, it must be observed, as onranoV had also been, not for the universe in the modern sense -- to pan, the All -- but for the visible system of the earth and the heavens, the latter being generally regarded as a spherical enclosing envelope. There is also, as in the earlier term, more prominent reference to the phenomena of the heavens than to the earth. Anaximander speaks of apeiroi onranoi, and later writers speak similarly of innumerable kosmoi or world-systems. See MUNDUS. (A.S.P.P.)


Cosmothetic Idealism. A term suggested by Sir William Hamilton, who contrasted it, as Representationism, with Presentationism or Natural Realism. See IDEALISM. (J.M.B.)


Cost [ME. cost]: Ger. Kosten; Fr. frais de production; Ital. costo. The amount of wealth rendered unavailable in any economic process, or group of processes.

(1) If we measure wealth as property, cost will take the form of expense.

(2) If we measure wealth as accumulated resources, cost will take the form of waste.

(3) If we measure wealth as utility, or source of pleasure, cost will take the form of disutility -- pain.

The physiocrats adopted a sense of cost analogous to (2): the cost of an article was measured by the amount of food embodied in its production. Smith distinguished (1) and (3): the former he called money cost or price; the latter, real cost or price. Malthus and Ricardo fell back on the Aristotelian conception of quantities of labour as the only measure of cost -- a crude use of the third conception under forms borrowed from (1). Marx took Ricardo's conception, and showed the contradictions in which careless use of terms had involved the orthodox economists, but was not equally successful in establishing better forms for himself. Jevons, in this as in many other points, laid the foundations of more philosophic treatment; and the theory of pain-cost which he outlined has been superbly developed by Marshall. But pain-cost alone gives a somewhat incomplete explanation of price; and some writers (Patten), following out a half-forgotten conception of Ricardo, supplement it by a study of a fourth sense of cost in the form of lapse of opportunity. In recent years there has been a tendency in several quarters to go back to the sense of waste as the fundamental meaning of cost. The analysis based on this meaning seems to furnish a solution of several problems where old methods failed (compare the treatment of Wages in Hadley's Economics). On Prime Cost, Supplementary Cost, see Marshall, Princ. of Econ., Bk. V. chap. iv. The old distinction between cost of production and cost of reproduction has lost its importance under modern analysis. (A.T.H.)


Counter-irritation: Ger. Gegenreizung; Fr. contre-stimulus or contre-irritation; Ital. contro-stimolo. A stimulation, irritation, or congestion, produced artificially in order to relieve inflammation in another part. See IRRITATION. (C.F.H.)


Couple [Lat. copula, a band, a bond]: Ger. Kräftepaar; Fr. couple; Ital. coppia. A force or resultant which tends to make a body rotate, without giving it any movement of translation. A couple may always be represented by a pair of equal and parallel forces, F and G, acting in opposite directions. The moment of the couple is the product of either force into the perpendicular distance, FG, between the lines of action. The axis of a couple is any line perpendicular to the plane containing the forces; it is therefore only a direction in space.

The value of this conception arises from the theorem that, in their action on a rigid body, all couples, having the same moment and the same direction of axis, are equivalent. For example, the couple F' G' will produce the same effects as F G, if F' x F' G' = F x F G. Hence, to define a couple, we need specify only its moment, and the direction of its axis.

Introduced into mechanics by Poinsot shortly after the middle of the first half of the century. (S.N.)


Courage [OF. corage, from Lat. cor, heart]: Ger. Muth; Fr. courage; Ital. coraggio. The habit of voluntary activity (or virtue) which is shown both in the control of pain and of the fear of pain, and in the due exercise and regulation of the active and combative impulses.

In the latter terms courage is defined by Plato in the Republic, while the former and more fundamental aspect is brought out by Aristotle. Aristotle treats courage as a MEAN (q.v.) or moderate state in respect of the feelings of fear and confidence, and distinguishes it from a double system of extreme states: excess of fear and defect of confidence, which constitute cowardice; and excess of confidence, which is rashness, and defect of fear (an unnamed quality).

Like all the personal virtues, courage is built upon an impulsive and organic basis; and in courage the impulsive basis is more obvious than in the case of the other virtues. Yet it is not entirely a matter of inherited constitution; and the courage of deliberate purpose, which is a moral virtue, may be distinguished from the courage of physical constitution, which is an inherited quality. Further, a distinction may be drawn between the passive courage which endures pain (the fortitudo of mediaeval ethics), and the active courage which prompts to enterprise in spite of danger.

What is popularly called 'moral courage' does not indicate a more moral, or more voluntary, quality than courage generally; it applies to the control of the fear of social evils (disgrace or ridicule from those who determine the opinion of the community), whereas the ordinary application of courage is to the control of the fear of physical evils.

Literature: PLATO, Laches, and Republic, iv; ARISTOTLE, Ethics, iii; SIDGWICK, Meth. of Eth., III. x; GREEN, Proleg. to Eth., iv. (W.R.S.)


Court (in law) [Fr. cour]: Ger. Gerichtshof; Fr. cour; Ital. corte. A tribunal for the administration of remedial justice, having, or acting under a claim of having, legal authority for its proceedings. If it have such authority, it is a de iure court; otherwise a de facto one.

Phrases. Civil court: (1) an ordinary court, as distinguished from a military, naval, martial, or ecclesiastical court; (2) a court having cognizance of civil actions, as distinguished from one having cognizance of criminal prosecutions, i.e. a criminal court. Military court: one having cognizance of offences by those in naval service. Naval court: one having cognizance of offences by those in naval service. Court martial: (1) a court organized during war, in a place that is the seat of war, to dispense justice by martial law; (2) a military or naval court. Day in court: due opportunity to be heard in one's defence before an adverse judgment is pronounced in court. The court is often used to describe the judge as distinguished from the jury. (S.E.B.)


Cousin, Victor. (1792-1867.) French philosopher. He received a philosophic impulse under the tutelage of Laromiguière, Royer-Collard, and Maine de Biran. In 1815 he began to lecture in the Sorbonne, Paris, continuing the teaching of Scottish philosophy. He was an important factor in the reaction against Condillac and other sensualistic thinkers of the 18th century. In 1820 he was suspended for political reasons, and in 1827 again replaced in his chair. Cf. ECLECTICISM.


Covenants (doctrine of) [Lat. con- + venire, to come]: Ger. Bundestheologie; Fr. doctrine des alliances; Ital. teoria dell' alleanza (di grazia, &c.). Another name for the 'Federal Theology' of Cocceius (1603-69), professor at Leyden.

In contrast to the Scholastics, whose methods had been adopted by many of the Reformers (e.g. Calvin), Cocceius appealed to the Bible. The Bible is the history of the 'covenant of grace' made by God with man. This in contrast to the 'covenant of works' which subsisted before the Fall. According to the 'covenant of works,' God promised man everlasting felicity, on condition of obedience during the life on earth. According to the 'covenant of grace,' man needed to receive again what he had lost by the Fall, in order to be able to render obedience; and this fresh gift, due to the grace of God, has been transmitted by the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.

Literature: FISHER, Hist. of Christ. Doctrine, 347 f.; DORNER, Hist. of Protestant Theol., ii. 31 f. (Eng. trans.); WEISSMANN, Introd. in Memorabilia Eccl. Hist Sacrae, ii. 698 f., 1103 f.; OWEN, The Doctrine of Justification; A. A. HODGE, Outlines of Theol., chap. xxi; C. HODGE, System. Theol., ii. 192 f.; KRAETZSCHMAR, Die Bundesvorstellung im Alt. Test.; T. M. LINDSAY, in Brit. and For. Evang. Rev. (1879). (R.M.W.)


Coyness [ME. coy, quiet, secret]: Ger. Scheu, Sprödigkeit (sexual); Fr. coquetterie; Ital. civetteria (sexual). The form of shyness, with its bodily reaction, due to consciousness of the presence of the other sex. Cf. SHYNESS, BASHFULNESS, SHAME, and MODESTY.

On the mental side coyness includes the form of so-called 'self-consciousness,' which is stimulated by the other sex; 'coquetry' and 'flirtation' when these are not deliberate; 'showing-off' or SELF-EXHIBITION (q.v.), and 'make-believe.' On the physical side, it involves attitudes of 'courting,' e.g. play, self-exhibition, advance and retreat, with the characteristic organic changes. The term 'self-consciousness,' when employed for coyness, is very inexact and confusing, and should be discontinued. The difference between coyness and modesty (when the latter relates to sex) is that the former does not involve reflective self-consciousness, while the latter does.

Literature: titles given under SHYNESS, especially GROOS, Die Spiele d. Thiere (Eng. trans.). (J.M.B.)


Craniology and Craniometry [Craniology: Ger. kranion, skull, + logoV, discourse. Craniometry: kranion + metron, measure]: Ger. Craniologie, Craniometrie; Fr. craniologie, craniométrie; Ital. craniologia, craniometria. In its most general sense craniology designates the accumulated systematic knowledge of the skull; thus including the anatomical, morphological, and pathological aspects, as well as the comparative study of the skull in different animals. The term, however, is apt to be used in reference to the study of the human cranium, with special regard to the ethnological conclusions as to race and origin which such study may yield.

The term seems to have originated with Gall's phrenological correlations; was established in the ethnological sense mainly by the efforts of Broca, and under recent developments has assumed a somewhat broader, as well as more scientific, character. The most practical subdivision of the topic seems to be that adopted by Török, who refers to cranioscopy the description of the anatomical and morphological characteristics of the skull (general form, position of distinctive points, shape of bones, sutures, &c.), and to craniometry the geometrical characteristics capable of precise measurement. Craniography refers to the study of the skull by means of charts, photographs, and projections, which in turn yield craniometric details not readily obtainable on the skull itself. The systematic and explanatory exposition of all such results belongs to craniology. The descriptions and measurements of cranial characteristics have been developed with great detail and precision, although a much-desired consensus of method of taking such measurements has not as yet been reached. Among the scores, if not hundreds, of such characteristics which have been proposed as significant for ethnological distinctions, the four most important are the maximum length and the maximum breadth of the skull (the relation of which leads to one INDEX, q.v., of several), the facial angle, and the cranial capacity (see CAPACITY, cranial) or cubic contents of the skull. In all these respects there are minor differences of measurement which prevent a general description from being precisely accurate. See also DIAMETER, and FACIAL ANGLE.

Many important measurements may also be made on the living head (Cephalometry). Instruments for cranial measurements are termed Craniometers; those for the head, Cephalometers.

As a partial guide to the points and proportions of the cranium, of importance in craniometry, the above illustration may be consulted.

With reference to the points fixed in the figure certain lines are drawn, which in turn give rise to diameters, angles, and indices. The various facial angles, and the lines determining them, are given under the topic FACIAL ANGLE (q.v.); and the other chief diameters are noted under DIAMETER.

Literature: TOPINARD, Anthropology, 31-51, 227-97; art. Craniologie, in Dict. des Sci. Anthropol.; BROCA, Mém. d'Anthropol., 5 vols.; and particularly, Instructions Craniologiques (1875); TÖRÖK, Reform d. Kraniologie, Int. Monatsch. f. Anat. u. Physiol., xi. 297, 360. (J.J.)

Also RIEGER, Eine exakte Methode der Kraniographie (1885); TÖRÖK, Ueber ein Universalkraniometer (1888); LOMBROSO, art. Cranio, in Encic. med. Italiana; E. SCHMIDT, Anthropol. Meth.; MORSELLI, Semej. malat. ment. (1st and 2nd ed., 1898); Année Psychol., v (1899): Historique des Recherches sur la Céphalométrie; MANOUVRIER, Aperçu de Céphalométrie; anthropologique. (S.E.- L.M.- E.M.)


Crantor. A Greek academic philosopher, who lived about 300 B.C., and wrote a treatise on Affliction.


Crates of Thebes. A Greek cynic, a disciple of Diogenes of Athens, who lived in the 4th century B.C.


Cratylus. A Greek philosopher, who lived in the 5th century B.C. He was one of Plato's teachers. He maintained the doctrines of Heraclitus.


Crazy [Fr. écraser, to crush]: Ger. verrückt; Fr. fou; Ital. matto, folle. A popular term meaning insane, or of unsound mind. It is especially characteristic of a chronic broken-down or demented condition. (J.J.)


Creation (in biology): see SPECIAL CREATION THEORY.


Creation (in theology) [Sansk. kri, to make; Lat. creare, to bring forth]: Ger. Schöpfung; Fr. création; Ital. creazione. The genesis of the world, and the things therein, by a divine act. The conceptions by which it is characterized are less pictorial than those of COSMOGONY (q.v.), proceeding, as they usually do, from a more advanced civilization.

The term is usually associated with the Hebrew-Semitic doctrines to be found in the first and second chapters of Genesis. These doctrines have a philosophical aspect in that they are strictly dualistic, and so stand contrasted with the more or less monistic conceptions characteristic of Greek thought. In the history of Christian thought, the Old Testament account, adopted by the Church, has undergone various modifications. (R.M.W.)

'Immediate' creation, in which the divine act takes direct effect, is contrasted with 'remote' creation, by so-called 'second' or 'proximate' causes, in which the divine purpose is realized indirectly through the ordinary operations of nature. Cf. the philosophical conceptions of OCCASIONALISM and PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY. (R.M.W.- J.M.B.)

Literature: for the Jewish view, HOLZINGER, Hexateuch, 335 f.; WEBER, Syst. d. Altsynag. Paläst. Theol., 197 f. For history of modifications of doctrine in the Christian Church, TERTULLIAN, Adv. Hermogenem; ORIGEN, De Principiis, and Adv. Celsum; AUGUSTINE, De Genesi contra Manichaeos; Confessiones, xi-xiii; De Civ. Dei, xx; PETRUS LOMBARDUS, Libri Sententiarum; HUGH MILLER, Footsteps of the Creator; see also literature on MANICHAEISM. Modern works: ZÖCKLER, Theol. u. Naturwiss.; GUNKEL, Schöpfung u. Chaos; art. Schöpfung in Herzog's Real-Encyc.; REUSCH, Nature and the Bible (Eng. trans.). See also literature under COSMOGONY, and RELIGION (philosophy of). (R.M.W.)


Creationism: Ger. Theorie der Schöpfung; Fr. théorie de la création; Ital. dottrina della creazione. The form of Deism which teaches that the creative act by which the world arose did not, and does not, identify the Creator with the universe in an essential or substantial sense.

Creation by a single act, or 'continuous' creation (by a series of acts), alike hold the theory of transcendence as opposed to that of complete immanence. Theism vibrates between this form of Deism and Pantheism, attempting to hold a form of divine immanence which is still not pantheistic. Cf. DEISM, THEISM, and PANTHEISM (also for Literature). (J.M.B.)


Creationism (in theology): Ger. Creationismus; Fr. créationisme; Ital. creazionismo. The doctrine according to which the human spirit (anima) is created separately in each individual case, and infused from an external source into the foetus so as to vitalize it.

This doctrine is opposed to PRE-EXISTENCE (q.v.), and to TRADUCIANISM (q.v.), the two competing theories.

While Pre-existence (e.g. with Origen) and Traducianism (e.g. with Tertullian) were held in the earlier history of Christian thought, Creationism came to be the accepted doctrine later, as with Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and Petrus Lombardus.

Literature: see BIBLICAL PSYCHOLOGY. (R.M.W.)


Credible (1) and Incredible (2) [Lat. credere, to believe]: Ger. (un) glaublich; Fr. (in)-croyable; Ital. (in) credible. (1) Believable. (2) Unbelievable. See BELIEF. (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)


Credit [Lat. creditum, a thing entrusted, a loan]: Ger. Kredit; Fr. crédit; Ital. credito. The power to use a promise to pay as a means of present payment.

The advantages of credit are of two kinds: (1) It allows a man to extend his business activity to the range of his proved capacity, instead of limiting it by his accumulations. (2) It economizes the use of money, and makes it possible to extend business without feeling scarcity of coin.

The economists of the German Historical school distinguish three stages of industry: Natural-, Geld-, and Kredit- Wirthschaft. But it is an error to suppose that there is a direct substitution of credit for money in modern life. The tendency is rather towards a substitution of cash for credit in old fields, and a use of credit in relatively new ones.

The function of a banking system has been aply described as the insurance of credit. (A.T.H.)


Credulity (1) and Incredulity (2) [Lat. credere, to believe]: Ger. (1) Leichtgläubigkeit, (2) Ungläubigkeit; Fr. (in) crédulité, Ital. (in) credulità. (1) Over-readiness to believe: the tendency to form a belief on slight objective grounds. The slighter the objective ground, as distinguished from the subjective interest or bias, the greater is the credulity.

(2) Under-readiness to believe: the tendency to withhold belief when the objective grounds are strong. It is also a matter of subjective bias.

These terms are not of sufficient exactness for scientific use. Bain has used the phrase 'primitive credulity' for the child's early uncritical attitude of acceptance toward things generally, on which see REALITY-FEELING, and BELIEF. (J.M.B.)


Creed [Lat. credere, to believe]: Ger. Glaubensbekenntniss; Fr. confession, symbole; Ital. credo. A systematic, authoritative, and dogmatic (in the sense of giving no reasons) statement of a body of doctrine, which constitutes a profession of faith.

Usually in written form, though this is by no means necessary. It may originate in various ways; e.g. sporadically, like the 'Apostles' Creed'; in a council of the entire Church, like the Creed of Chalcedon; in a special communion, like the Augsburg Confession; in a commission ad hoc, like the Westminster Confession, and so on. As matter of history, Christian creeds proceed (1) from the original and still united Church; (2) from one or other of the chief divisions of the Christian Church -- the Latin, the Greek, the Lutheran, the Reformed.

As a matter of usage, the term Creed is specially applied to the 'Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian formulae.

Much attention has been paid recently to the historical investigation of the Creeds, especially the 'Apostles'.'

Literature: SCHAFF, Creeds of Christendom; SWAINSON, Apostolic and Nicene Creeds; HEURTLEY, Harmonia Symbolica; CASPARI, Quellen z. Gesch. d. Taufsymbols u. d. Glaubensregel; LUMBY, Hist of the Creeds; ZAHN, Apost. Symb.; HAHN, Biblioth. d. Symb. u. Glaubensreg. d. alt. Kirche, iii; GEBHARDT, HARNACK, and ZAHN, Patr. Apost. Op., Bd. i, Heft 2; HARNACK, Apost. Glaubensbek.; SWETE, Apostles' Creed; OMMANNEY, Athanasian Creed. For further literature on Ritschlian school, see F. NIPPOLD, Die theol. Einzelschule; and on the recent Apostolicum controversy see arts. in Zeitsch. f. Theol. u. Kirche, and in Die christl. Welt. (R.M.W.)


Cretinism [Fr. crétin]: Ger. Cretinismus; Fr. crétinisme; Ital. cretinismo. A peculiar form of lack of development associated with disease of the thyroid gland, and presenting, as a prominent characteristic, a mental enfeeblement or idiocy.

The disease seems to be endemic, and largely confined to valleys of mountainous regions. It prevails in Switzerland. The cause of the disease is obscure, but recent research points to the interference with the function of the thyroid gland as the determining pathological change. Local, climatic, and hereditary predisposing conditions are important factors in its aetiology, but it may appear in a spasmodic form (sporadic cretinism). The disease seems almost invariably congenital, although it may fail to develop until early or late in childhood. Severe cases of cretinism are very short-lived. In typical cases the bodily abnormalities are a general failure of development, the adult rarely exceeding five feet in height, and presenting the general appearance of a child; the skull is broad and short, the bones thick, and the sutures may give place to the Wormian bone; the nose is broad and flat, the eyes widely separated, the face but slightly developed; the skin is apt to be rough, insensitive, and dark; the teeth are defective, the mouth large, the lips thick; the lower limbs are frequently emaciated, and the muscles poorly developed. One of the most characteristic physical signs is goitre, or enlargement of the thyroid gland, although other affections of this organ may also be present. Physiological activity is weak, involving a low temperature, slow respiration and circulation, irregular digestion, flabby muscles. If cretinism appears in early childhood (usually about the fifth year), the change from a normal bright child to a stunted cretin can be readily observed as years go by. Cretins may be simply weak-minded, understanding a few common words and directions, and capable of simple occupations; or they may be completely idiotic, speechless, and helpless. Hearing is apt to be affected, but the senses are usually fairly normal. The emotional development is low, but fear, affection, and the like may be shown.

Literature: art. Cretinism in Tuke's Dict. of Psychol. Med. (with references); GLEY, in Année Biol., i. 320 ff.; ALLARA, Sul Cretinismo (Ger. trans., 1894); LOMBROSO, art. Cretinismo in Encic. med. Italiana. (J.J.)


Creuz, Friedrich Casimir Carl von. (1724-70.) A German psychologist who was born and lived, as Geheimrath in his later life, at Homburg v. d. Höhe. He insisted that psychology should be based on experience alone.


Crime (in law) [Lat. crimen]: Ger. Verbrechen; Fr. crime (abstract), délit; Ital. delitto. (1) Any offense against the state by a breach of public rights and duties affecting the interests of the whole community. (S.E.B.)

An act declared by the state to be offensive to the state (in distinction from a tort, an act of wrong to an individual), forbidden by the state, and punished by the state. (F.H.G.)

(2) Any grave offence of such a character. Petty offences are known in law as misdemeanours. Every violation of law is wrong, and in the early stages of civilization little account has generally been taken of the difference between wrongs to individuals and wrongs to the public. Hence, imprisonment for debt, and civic degradation as a consequence of (and punishment for) bankruptcy. As law develops, public remedies are confined to acts of public wrong, and individuals are left to seek a remedy by private actions for wrongs personal to themselves (torts).

Literature: BENTHAM, Mor. and Legisl., ii. chap. xvi; and BECCARIA, Dei Delitti e delle Pene, which led the way to a general mitigation of penalties for crime all over the civilized world; PHILLIMORE, Maxims and Princ. of Jurisprudence (1856), xiii; IHERING, Zweck im Recht, i; STEPHEN, Hist. of Criminal Law in England. (S.E.B.)


Crime (in sociology). (1) An act which awakens the passion of vengeance in the community, in distinction from a wrong which awakens the passion of revenge in an individual only.

(2) An act which public opinion pronounces hostile to social integrity and public welfare.

Maine (Ancient Law, chap. x) shows that in early Aryan communities crime was not differentiated from torts and sins. Crime is first clearly recognized when the community perceives the distinction between acts that individuals and their relatives seek to avenge, and acts which the whole community is moved to avenge, as e.g. by lynching. In the present century public opinion, influenced greatly by Jeremy Bentham (Princ. of Mor. and Legisl., and Theory of Penalties and Rewards), has tended strongly to discountenance vengeance, and therefore to cease to conceive of crime as that which provokes vengeance, and to substitute for the older notions a conception of crime as that which is fundamentally contrary to public utility. The conflict of these ideas is well presented by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Lectures on the Common Law. The psychological ground of the newer views is clearly set forth by Baldwin, Social and Eth. Interpret., Bk. I. chaps. ii and x. Cf. JUSTICE. (F.H.G.)


Criminal (in law): Ger. (1) verbrecherisch, (2) Verbrecher; Fr. (1, 2) criminel; Ital. (1) criminale, penale, (2) (uomo) delinquente. (1) Relating to crime. The term is used with reference both to crimes and misdemeanours, without discrimination. Criminal conversation; adultery (often abbreviated to crim. con). Criminal law, the law defining (substantive) or punishing (adjective) criminal offences. (2) A person convicted of having committed a crime in the legal sense. SEE CRIME (in law). (S.E.B.)


Criminal (in sociology). (1) A person whose instincts or acquired habits incline him to conduct inimical to the integrity and well-being of society. See CRIME (in sociology). (2) Relating to the character or conduct of such a person.

Various types of criminals have been distinguished in recent anthropological literature (see especially Ferri, as below): --

(a) Criminal by Instinct, or instinctive criminal, or criminal by nature, or congenital criminal, or criminal-born: terms of recent origin, designating those whose inherited qualities predispose them to crime.

A prominent class of cases are those which show physical characters of the atavistic or reversionary type. See ATAVISM.

(b) Occasional Criminal: one whose instincts are ethically and socially sound, but whose passions (of anger, cupidity, sexuality, or other) are so strong that he may commit crime under peculiar provocation.

(c) Professional Criminal: one who, whether sound in body and mind or not, deliberately follows a crime as a business.

(d) Criminal Reformer: one who actively protests against social opinions and regulations, to the extent of violating convention or law. The commonest class are so-called political criminals, exemplified in the deeds of violence done by anarchists. Less marked instances are cases where the protest takes an ethical or strictly social form, as violations of marriage laws, &c.

Various subdivisions of the general subject are recognized: --

(a) Criminal Anthropology: the scientific study of the criminal in his various types, as revealed in his anatomical, physiological, and psychological characters.

(b) Criminal Sociology: the scientific study of crime and criminals, as DEMOGRAPHIC (q.v.) or social phenomena. Cf. CRIMINOLOGY.

The distinction between the legal and the anthropological or sociological criminal is of recent origin. Criminal anthropology is a product of medical jurisprudence, which, in turn, was developed from the legal and medical analysis of insanity as a defence in criminal cases.

Literature: the distinctions made above, inclusive, we owe largely to a group of Italian writers: LOMBROSO, L'Uomo Delinquente (1874-87), and (with FERRERO) La Donna Delinquente (1889); MARRO, I Caratteri dei Delinquenti (1887); GAROFALO, Criminologia (1890); SIGHELE, La Foule Criminelle (Fr. trans.; orig. 1892); FERRI, Sociologia Criminale (1880). See also BENEDIKT, Anatomische Studien an Verbrecher-Gehirnen für Anthropologen, Mediziner, Juristen und Psychologen (1879); TARDE, La Criminalité comparée (1890); PROAL, Le Crime et la Peine; FÉRÉ, Dégénérescence et Criminalité (1888); CORRE, Les Criminels: Caractères physiques et psychologiques (1889). See also under CRIMINOLOGY. (F.H.G.- J.M.B.)


Criminal Anthropology: see CRIMINAL, and CRIMINOLOGY.


Criminal Psychology: see CRIMINOLOGY.


Criminal Sociology: see CRIMINAL, and CRIMINOLOGY.


Criminal-born: see CRIMINAL.


Criminology: Ger. Criminologie; Fr. criminologie; Ital. criminologia. The science of crime and criminals.

The criminal has been studied mainly from the physical side, giving a natural history or Criminal Anthropology. It deals with two main questions: (1) the differentiation of criminal-types (as distinct from crime-types), which might be called Criminography, or Descriptive Criminology; and (2) the theory of the criminal as a racial phenomenon, for which Criminogenesis or Genetic Criminology might serve. A similar study of crime divides itself into two main inquiries: (1) the psychology both of crime and its types, giving Criminal Psychology, and also of criminal tendencies (a branch of Abnormal Psychology); (2) Criminal Sociology, dealing both with crime considered as a phenomenon, involving social relationships, variations, &c., being Criminal Sociology in a narrow sense, or Criminal Psychonomics (after analogy with bionomics); and also crimes studied singly, as to distribution, frequency, &c., by mathematical methods (Criminal Statistics). The psychological and sociological sides of the study of crime are as yet very undeveloped.

Literature: on criminal anthropology, see under CRIMINAL; on particular crimes, see under ANARCHISM, SUICIDE, &c.; on the social and psychological aspects, see under SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, and SOCIOLOGY, See also MACDONALD, Bibliog. of Criminol.; BILLINGS, Index Catalogue (sub verbis); and the literature under MORAL STATISTICS. (J.M.B.)


Crisis [Gr. krioiV, decisive point]: Ger. Krisis; Fr. crise; Ital. crisi (in opposition to lisi). Crisis refers to the tendency of certain diseases, notably fevers suddenly to decrease after a somewhat definite duration; the time or manner of such change being regarded as significant for recovery or death.

The conception was carried over to mental diseases, and was much used by Esquirol. The French usage of the term is more nearly equivalent to 'an attack' or 'spell,' and in an allied sense the notion formed an essential feature in the earlier doctrines of Mesmer; the purpose of his 'magnetic' treatment, being to aid nature in calling out the crisis, and thus to quicken recovery. The symptoms induced by Mesmer were those usually observable in crisis; and the room in which the 'baquet' was set up and the cures performed was called the 'salle des crises.' (J.J.)


Criterion [Gr. krithrion]: Ger. Kriterium, Kennzeichen; Fr. critérium; Ital. criterio. Literally, a test, or standard of judgment. The criterion, in a logical reference, is the possible rule or body of rules by which a final decision may be given on the truth or falsity of judgments.

Since the time of Kant, it has been customary to distinguish a formal from a material criterion, to point out that a material criterion in the sense above defined is impossible, and that the formal criterion is to be found in the body of rules defining logical CONSISTENCY (q.v.), that is, in form, absence of contradiction and conformity to the requirements of logical consequence. The distinction is sound, though in the Kantian formulation it is made too absolute. See Kant, Logik, Introd., § vii; Hamilton, Logic, Lect. 27.

In the history of the discussions regarding a criterion of truth, the most important place is occupied by the attempts of the Stoics to establish a universal and practical standard, in face of the arguments urged against their view by the academics and sceptics. Many of the real points of interest in modern controversies are there anticipated. Modern philosophy has had the task of redefining the issue, and reducing the problem, so far as possible, to a manageable form. Cf. TESTS OF TRUTH, and see the references under CERTAINTY. (R.A.)


Criterion (aesthetic): Ger. Massstab; Fr. critérium esthétique; Ital. criterio, canone. See AESTHETIC STANDARD, and CRITICISM (aesthetic). (J.H.T.)


Criterion (ethical). The test or standard by reference to which the moral worth of character, or the rightness or wrongness of conduct, is determined.

The ethical criterion used for determining moral validity is commonly identical with the ultimate moral ideal, whether that be the moral law revealed in conscience or some conception of the summum bonum. But they are not necessarily identical. Thus, according to Spencer (Princ. of Eth., Pt. I, 'Data,' chap. iv), happiness is the 'ultimately supreme end'; but owing to the indefiniteness of the conception itself, and of the means required to reach the ideal, he holds that it is imperfect, though perhaps not useless, as an ethical criterion of conduct. Cf. ETHICAL THEORIES. (W.R.S.)


Criticism [Gr. kritikoV, from krithV a judge]: Ger. Kriticismus; Fr. criticisme; Ital. criticismo. The system of philosophy of Immanuel Kant; so called from the titles of his three works, called Critiques (Kritiken). See KANTIANISM, KANTIAN TERMINOLOGY, NEO-KANTIANISM, and IDEALISM.

Literature: works of KANT; ADECKES, Kant Bibliography, Suppl. to the Philos. Rev.; Hist. of Mod. Philos. (with references, notably UEBERWEG-HEINZE); CAIRD, The Crit. Philos. of Im. Kant. Also references under topics cited, and in EISLER, Wörterb, d. philos. Begriffe (sub verbis). (J.M.B.)


Criticism (aesthetic). The appreciation or estimation of works of art. This presupposes some standard or criterion (see AESTHETIC STANDARD), which must be found ultimately in the end sought by ART (q.v.); but certain rules or canons, found embodied in works of art generally recognized as successful, may be used for the examination of supposedly similar productions. This, however, must always be subject to revision, if it appears that the work in question is seeking a new method. Otherwise criticism becomes merely formal, and is a hindrance to progress.

Aristotle was the founder of aesthetic criticism, and in his Poetics analysed Greek tragedy and formulated its rules. Horace and Quintilian criticized poetry and eloquence. The close of the 17th century saw a revival of criticism, especially in France and England (Boileau, Dryden, Pope), which, however tended to be formal, and to see, in its rules derived from Greek art, the principles for all art whatever, e.g. Shakespere was condemned for 'irregularity.' Lessing and Winckelmann led the way in a truer appreciation of the antique. The romantic movement (see ROMANTICISM) was in part a protest against the attempt to fetter art by supposed canons. Finally Goethe, the Schlegels, Schiller, Hegel, Coleridge, brought forward and applied the principles that rules are to be judged by the work of genius, not vice versa, and that the supreme tests of a work of art are (1) its interpretation and expression of the life and interests of the people and age in which it arose, and (2) the embodiment of these in forms which give aesthetic delight. These two principles, which may be called the historical and the aesthetic or psychological, are fundamental to modern criticism. In accordance with them a work of art should be judged both by its historical significance and by its relation to general laws of human nature.

Literature: CARRIERE. Die Kunst im Zusammenhang der Kulturentwickelung (3rd ed., 1885); ARNOLD, The Function of Criticism, in Essays on Criticism; SYMONDS, Essays, Speculative and Suggestive; J. M. ROBERTSON, New Essays toward a Critical Method (1897); WORSFOLD, The Princ. of Criticism (1897); MOULTON, Shakespere as Dramatic Artist (Int. Plea for an Inductive Science of Criticism), (3rd ed., 1893); SAINTSBURY, Essays in Eng. Lit. (1891); DOWDEN, New Studies in Literature (1895); L. J. WYLIE, Studies in the Evolution of Eng. Crit. (1894); E. HENNÉQUIN, La Critique Scient. (2nd ed., 1890); F. BRUNETIÈRE, L'Évolution des Genres dans l'Histoire de la Littérature (1890); Questions de Critique (1889); art. Critique Littéraire, in La Grande Encyc.; E. TISSOT, L'Évolution de la Critique Française (1890); A. RICARDOU, La Critique Littéraire, Étude Philos. (1896); BRAITMAIER, Gesch. d. poet. Theorie u. Krit. (1888); BOECKH, Encyklopädie u. Methodologie d. phil. Wissenschaften (2nd ed., 1886), 169-754; J. E. SPINGARN, A Hist. of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance (1899); GAYLEY and SCOTT, An Introd. to the Methods and Materials of Literary Criticism, i (1899); WINCHESTER, Some Principles of Literary Criticism (1899); E. ROD, in Int. Monthly (Jan., 1900); H. PAUL, Grundr. d. germ. Philol. (2nd ed., 1896), 221-47. (J.H.T.)


Critique: see CRITICISM.


Crowd [AS. croda]: Ger. Menge, Haufe; Fr. foule; Ital. folla. (1) In sociology; an incidental aggregation, held together by a relatively extrinsic and temporary bond. (2) In psychology: a group whose co-operation is relatively occasional and temporary, as opposed to that which is either instinctively or reflectively determined.

A crowd whose performances are particularly capricious and violent is called a mob.

Literature: SIGHELE, La Folla delinquente (1891; Fr. trans., La Foule criminelle); G. LE BON, Psychol. des Foules (1895), (Eng. trans., The Crowd); TARDE, Études de Psychol. Sociale (1898); P. ROSSI, L'Animo della Folla (1898), and Psicologia collettiva (1900); BALDWIN, Social and Eth. Interpret. (1897), § 151 ff. See also under SOCIOLOGY, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, and IMITATION. (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)


Crusius, Christian August. (1715-75.) A German theologian, born near Merseburg, who became senior professor of the theological faculty and professor of philosophy at Leipzig. He zealously opposed the philosophy of Wolff and his followers. Crusius was strongly influenced by Rüdiger, through one of the latter's pupils.


Crystal Vision: Ger. Krystallsehen (?); Fr. cristalloscopie, vision au cristal; Ital. cristalloscopia. The awakening of visual perceptions of a more or less hallucinatory character by visual attention concentrated upon a crystal or other polished surface.

No theories of this phenomenon are as yet sufficiently mature to merit citation. It is generally looked upon, however, as in some way illustrating subconscious processes, as opposed to the older theory of supernatural influence.

Literature: NEWBOLD, Psychol. Rev., ii. (1895), 348; 'MISS X,' Proc. Soc. Psych. Res., v. 486 (with bibliography), and vi. 358; MYERS, ibid. viii. 436; HYSLOP, ibid. xii. 259; MORTON PRINCE, Brain (Winter, 1898). (J.M.B., G.F.S.)


Ctetology: see USE-INHERITANCE.


Cudworth, Ralph. (1617-88.) Born at Aller, Somersetshire; educated at Cambridge. He became master of Clare Hall in 1645; professor of Hebrew at Cambridge, 1645; master of Christ's College, 1654; prebendary of Gloucester, 1678. See NEO-PLATONISM.


Culpa [Lat.]: Ger. Fahrlässigkeit (?); Fr. faute (coulpe is used only for breaches of religious duty); Ital. colpa. A want of due care, whether intentional or unintentional; negligence.

Grotius uses the term as including an active wrong. 'Maleficium hic appellamus culpam omnem, sive in faciendo, sive in non faciendo, pugnantem cum eo quod aut homines communiter aut pro ratione certae qualitatis facere debent. Ex tali culpa obligation naturaliter oritur, si damnum datum est, nempe ut id resarciatur' (De Iure Belli et Pacis, ii. 17. I). Cf. Holtzendorff's discrimination between culpa considered as a violation of civil right, and as an infraction of criminal law, in his Encyclopädie der Rechtswissenschaft (sub verbis).

The essential characteristic of culpa is an omission of duty. This duty is that of diligentia. It is not owed to all the world, but is to those with whom we are brought in contact in a certain manner, and as to them may vary in degree. The greater the diligence required, the greater the culpa for its omission. A master's liability for the act of his slave might be so slight as to amount to levissima culpa (Dig., ix. 2, Ad Legem Aquiliam, 44). 'Latae culpae finis est non intellegere id quod omnes intellegunt' (Dig., 1. 16, De Verborum Significatione, 223). The omission of duty may be so gross, that a lata culpa will be tantamount to fraud or malice (dolus).

Literature: HESSE, Die Culpa des Römischen Rechts; PHILLIMORE, Maxims and Princ. of Jurisprudence (1856), xxviii.


Culpability [Lat. culpabilitas, blame-worthiness]: Ger. Schuld; Fr. culpabilité; Ital. colpevolezza. The condition of deserving moral blame.

Moral culpability has to be distinguished from legal responsibility, which may exist without moral blame (as in a man's responsibility for injury done by his agent), and which does not extend to the inward sources of action, or to certain external actions. Culpability implies that the wrong action was performed by the agent, and that he knew or might have known what he was doing. The degree or extent to which constraint or ignorance may limit or annul culpability is discussed by Aristotle (Ethics, III. i.) and by almost every succeeding moralist. See ACCOUNTABLE, RESPONSIBILITY, and PUNISHMENT. (W.R.S.)


Culture [Lat. cultus, from colere, to cultivate]: Ger. Kultur; Fr. culture, civilisation; Ital. cultura, (more properly) civiltà. Culture refers to the comprehensive changes in individual and social life, due to the continued and systematic influences of mental improvement and refinement. Considered from a strictly sociological point of view, it is called civilization, but anthropologists make culture the broader term. In the individual it is EDUCATION (q.v.).

Whatever affects the intellectual status of man, whether directly or indirectly, may be said to be an element in culture. Arts and sciences, language and literature, education and government, social customs, ethics and religion, contribute directly to the culture of a people; but practical industries, means of transportation and communication, and the physical comforts of life exercise, particularly in modern times, no less profound, though more indirect, an influence upon the totality of human culture. The study of the development of these varied activities belongs alike to history and to anthropology. That special phase of historical study which is devoted to this end, as distinguished from that which deals rather with the sequence of events, is termed the history of culture (Culturgeschichte), and is constantly gaining in scope and significance. Anthropology likewise recognizes the all-important influence which the factors of culture exercise in the status of primitive man, as well as in the various forms of civilization, historic and prehistoric, which that science considers. Cf. ANTHROPOLOGY.

It is customary in discussing the unfolding of culture in certain peoples, or in the human race at large, to speak of culture stages or epochs more or less distinctly marked off. The Stone Age and the age of bronze, or of iron, are suggestive of certain limits of development in primitive times, while such terms as 'mediaeval' suggest forms of life and civilization quite as strongly as a definite period of history. The eighteenth-century division into 'wild,' 'barbarous,' and 'civilized' periods was revived by Morgan.

The psychologist finds in the material furnished by history, and by anthropology, abundant material for the illustration of the principles with which his science deals, as well as of the complexity and variability of personal psychological traits. This field of investigation, however, is so extremely comprehensive, and requires for its successful pursuit such specialized methods, that it cannot be included in the science of psychology as ordinarily interpreted. (J.J.)

The term Humanity is used as nearly synonomous with culture, and the culture-bringing influences and institutions (studies, art creations, &c.) are called 'the humanities,' or said to be 'humanizing.' (J.M.B.)

Literature: much of the literature of general anthropology. As works illustrative of certain aspects of culture: LECKY, Hist. of European Morals; A. D. WHITE, Hist. of the Warfare between Science and Theology; HOLLAND, Rise of Intellectual Liberty; CROZIER, Hist. of Intellectual Development, i. (1897). Works devoted to culture history are: LIPPERT, Culturgeschichte (1886-7); NIKEL, Culturgeschichte (1895); MORGAN, Ancient Society. French writers prefer the title 'Histoire de la Civilisation' (see SEIGNOBOS, 1887, J. DE  CROZALS, 1887). For historical matter and notes on the terms Culture and Civilization, with literary expositions, see BARTH, Philos. d. Gesch. als Sociologie, i. 251 ff., and 144 note. See also FOLK PSYCHOLOGY. (J.J.- J.M.B.)


Culture Epochs (theory of, in education): Ger. kultur-historische Stufen; Fr. époques de culture; Ital. epoche della civiltà. The term 'culture epochs,' as used in educational theory, involves the idea that there is a parallelism between the development of each child and the historical development of the people or the race, and that in this parallelism we find a guiding principle for the sequence of subjects or, at least, topics of instruction. Ziller employs this principle in connection with his theory of concentration.

The culture material found in religion, history, and literature forms the core, or backbone, of the curriculum; the sequence of this subject-matter is determined by the ascertained parallelism between the stages in the child's development and the corresponding nodes, or stages, or 'epochs' in the history of culture or civilization, through which the people to which the child belongs has passed. See CULTURE, and CONCENTRATION.

Literature: ZILLER, Allg. Päd., 189-98; REIN, Outlines of Pedagogics (trans. by Van Liew), 101-16; McMURRY, Gen. Meth., 90-105; DE GARMO, Herbart and the Herbartians; LUKENS, SEELEY, BROWN, DEWEY, McMURRY, GALBRAITH, HINSDALE, FILMLEY, and VAN LIEW in Second Year-Book of the National Herbart Society, 56-140; BALDWIN, Ment. Devel. in the Child and the Race, and Social and Eth. Interpret.; STEINMETZ, Année sociologique (1900). (C.DE.G.)


Cultus [Lat.]: Ger. Kultus; Fr. culte; Ital. culto. The external manifestation of the religious consciousness in rites, ceremonies, customs, &c. This as contrasted with doctrine, or religious thought and speculation. Cultus always implies acts.

The investigation of cultus belongs to the phenomenological section of the science and history of religions. The systematic elucidation of its pervading principles belongs to the portion of philosophy of religion which deals with the contents of the religious consciousness and their manifestation. The importance of both these investigations lies in the psychological reference which they imply, thus lifting the question even of ritual out of the sphere of barren antiquarianism, and explaining it from its vital causes.

In semi-popular usage the term cultus is frequently employed to designate an early, or rudely idolatrous, form of worship as contrasted with a later and more spiritual, to which the name worship is referred; it is also used to designate a semi-private usage rather than a national or universal one. See IDOLATRY, MYSTERIES, and WORSHIP.

Literature: PFLEIDERER, Philos. of Religion, iv. 182 f. (Eng. trans.); TYLOR, Primitive Culture; ROSKOFF, Das Religionswesen d. rohesten Naturvölker; FR. SCHULTZE, Der Fetischismus. For further literature see DE LA SAUSSAYE, Lehrb. d. Religionsgeschichte. See also FOLK PSYCHOLOGY. (R.M.W.)


Cumberland, Richard. (1632-1718.) Born at London, educated at Cambridge; rector of Brampton, 1658; of Allhallows, Stamford, 1667; bishop of Peterborough in 1691. His reputation was made by a work in moral philosophy, a refutation of Hobbes' system, called Philosophic Inquiry into the Laws of Nature.


Curiosity: Ger. Neugier, Wissbegier; Fr. curiosité; Ital. curiosità. The disposition to give attention, so far as it has for its motive the mere increase of knowledge, apart from practical interest. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)

The two cases often distinguished (as in the German terms) are those respectively of curiosity and interest in novelty (Neugier), and the disposition to learn or to know for the sake of information (Wissbegier; cf. Groos, Die Spiele d. Menschen), the latter being, however, usually motived by the somewhat trivial reason which characterizes curiosity in general.

Literature: GROOS, loc. cit., 184 ff., also Die Spiele d. Thiere (Eng. trans.); JAMES, Princ. of Psychol., ii. 430. See the topic 'Interest' in the textbooks of psychology. (J.M.B.)


Currency [Lat. currens, running]: Ger. Zahlungsmittel; Fr. monnaie (in the broader sense); Ital. circolazione. The sum total of the means of payment which circulate or pass current hand to hand -- coin, government notes, and bank-notes, but not blank cheques.

The terms money and currency have not been sharply distinguished in practice; but currency is the broader of the two. Smith in one or two passages seems to use the term to denote the whole medium of exchange actually in use, as distinct from the officially accredited coinage. Mill habitually speaks of money when dealing with instruments that have an intrinsic value, like gold and silver coins, and of currency when he wishes to include government notes or bank-notes. Walker uses money for the distributive, currency for the collective, sense: paper money, a currency composed of paper. It has sometimes been proposed to extend the term currency to include such means of exchange as bank cheques, or to enumerate bank deposits in estimating its volume; but this is hardly sanctioned by the best authorities. (A.T.H.)


Curve [Lat. curvus, crooked]: Ger. Curve; Fr. courbe; Ital. curva. A line described according to a law.

Following the method of Descartes (Géométrie, 1637), a curve and its equation are represented by a relation between the coordinates of a point of the curve. The axes of co-ordinates are two lines xx1, y y1, usually at right angles to each other, intersecting at the point O, called the origin. The position of a point P is determined by its distances form the two axes, OM or NP (x) and ON or MP (y), x being the abscissa, and y the ordinate of the point P; x is positive when to the right of O, and negative when to the left; y is positive when above O, and negative when below. Cf. GRAPHIC METHOD (1).

The curve shown in the figure has for its equation y = log x, expressing the relations believed by Fechner and others to obtain between sensation and stimulus. See FECHNER'S LAW. (J.McK.C.)

Custom (in law) [Lat. consuetudo]: Ger. Gewohnheit, Usus; Fr. usage; Ital. uso (or diritto usuale). A usage so public, peaceable, uniform, general, long-contained, reasonable and certain, that is has acquired the force of law.

It is for the courts to determine when these conditions are satisfied. A custom becomes law, for practical purposes, when the courts recognize it as such, by applying it, as a rule of decision, in a particular case. They, however, treat it as having been law at the time when the cause of action arose. Local or particular customs are such as grow up in particular places or occupations.

Custom is the child of morals and the mother of law. Customary law is 'ius moribus constitutum' (Dig., i. 3, De Legibus, &c., 32, § 1). It is created for each people by themselves and their ancestors, as an unconscious adaptation of life to its environment, and comes to constitute their unwritten law. Before the French Revolution, France was largely dependent on local customs for her law, as the Custom of Normandy, the Custom of Paris. 'Common law, then, is founded on popular custom, and when the judges declare it, they merely discover and declare what they find existing in the life of the people, as the rule of their relations' (Effinger v. Lewis, 32 Pennsylvania State Reports, 367). 'As customs change, the unwritten law dependent upon them may change also' (ibid.). (S.E.B.)

Literature: MAINE, Ancient Law, chap. i; HOLLAND, Elements of Jurisprudence, chap. v; POLLOCK, First Book of Jurisprudence, Part II. chap. iv; FELIX, Der Einfluss der Sitten und Gebräuche auf die Entwickelung des Eigenthums (1885).


Custom (in social psychology and sociology): Ger. Sitte (n); Fr. coutume, usage; Ital. costumi (usually plural). A manner of acting somewhat widespread and habitual in a society, but not physically inherited.

Custom, in the individual, is the mother of morals and the daughter of law; for customs are enforced upon the individual, and he becomes accustomed to being moral -- both before he is competent to judge for himself. Custom in society rests upon acquired HABIT (q.v.) in individuals. If a custom should be physically inherited, it would then be an instinct. Customs which are relatively less intrinsic to social organization are called, at the time when most operative, fashions. The equivalent of human custom in animal companies is sometimes termed habit -- used usually in the plural -- and this for the evident reason that the notions of social custom and private habit merge into one in so far as, in the animals, both are covered by the organization of animal instinct. It is better, however, in animals as in man, to restrict habit to the individually acquired acts which, when generally current, become customs. Custom considered as socially transmitted from generation to generation is called TRADITION (q.v.). (J.M.B.- G.F.S.)

Originally, both morality and law are indistinguished from the custom of the community. They are only gradually differentiated from it, perhaps through the contact of different societies with divergent customs, and through the more urgent need of conformity to certain customs rather than others, leading to their more effectual enforcement by extreme penalties; these causes being accompanied by a growth of conscious reflection.

In civilized communities custom continues (for the most part) to protect morality and law, and at the same time to shape itself into a variety of forms determining the conduct of individuals of groups of individuals. (W.R.S.)

Literature: HUME, Treatise on Human Nature (ed. Green and Grose), i. 403 ff., ii. 201; ADAM SMITH, Mor. Sent.; S. ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress; TARDE, Les Lois de l'Imitation; SIMMEL, Einleitung in die Moral-Wissenschaft, i; BALDWIN, Social and Eth. Interpret., chap. ii; WUNDT, Ethik, Part I, chap. iii; STEPHEN, Science of Eth., 137 ff.; POLLOCK, First Book of Jurisprudence, 10. (W.R.S.- J.M.B.)


Cutaneous Sensation [Lat. cutis, skin]: Ger. Hautempfindung; Fr. sensation de la peau, sensation cutanée; Ital. sensazione cutanea. A sensation set up by adequate stimulation of a point of the skin, without concomitant stimulation of joint, tendon, muscle (voluntary or involuntary), or other deeper-lying sense-organ.

In strictness, the adjective 'cutaneous' (or 'dermal') refers only to cutis (or derma), the true skin. Hence if pain (von Frey) is an epidermal sensation, it can be traced 'cutaneous' or 'dermal' only by an extension of the meaning of these words. (E.B.T.)

The typical cutaneous sensations, therefore, are those of touch and temperature. It is possible that pressure is also epidermal. (L.M.- J.M.B.)

Literature: WUNDT, Physiol. Psychol. (4th ed.), i. 413; VON FREY, Abhandl. d. kgl. sächs. Gesell. d. Wiss., xxiii. (1896); DESSOIR, Du Bois-Reymond's Arch. (1892); FUNKE and HERING, Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., iii. 2; GOLDSCHEIDER, Gesamm. Abhandl. (1898); WEBER, Wagner's Handwörterb. d. Physiol., iii. 2. (E.B.T.)


Cuticle [Lat. cuticula, dim. of cutis, skin]: Ger. Oberhäutchen; Fr. cuticule; Ital. cuticola. Outermost layer of the skin; the epidermis. See SKIN. (C.F.H.)


Cyclopean Eye [Gr. kmklwy, a giant with one eye in the middle of the forehead]: Ger. cyklopisches Auge; Fr. oeil cyclopéen; Ital. occhio ciclopico. All objects are referred to points in space exactly as they would be if, instead of two eyes, we had one eye in the middle of the forehead.

This fact was first made out by Hering, and this imaginary eye was well named by him the cyclopean eye. The best account of all the consequences of this mode of reference is given by Le Conte, Amer. J of Sci., 3 ser., i. 33, and Sight, 216. (C.L.F.)


Cyclosis (in botany) [Gr. kuklwsiV, a surrounding]: Ger. Kreisen; Fr. cyclose; Ital. circolazione. (1) The circulation of the latex (milky juice) in the vessels of plants. In this sense the term was applied by Max Schultze in 1831. (2) The rotational and circulatory movements of the endoplasm of the vegetable cell.

The movements of the endoplasm, to which the term is now commonly applied, were first observed by Bonaventura Corti (1772), and later by Treviranus (1807). They are: (a) Circulation, when the streaming takes place to and fro along the strands which join a more or less centrally placed mass of protoplasm, surrounding the nucleus, to the peripheral layer, in which streaming also takes place, but not in a direction common to all parts of it. (b) Rotation, when a peripheral layer of protoplasm surrounds a central vacuole. The endoplasm shows streaming movements in one direction within the ectoplasmic layer. Around the poles of rotation there is an indifferent band where the protoplasm is unaffected.

Literature: D. H. SCOTT, Introd. to Structural Botany (Flowering Plants, 1894); M. VERWORN, Gen. Physiol. (1899). (C.LL.M.)


Cynics: see SCHOOLS OF GREECE (Post-Socratic).


Cyrenaics: see SCHOOLS OF GREECE (Post-Socratic).


Cytology [Gr. kntoV, hollow, + logoV, science]: Ger. Cytologie, Zellenlehre; Fr. cytologie; Ital. citologia. Science of the individual cell, as distinguished from Histology, which deals chiefly with the cells, and their relations to one another, in the formation of tissues and organs. See CELL. (C.F.H.)


Cytoplasm [Gr. kutoV, hollow, + plasma, anything formed]: Ger. Zellkörper; Fr. cytoplasme; Ital. citoplasma. The protoplasmic substance of the cell-body as contrasted with that of the nucleus (karyoplasm). A term proposed by Strasburger in 1882. See E. B. Wilson, The Cell in Devel. and Inheritance, 1896. (C.LL.M.)


Czolbe, Heinrich. (1819-73.) A German medical man and philosopher, described by Höffding (Hist. of Mod. Philos., Eng. trans., ii. 504 f.) as at first a 'consistent materialist.' He afterwards 'came very near Spinoza's fundamental ideas, which he attempted to develop empirically.' Cf. Vaihinger, 'Die drei Phasen des Czolbe'schen Naturalismus.' Philos. Monatsh., xii. He was born near Danzig, educated at Berlin, lived and died at Königsberg.