DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Grace [Lat. gratia]: Ger. Anmuth; Fr. grâce; Ital. grazia, graziosità. That species of the beautiful, or of aesthetic value, found primarily in ease and spontaneity of posture or motion, and, by analogy, in freely flowing curves and contours, in slender columns, in speech or conduct which suggests ease and spontaneousness rather than power.

It is thus contrasted with the sublime or majestic, but the element of smallness is not so prominent as in the pretty. Beauty with the element of dignity inspires respect, and keeps the observer at a distance; grace attracts -- a factor still more prominent in the German Anmuth, which is nearly equivalent to 'grace and charm.' This distinction was suggested by Plato, made more explicit by Cicero, and elaborated by Schiller (Anmuth u. Würde). Hogarth distinguished from the waving line of beauty the more varied serpentine line of grace formed by winding a line about a cone.

Literature: SCHILLER, Grace and Dignity, in Essays, Aesth. and Philos.; HARTMANN, Aesth., ii. chap. iv; WALTER, Gesch.d. Aesth. im Alterthum; SPENCER, Essays, ii. (J.H.T.)

Grace (in theology): Ger. Gnade; Fr. grâce; Ital. grazia. The name given to the special attribute of God manifested to humanity in the plan of redemption. It involves the conception of favour, accompanied by spontaneity, mercy, and goodness, which the recipient has not merited.

It originates in God's 'eternal pleasure.' God's grace is held to establish a kingdom of grace; and here the controversies with which the subject is connected begin to emerge. To what extent does man, looking to his lost condition, co-operate with God in this kingdom of grace? The antagonism between AUGUSTINIANISM (q.v.) and PELAGIANISM (q.v.), as between CALVINISM (q.v.) and ARMINIANISM (q.v.), originated here. An antinomy between sin and freedom, between grace and works, displayed itself which had the greatest influence on thought, especially after the Reformation. It need hardly be added that these problems arise in a universe which is presupposed to be constructed, as regards man, on a definite plan. Man fell; hence God's grace, and all the difficulties which the conception has called up.

Literature: Lichtenberger's Encyc. des Sci. religieuses, art. Grâce Divine, by BOIS; CUNNINGHAM, Historical Theol.; SPENER, Von d. Natur u. Gnade; Herzog's Real-Encyc., art. Gnade, by LANGE, gives full literature; SCHLEIERMACHER, Glaubenslehre; any good work on Biblical theology -- OEHLER, WEISS (Eng. trans.). (R.M.W.)

Graces (Christian). A term used, generally in Christian ethics or in homilies, to indicate the characteristic marks of the ethico-religious life in the Christian man. The graces are practical accompaniments of the main Christian virtues -- faith or fidelity; love or steadfastness of good will; wisdom as displayed in cheerful hope. They reveal themselves principally in the unaffected or unconscious performance of duty as inspired by the Christian ideal.

Literature: see ETHICS (Christian). (R.M.W.)

Grade (of consciousness) [Lat. gradus, degree]: Ger. Rang; Fr. grade, rang; Ital. ordine. Relative position in the scale of animal minds.

Grade is the term recommended for the place of this or that consciousness from the point of view of psychological observation, as opposed to the relative 'degree' of consciousness of the same mind from time to time. See SUBCONSCIOUS for the further working out of this distinction. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Grammar [OF. gramaire, from Med. Lat. grammaria, improperly used for grammatica]: Ger. Grammatik; Fr. grammaire; Ital. grammatica. Orderly presentation of the material of language.

When the basis of arrangement is the form and relation which the phenomena exhibit in actual use, it is called descriptive grammar. Most school grammars belong to the descriptive class, though in recent days a tendency has shown itself to seek aid from historical grammar, so far as it can be done without compromising pedagogical clearness of statement. When the basis of arrangement is the relation to an order of historical development, it is called historical grammar. When the basis is relation to the general principles governing the psychological life of language, it is called general or philosophical grammar. Only two peoples have independently developed complete grammatical systems, the Hindus and the Greeks. The Hindu system, characterized by greater objectivity, gave the impulse, when opened up to Western scholars in the beginning of this century, to the development of modern scientific grammar. The Greek system originated in the service of philosophy, and later freed itself from the leading-strings of metaphysics, only as the accumulation of ordered facts compelled it. The little handbook of Greek Grammar prepared by Dionysius Thrax, probably in the 2nd century B.C., under the title Tecnh Dionusiou Trammatikou, became the basis for all the Greek and Latin grammars down to modern times, and determined the traditions of all descriptive grammar in the Western world.

Literature: H. STEINTHAL, Gesch. d. Sprachwiss. bei den Griechen u. Römern (1863; 2nd ed., 1890); TH. BENFEY, Gesch. d. Sprachwiss. (1869); B. DELBRÜCK, Einleitung in das Sprachstudium (2nd ed., 1885, Eng. trans.); G. UHLIG, Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica (1883). (B.I.W.)

Grandeur (delirium of): Ger. Grössenwahn, Megalomanie; Fr. délire des grandeurs, mégalomanie; Ital. delirio di grandezza, megalomania. The belief, on the part of an insane person, that he possesses unusual powers, riches, or other sorts of superiority: MEGALOMANIA (q.v.).

Delusions of grandeur accompany the excited or exalted forms of mania and central paralysis. In some cases this fixed delusion is the chief symptom of insanity, thus forming a monomania of grandeur, or pride. For literature see EXALTATION, MANIA, and MONOMANIA. (J.J.)

Graphic Method (of recording): see LABORATORY AND APPARATUS, II, general.

Graphic Method (of representation): Ger. graphische Methode; Fr. méthode graphique, méthode des courbes; Ital. metodo grafico. The presentation to the eye of the results of measurements or statistics by means of curves and other figures.

Graphology [Gr. grafh, writing, + logoV, lore]: Ger. Graphologie, Handschriftenkunde; Fr. graphologie; Ital. grafologia. The study or science of HANDWRITING (q.v.).

In the best French and German works, graphology views handwriting as a motor indication or expression, to be interpreted by the aid of and along with the other motor activities on the basis of psychological principles. As a practical art, attempting to interpret or read character in individuals from their handwriting, it has as little scientific basis as palmistry or phrenology. While both the principles and conclusions are frequently of doubtful validity, yet the study includes the legitimate factors in a possible science of handwriting.

From the practical point of view of identification of handwriting, graphology is also called into requisition, and the term graphologist becomes equivalent to handwriting expert.

The pathology of handwriting presents a further interesting aspect of the study. The study of the degeneration of handwriting in the insane (see article of this title in Tuke's Dict. of Psychol. Med.) has revealed characteristic divergences from the normal in cases of general paralysis, idiocy (see Piper, Schriftproben von Schwachsinnigen, 1893), mania, melancholia, as well as in hysteria, changes of personality, hypnotic states, &c. In all such cases, handwriting is viewed as only one among many of the significant forms of highly specialized motor expressions. Mirror writing (see Ireland, Blot on the Brain, 1893, 299) is a form of writing in which the letters are reversed as if seen in a mirror, and occurs sporadically in normal individuals (notably in children) as well as in connection with mental disorders, and offers special problems of interest in the development and dissolution of writing. Agraphia includes the inability to write or difficulty in writing resulting from disorder in the cerebral centre for writing. See AGRAPHIA, and SPEECH AND ITS DEFECTS.

Literature: J. CRÉPIEUX-JAMIN, L'Écriture et le Caractère (1895, also in Eng. trans.); P. HELOT, L'Écriture et le Caractère (1889); LOUIS DES CHAMPS, La Philos. de l'Écriture (1892); also the periodical La Graphologie, published in different forms since 1871. ERLENMEYER, Die Schrift (1879), and PREYER, Psychol. des Schreibens (1895), represent the most valuable attempts to interpret handwriting. (J.J.)

Gratification: see SATISFACTION.

Gratitude [Lat. gratitudo, from gratus, pleasing]: Ger. Dankbarkeit; Fr. gratitude, reconnaissance; Ital. gratitudine, riconoscenza. The sentiment on the part of the recipient of a favour towards its donor, involving a disposition to promote the good of the donor.

Gratitude, inasmuch as it is the disposition to promote the good of another, is a special case of BENEVOLENCE (q.v.); but seeing that this disposition to do good is in a manner due to the other in return for favour received, the quality is assimilated to JUSTICE (q.v.). The question whether gratitude can be disinterested, or is always founded on self-love, is frequently discussed by the English moralists.

Literature: HUTCHESON, Inquiry, § 2, vi; J. GAY, Prelim. Diss. to King's Origin of Evil, x1ix; HUME, Princ. of Mor., App. ii. (W.R.S.)

Grave Harmonics. An erroneous term for COMBINATION TONES (q.v.). (E.B.T.)

Gravesande, Willem Jakob van's. (1688-1742.) Dutch philosopher and mathematician. Studied in Leyden. Began practising law (1707) at the Hague. In 1715 he accompanied an embassy to England as secretary, and became acquainted with Newton. He was chosen Fellow of the Royal Society. In 1717 he became professor of mathematics and astronomy at Leyden, and introduced the Newtonian philosophy to that institution. His works deal in part with Newton's philosophy.

Gravitation [Lat. gravitare, to gravitate]: Ger. Schwerkraft, Gravitation; Fr. gravitation; Ital. gravitazione. That seemingly universal tendency of every particle of matter to move towards every other particle with a force directly as the product of the masses of the particles, and inversely as the square of the distance (r) which separates them.

The fact that all bodies on the earth's surface tend to fall downwards was known from the beginning of human experience. That the force thus indicated tends towards the centre of the earth must have been dimly recognized since the time of Ptolemy. That the planets gravitate towards the sun was vaguely seen by Kepler, and more clearly by Huyghens and others. That the moon gravitates towards the earth was shown by Newton, who first propounded the law in all its generality. Gravitation differs from all other forces of nature in being, within the limits of human experience to the present time, absolutely incapable of increase, diminution, or modification by any agency whatever. Through all transmutations of the forms of matter, under the highest velocities in the planetary system, through all masses of extraneous matter that may intervene, every pair of atoms attract each other unceasingly according to the stated law.

Intimately associated with gravitation is the question whether it is really an actio ad distans -- whether it takes place without any intervening medium or other agency. Leibnitz objected to the Newtonian theory that a body cannot act where it is not. This negation is accepted as an axiom by many physicists, who find support for their view by the apparently well-ascertained fact that electric and magnetic attraction and repulsion act through the agency of the ether, and conclude from analogy that gravitation may be due to the same or a similar cause.

Some astronomical phenomena have recently led to the suspicion that gravitation does not vary rigorously as the inverse square, but increases more rapidly towards the sun by an amount so minute as to make its establishment difficult, except by the most refined and elaborate researches. The simplest proposed form of the modified law is that instead of being inversely as r², it is inversely as r to the power 2 + x, where x = 0^.0000001612 = 1612 / 10¹⁰ (S.N.)

Greatest Happiness: Ger. höchstes Glück; Fr. bonheur suprême, suprême félicité; Ital. felicità suprema. The greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain in the life or lives referred to; the reference being either to an individual, a community, mankind at large, or sentient beings generally.

The ethical doctrine that greatest happiness is the ideal of conduct received formal statement in Western thought by Epicurus; but the doctrine that the greatest happiness which the individual ought to pursue is not his own happiness, but that of the community, seems to have originated in political theory, and, in its precise formulation, to be mainly due to certain English writers of the 18th century. The social content of morality was undoubtedly no modern discovery. The conditions required for a quantitative estimate of happiness are laid down by Wollaston (Religion of Nature, 1722); and regard for the happiness of others was made the criterion of virtue by such writers as John Gay (Prelim. Diss. to King's Origin of Evil, 1731, xxxvi) and Hutcheson (Syst. of Mor. Philos., 1755). Hutcheson makes their 'tendency to universal happiness' the criterion of the material goodness of actions (whereas their formal goodness consists in their flowing 'from good affections in a just proportion'), and this criterion is systematically applied by him.

One of the most distinct of early statements of this criterion is in Priestley's Essay on the First Princ. of Government (1768): 'The good and happiness of the members, that is, the majority of the members of any state, is the great standard by which everything relating to that state must finally be determined' (p. 17). The double phrase 'good and happiness' does not imply here that good is different from happiness, for it is immediately added that 'justice and veracity, for instance,' have 'nothing intrinsically excellent in them separate from their relation to the happiness of mankind' (p. 18). A similar view is found in Beccaria (Dei delitti e delle pene, originally published in 1764), who asserts that the only proper end for legislation is 'la massima felicità divisa nel maggior numero' -- an expression rendered in the English translation (3rd ed., 1770) by the phrase to which Bentham afterwards gave currency, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number.' The constituents of greatest happiness are enumerated by Bentham (Princ. of Mor. and Legisl.), and made the basis of a hedonistic calculus. The importance, as sources of happiness, of permanent objects of interest is brought out by J. S. Mill (Utilitarianism), chap. ii), and still more by Sidgwick (Meth. of Eth., III. xiv).

Literature: the authors cited; see also ETHICS, and ETHICAL THEORIES, and BIBLIOG. F, 2, r. (W.R.S.)

Greek Terminology (considered in relation to Greek philosophy).

(1) The vocabulary of European philosophy has its principal source in the technical language of Greek philosophers. Of this technical language, a portion has passed directly over into our modern philosophical usage, e.g. a number of the familiar terms of the traditional formal logic, such as syllogism, enthymeme, &c. A portion, however, and in fact a very large portion, has reached us in the form of Latin translations and imitations of Greek terms. Of this part, again, there are subdivisions. The classical Roman philosophical writers began the process of 'making the dialectic art speak in Latin' (see citations in Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 511, at the outset of an important discussion of the Roman terminology). The words substantia and essentia, as translations of ousia, belong, for instance, to this first stratum of Latin imitations of Greek terms. A second group of Latin terms and phrases, formed under the influence of Greek originals, is found in the theological terminology of the Latin Church. The scholastic philosophy constitutes a third period during which Latin imitations or translations of Greek originals entered philosophical language. And from time to time, in modern philosophy, the coining of new compounds, of Greek origin, has gone on side by side with a continuation of the processes to which the scholastic vocabulary itself was due. The effective tendency to add to all these sources of philosophical terms the modern vernacular languages themselves has existed ever since Meister Eckhart, whose Middle German vocabulary contained many striking imitations of Greek and of scholastic terms by means of purely German words (e.g. Istigkeit for essentia = ousia). It will be seen, therefore, that the influence of Greek terminology has been manifold, and indirect as well as direct, since even the terms of vernacular origin are often more or less obviously modelled after Greek terms.

(2) The process whereby the Greek terminology of philosophy arose and became gradually more elaborate and more settled is, in outline, as follows.

First, the early thinkers, in the Pre-Socratic period, began by undertaking to discover general explanations of the origin and nature of things. In advancing their theories, they were from the start led to emphasize certain aspects of the physical world -- aspects which they deemed of especial importance as furnishing, or as illustrating, their explanations. To these emphasized aspects they gave names, some of which were already familiar in popular language. So the early names of the elements, water, air, fire, were of course words in daily use. But in two ways the undertaking, thus begun, very soon led to new developments. First, certain of the aspects of the world, which the philosopher was led to emphasize, were less familiar to the popular mind, and required relatively new names, so that, before long, quite novel coinages began to appear in the technical vocabulary of philosophy, or else words before existing were given a prominence that at once, by taking them out of their more usual context, changed them into technical terms. Of the former tendency, present for instance in the Pythagorean vocabulary, the coinage of new abstract nouns by individual philosophers remains, even to the present time, a familiar example. Here is, in fact, a perennial accompaniment of abstract thought; and few systematic thinkers have failed to coin at least one or two abstract nouns. Of the words already existent, but turned into technical terms by the way in which they are isolated and emphasized, the apeiron of Anaximander forms the first instance in the history of Greek philosophy. When Homer (Od. viii. 340: see Schmidt's Synonymik d. griechischen Sprache, iv. 512) makes Hermes speak of desmoi apeironeV, the meaning of the Homeric apeirwn, as 'numberless,' is clear. But what Anaximander meant by calling his elementary material the apeiron (i.e. the Infinite, or as Burnet, in the work cited below, renders it, the Boundless) becomes something at once technical and obscure, about whose precise meaning there has been much discussion. The term presumably means (see Windelband, Gesch. d. alten Philos., 25, and Schmidt's Synonymik, in the passage just cited) at once that which is boundless in its power to originate new products, and boundless in its extent; and it is thus a typical example of an early and undifferentiated terminology, whose meanings and usages have indeed too much of the 'boundless' about them.

(3) But next, even when the early philosopher coins no new words, and does not consciously intend any unfamiliar usage of the already existent terms, still it is his fate to find his most familiar words altering their meaning as he uses them. For to him these familiar words soon come to name principles and ultimate processes, rather than the objects ordinarily in question when common sense employs the words. In vain then does the thinker, anywhere in his choice of fundamentally important terms, cling to the speech of the people. His thought transforms whatever it touches. The pur aei zwon (fire ever-living) of Heraclitus is so characterized by him that it soon loses much of the seeming of the merely sensuous 'fire' of the common-sense world with which he no doubt intends to identify it. For this world-fire is 'kindled and extinguished' according to 'fixed measure'; it is intelligent; it is 'want and satiety'; and so in many other ways fire, taken as the name of the world-principle, soon alters its significance, and can no longer be conceived as mere fire. Here again we deal with a tendency ever since important in the history of terminology. The later vocabulary of psychology, of ethics, and of metaphysics is full of instances of the way in which technical usage has again and again come to make the familiar seem strange. Thus everybody uses the verb to be, and distinguishes between existence and non-existence; but a discussion of the meaning of the terms for 'being' at once seems, to the popular mind, something extremely recondite; and the most common words soon appear utterly foreign and mysterious when once they are found, in such a discussion, as technical terms. From the Eleatic philosophers down, and very notably in Plato's ontological dialogues, such as the Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Philebus, this is what happens to the terms used for being.

(4) The consequence to which these often unconscious transformations of the popular usage lead is that ere long, in early Greek philosophy, each thinker comes to employ, upon occasion, conscious devices for marking off his own peculiar usage of terms. To this end: (a) He sometimes objects to the popular view, because it does not sufficiently observe the meanings and distinctions of its own words. In calling attention to such popular confusions, the thinker indeed intends, so far, to clarify ideas without of necessity reforming vocabulary. But the effect upon terminology is inevitable, since the distinction, once emphasized, renders impossible the naïve usage. The attack of Parmenides upon the common opinions about the relation of being and non-being involves, for instance, just such an insistence upon the importance of a distinction already known to language, but, as Parmenides holds, neglected by common sense. You cannot truly speak of non-being; you must not recognize it. For it is absolutely different from being. The result of such observations becomes of importance for the future of terminology. Or again: (b) The thinker, in a somewhat different fashion, is led to express his own theory of things by consciously asserting that certain terms and phrases in common use are essentially misleading, so that for them there ought to be substituted such and such other words. To make observations of this kind is to aid in the formation of a definite terminology, in case the observations are themselves at all successful. Thus the early thinkers, after Parmenides, when attention has once been called to the deeper problems about the genesis of things, are found using such expressions as that of Empedocles: 'There is no origination (fusiV) of anything mortal, nor yet any end, . . . but only mixture and separation of what is mixed (mixiV and diallaxiV). But amongst men it is called fusiV' (see Fairbanks, First Philosophers of Greece, 162). Or again, Anaxagoras declares that 'The Greeks do not rightly use the terms "coming into being" and "perishing" (to de ginesqai kai apollusqai).' As a fact, he continues, one should use the terms summis gesqai and diakrinesqai, terms which again mean mixture and separation (Fairbanks, op. cit., 245). Efforts towards and establishment of usage which have reached this stage involve an intentional adjustment of terms to doctrines, and herewith the history of terminology proper begins.

(5) The next higher stage is the one especially due, in Greek thought, to the influence of Socrates, and in part also of the Sophists. The undertaking to define terms now becomes a recognized part of the philosophical ideal. Defining terms and reflectively clarifying ideas are henceforth undertakings that progress side by side. The method involved becomes a very important portion of the dialectical art. The Platonic dialogues develop this art with great and conscious virtuosity. The elementary faults in definition are well recognized (see the often-quoted passages in Plato's Theaetetus, 146-7, 208 D; in the Meno, 71 B; and in the Gorgias, 448 B; and cf. Zeller, Philos. d. Griechen, 3rd ed., Th. II. Abth. I. 617). In avoiding these faults, and in developing true definitions, one also undertakes to create a more precise terminology. By means of the processes of classification and division of terms and of ideas so extensively developed by Plato, one comes to arrange terms in more systematic groups, the hierarchy of classes in the case of the subdivisions of any largest class requiring the selection of appropriate terms for all the members of the hierarchy. Such systematic arrangements, however, often also require, for the filling out of the omissions in the scheme, the coinage of new terms, and this coinage is now guided by needs of which the method makes one definitely conscious. The direct influence of the art of classification upon the organization of philosophical terminology is thus from the start visible, and may be especially observed in the more technical Platonic dialogues, such as the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Philebus. The art in question also inevitably develops its own special terminology, whereby its various processes are themselves named (see, for a general survey of the Platonic use of classification, the monograph of Lukas, Die Methode d. Eintheilung bei Plato, Halle, 1888. In this monograph, special summaries of the terminology used by Plato for the art of classification are given, pp. 28, 54, 85, 110, 216). To divide a larger class into its subdivisions is expressed in Plato by the verbs temnein and diaireisqai. He uses, both for logical classes and subclasses, the terms genoV and eidoV; but no definite distinction between these two terms, as genus and species, exists for Plato (see also Campbell, in Jowett and Campbell's ed. of the Republic, 300). Yet, despite this high development of the Platonic art of classifying and organizing terms and meanings, Plato himself is led to no established system of philosophical terms, such as Aristotle undertook to develop. Plato's usage varies with the different dialogues, and in ways that have suggested to many investigators inquiries as to the chronology of the Platonic use of language in the various periods of his literary activity (Campbell, Lutoslawski, &c. See the literature in Lutoslawski's book (cited below), and the recent papers of Natorp, Arch. f. d. Gesch. d. Philos., xii). These 'stylometric' investigations, to be sure, concern much more than matters of technical terminology. Campbell calls Plato's philosophical terminology 'incipient, tentative, transitional,' and points out that he regarded the sophistic efforts in this direction as pedantry. In fine, then, the art of defining terms is for Plato a favourite and highly elaborate art, but he applies it each time afresh; and he is never disposed to be bound by the usage involved in the results of his previous efforts.

(6) In Aristotle, terminology and the ideal of a philosophical system culminate together. At the outset of his various systematic discussions, Aristotle often engages in a more or less extended argument regarding what does, and what does not, fall within the precise scope of any particular branch of science. In such and such matters the physicist (fusikoV) is interested; the metaphysician (o prwtoV filosofoV) is concerned with other aspects; and yet others are the affairs of the student of dialectics or of morals. The boundaries of the sciences thus stand as definitely named and conscious limitations of that freedom of the argument to wander wherever it will, upon which Plato, in the Theaetetus, had laid such stress, and of which Plato's most famous dialogues furnish so many instances. This new tendency in Aristotle is only one symptom of the general interest of that philosopher in technically distinguishing the various aspects of things, in fixing upon terms and expressions suited to each aspect, and in solving fundamental problems by means of this method of distinctions. For Aristotle's divisions of the sciences are not wholly due to the same interest which gets expressed in the modern 'division of labour,' since Aristotle himself covered the whole range of the various sciences, whose provinces he all the while divided, by their definitions, from one another. Nor yet is his interest merely that of the lover of system for its own sake; for Aristotle is no pedant. His use of the distinctions of a highly wrought terminology is, to a considerable extent, due to his efforts to harmonize the various points of view of earlier thinkers, and to solve apparent contradictions by showing how, 'in a certain sense,' each of two apparently contradictory propositions can be true. Thus terminological organization and definiteness is, with Aristotle, a conscious instrument of his many-sidedness. In finding his various terms, Aristotle makes free use of the rich materials already prepared for him by the previous thinkers, especially by Plato. In the fifth book of the Metaphysics he gives us a specimen of his terminological method, in the form of a discussion of the various meanings of a series of philosophical terms and usages. This book was presumably written as a separate essay, and many of its distinctions are elsewhere more fully discussed, in their systematic places. But the device of at once appealing to general usage, while at the same time consciously purifying and altering it, is much more systematically used by Aristotle than by Plato, with the result that almost no terms pass through Aristotle's hand without, as Eucken says, retaining traces of the influence of his thought (Eucken, Gesch. d. philos. Terminol., 26). Meanwhile, Aristotle freely invents new terms, in a way easily rendered possible by the facility of forming compounds in Greek. Eucken (loc. cit.) enumerates, as a mere specimen of Aristotle's construction of terminology, a list of some seventy-five new terms and expressions, but regards the philosopher's transformation and fixation of the earlier usages as of still more historical importance. A notable characteristic of the Aristotelian language, also dwelt upon by Eucken, is the setting into sharp antithesis of terms formerly either synonymous, or else less sharply distinguished. Thus genoV and eidoV with him first assume their well-known antithesis as genus and species. Another familiar Aristotelian antithesis is that of exiV and diaqesiV (permanent condition or established habit on the one hand, temporary or changeable disposition on the other hand). Still more important is the antithesis of dunamiV and energeia (capacity or potentiality on the one hand, attainment or actuality on the other); and well known is also the characteristic contrast between proteron th fusei and proteron proV hmaV, which plays such a part in Aristotle's theory of knowledge (the former expression meaning the universal principle, or, as Prantl is fond of calling it, der schöpferische Begriff, the creative notion or form; while the latter expression refers to the individual, especially to the sensuous individual, which in our knowledge comes first, while in the nature of things the universal is prior to the individual). These are all classic instances of the evolution of terminology in Aristotle through sharper differentiation of expressions and of meanings.

(7) In consequence, philosophy owes to Aristotle a very large portion of its later technical terminology. In logic the debt is especially obvious and well known, since here, even where Aristotle uses expressions already employed by Plato or by other writers, their definitive meaning or usage is rightly most associated with Aristotle's name. The well-known table of Categories; the terms substance, accident, quality, quantity, relation, &c.; the classes of judgments; the names of the processes, or of the means, of inference, and of the modes and figures of the syllogism (apart from a few later additions or formal refinements of Aristotle's terminology); the names of the principal fallacies of the textbooks of formal logic; the well-known metaphysical distinction between form and matter (a distinction now very familiar even in popular language); the terminology of all the principal ontological problems -- these, whether preserved to us in the original Greek terms, or represented by Latin translations, are some of the most characteristic of the Aristotelian contributions to the speech of later thought. It is true that, upon closer examination, the part played by Plato in the preparation of all these expressions appears greater than at first sight. Plato, for instance, in the Theaetetus, already gives what Lutoslawski ventures to call the first table of categories (Theaet. 185); and in the Sophist and the Philebus other efforts towards a systematic list of fundamental notions are present. In many other cases Plato has also prepared the way. But, as we have already found Eucken pointing out, Aristotle is even more important as a reformer and an establisher of previously suggested terminology, than as an inventor of wholly new terms. In the other branches of science, Aristotle's terminology is of great historical importance, although the growth of knowledge has in many regions tended to set beside his terms others of later date. Of permanent significance is his terminology, especially, in the philosophical portions of the philosophy of nature, in psychology, in ethics, and in such portion of political science as his own discussions have most affected.

(8) In later Greek philosophy the terminology of the Stoics is of the first importance. The most significant and characteristic advances of all the later Greek terminology have to do (i) with the growth of a clearer consciousness as to the inner life, and as to the contrast between the objective and subjective aspects of reality (see Eucken, op. cit., 31; and the terminological discussions in Siebeck's Gesch. d. Psychol., Th. I, Abth. II, especially Siebeck's account of the later doctrine of the emotions, 222-41, and the summary of later doctrines as to the practical aspect of mental life, 241-61, as well as the chapter on the concept of consciousness, 331-42). The later Greek terminology is influenced (ii) by the relations between philosophy, and the now more or less independent developments of the special sciences, such as medicine. Here the psychophysical problems connected with psychology are of especial importance for terminology. The doctrine of the pneuma, or 'vital spirit,' is a typical instance where medical and philosophical speculations interacted, and influenced terminology (see Siebeck, op. cit., 130-60). Here, indeed, the theories in question had their basis in very early thinking, and their place in Aristotle. But the Stoics, and Galen (who died about 200 A.D.), extended and systematized both the empirical bases and the speculative applications of this doctrine of the pneuma, and the result, in one direction, influenced even the quite modern terminology of psychological theory (e.g. in case of the Cartesian doctrine of the 'animal spirits'); while, in another direction, through a contact with Jewish theology (in Philo and in the Jewish-Alexandrine speculation generally), the theory of the pneuma came to occupy a place of vast importance in the history of theology. The well-known popular distinction of 'body, soul, and spirit' becomes historically intelligible only in the light of this particular development of terminology; and the doctrine of the Trinity received expression in terms belonging partly to the same historical context. On the other hand, the development of the psychophysical terminology is also seen in the later doctrine of the temperaments, systematized by Galen, and since very widely popularized through psychological discussions (cf. Siebeck, op. cit., 278-90). Other instances of this type of terminological development are not lacking. But (iii) the later terminology expresses a constantly increasing interest in the problems of theology viewed as such. Despite the growing sense of the contrasts between inner and outer, subject and object, good and evil, divine and mundane, the Stoic philosophy, which is prevailingly monistic, recognizes such contrasts only in order to attempt to reduce them again to unity; and the terminology of the theories here concerned became important for all later theology. Central in this development is the doctrine of the logoV. The philosophical use of this term began indeed with Heraclitus, but as a metaphysical term, for the objective reason in things, it had gone into the background since that thinker, both Plato and Aristotle giving other terms the preference. The Stoics revived it, and developed, in connection with it, a considerable terminology, whose applications were at first pantheistic. Later, through Philo, as well as through the inner development of certain Stoical and electic tendencies, the term logos came into relations with theistic doctrines, and attained a very important place in Christian theology. The relations between the term logos and the before-mentioned pneuma were from an early stage close, and the interpretation given to both became also of critical significance, in the discussions regarding the monistic and dualistic interpretations of the relations between God and world, and between the divine spirit and the individual soul. (Upon the logos, and the whole related terminology, see, in addition to the systematic histories of Greek philosophy, Heinze's Lehre vom Logos in d. griechischen Philos., Oldenburg, 1872.) In close connection with the theological problem stands that regarding the freedom of the will, whose influence upon psychological terminology goes, together with the consequences of that advance, in a knowledge of the inner life above mentioned (cf. Siebeck, op. cit., 248 ff.; Heinze, op. cit., 125 ff., 153 ff.). And next (iv) the later terminology is significant in its more purely ethical aspects. The Stoical definition of the highest good as the concordant or consistent life, or as the life in accordance with nature (omologoumenwV zhn, or omologoumenwV th fusei), is an instance of an expression that has since been in very general use (cf. Zeller, Philos. d. Griechen, Th. III, Abth. I, 211). The concept of the indifferent, which is neither good nor ill, but is a mere matter of fortune (the adiaforon in general), is expressed by another characteristic Stoic term. The Stoic theory of virtue, and of the various special virtues, involves a terminology that is, in part, modelled after Aristotle and Plato, in part independently expressed. The doctrine of the absolute distinction between the wise and the foolish amongst men, and of the absence of degrees in the possession of the virtues, also affects the ethical terminology of the Stoics. These may serve merely as examples of Stoic usage. Less significant are the Epicurean additions to ethical terminology. (v) In the later, and especially, again, in the Stoic logic, there appear considerable alterations and elaborations of former terminology, as well as new expressions. (Here one may consult especially Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 412-96. More compendious is Zeller's account, Philos. d. Griechen, Th. III, Abth. I, 63-70, 86-114.) In the first place, here, the technical name logic is itself of Stoic origin, Aristotle having used the terms dialektikoV and analutikoV. The term dialectic survives, to be sure, as the usual one for the Stoics also. In the next place, the Stoics offer a revised table of categories, wherein, instead of the Aristotelian table, they offer a list of four categories, substratum (to upokeimenon), quality (to poion), state or condition (to pwV econ), and relation or relative state (to proV ti pwV econ). They also pay considerable attention to the doctrine of the judgment, and in this region develop a complex and formal terminology, especially in case of the theory of the hypothetical judgment. A similar development of relatively new terminology exists in case of their theory of the hypothetical syllogism (see, in particular, Prantl, op. cit., 470). Finally, (vi) apart from the foregoing characteristics of the later terminology, there is to be noted a general alteration of the context and significance of the various conceptions of philosophy -- an alteration which is due to the deepening religious consciousness of the centuries immediately following the Christian era, to the broadening of those interests in common humanity which grew with civilization, to the greater prominence given by later thought to the destiny of the individual soul, and, in general, to the richer, if also more problematic and confused, life of the Roman empire, and of early Christianity. From this point of view it has to be remembered that terms such as those for justice, for freedom, for the divine, for reason, and for humanity, necessarily tend to have a greater, although also vaguer, depth of meaning for later, ancient thinkers than for those whose world was a narrower one. That this greater depth of meaning also often implies a more obscure character, a tendency on the part of the thinkers to lose sight of the sharper definitions of their terms; and that the same progress in human experience leads, on the other hand, to an increasing temptation to seek escape from all these too-puzzling life-problems by means of formalism and pedantry: these are the inevitable mishaps of a more complex civilization. In general, moreover, it has to be remembered that, if the life of humanity, after the Christian era, faced problems of deeper meaning than those of the Greek cities, there was never again present, in the ancient world, the creative power that Plato and Aristotle had possessed, so that the later ancient philosophy was never adequate to its vastly enlarged task. In the work of the last great thinker of Greek philosophy, Plotinus, the older terminology was not notably reformed or increased; but the deepened insight into religious and ethical problems, and the vaster world in which Plotinus lived, tend to change the force and the implication of his terms in a way which Eucken has in general discussed (op. cit., 39 f.).

(9) The foregoing sketch of the history of Greek terminology is intended only as a rude outline, to suggest the general motives that appear to have determined the development of philosophical speech. Upon the subject, taken in its entirety, no adequate treatise exists. Materials bearing upon the topic have been collected in the most various ways, and lie scattered throughout the literature of ancient philosophy. While therefore no adequate bibliography of our topic can here be given, it is proper to add to the few foregoing literary references a more formal mention of a number of aids to a study of Greek terminology. Of the general histories bearing upon ancient thought, Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen contains, usually in the form of footnotes, a great many discussions of individual terms. These discussions are introduced at points of the text, determined by the general interests of Zeller's explanation of the various doctrines, so that here, as is usual throughout the whole literature of philosophy, the terminological interest is subordinated to the systematic and to the expository interests. The general index to Zeller's history, published as a supplement to the third edition (the first part only being referred to, in this index, in its fourth edition), is inadequate as a terminological index of the notes in question, so that for Zeller's best remarks the student must in general seek in their own places. Briefer are the discussions of terms to be found from time to time in Ueberweg's and Windelband's histories. The latter author, in his General History of Philosophy, treats of the development of concepts, rather than of the philosophers as individuals, or of their systems as separate wholes; but no very great space is given to the special history of terms, although many terms are incidentally treated. In Windelband's account of Greek philosophy in the Handbuch der klassischen Alterthumswissenschaft, there are also a good many brief statements of a terminological character. Prantl's Geschichte der Logik is decidedly full in its account of the development of the logical vocabulary; but once more, the material is widely scattered through Prantl's text, and is not easy to find for the purposes of the history of special terms. A valuable collection and comparison of all of the various enumerations which Aristotle gives of his categories (see the summary table in Prantl, i. 207) is a good example of the elaborateness of Prantl's work in this field. Specially upon terminology itself Eucken has written, in his admirable and compact Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie, several times cited in the foregoing. Here pp. 8-47 are devoted to a sketch of the history of Greek terminology. The relations of the technical terminology of Greek philosophy to the language taken as a whole, and to the popular and literary usage, can be extensively studied by a use of J. H. Heinrich Schmidt's Synonymik der griechischen Sprache (Leipzig, 1876-86, 4 vols.), where, of necessity, the philosophical vocabulary is always treated, so to speak, as an episode in the general development of the language, but where a great mass of material bearing upon our subject has been collected, compared, and indexed. Examples of Schmidt's method, and of its relation to philosophical interests, are his article 13 (i. 282 ff.) on gignwskein; his series of articles 41-50, at the outset of Book II, on the Greek expressions for space and time relations; his article 81 (ii. 527-49) on einai, the existential vocabulary, and the copula; and his article 147 (iii. 621-55) on nomV, and its allied terms. Of no little interest for an understanding of the relations between the popular and the technical vocabulary of ethics is Leopold Schmidt's Ethik der alten Griechen. The terminology of Greek psychology receives much attention in Siebeck's Geschichte der Psychologie (Erster Theil).

(10) Passing from more general to more special works, the vocabulary of the early Greek philosophers has been discussed, with much independence, although in the usual incidental way, by Burnet, in his Early Greek Philosophy (see, for example, his account of the term fusiV, p. 10; apeiron, p. 59 ff.). Regarding the terminology of Plato, the material is indeed oppressively vast, but for that reason extremely hard to bring into order. Ast's Lexikon Platonicum (3 vols., Leipzig, 1853-8) is still the principal attempt at a complete account of the Platonic vocabulary. There exists also Mitchell's Index Graecitatis Platonicae (2 vols., Oxford, 1832). In the third volume of Jowett and Campbell's edition of the Republic, an essay by Campbell upon 'Plato's Use of Language' contains, as its second part, a study of the Platonic diction. Of this part of the essay one sub-section (pp. 291-340) is especially concerned with Plato's philosophical expressions. The Platonic vocabulary upon its ontological side has been very elaborately analysed, as a contribution to the 'history of concepts and of terms,' by Peipers, in his Ontologia Platonica (Leipzig, 1883). Plato's logical terms, not without much discussion of other sides of his vocabulary, find place in Lutoslawski's recent work upon The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic (London, 1897). In this book, moreover, since the author is much concerned in attempts to fix the chronology of Plato's writings by means of stylometric criteria, an account is given of a long series of works that have been devoted to various aspects of Plato's style and language; and in consequence Lutoslawski's book, in addition to its intrinsic worth, is a valuable bibliographical aid to any one interested in a comparative study of the literature regarding Plato's language and usage of terms. In the case of Aristotle, the centre of all study of his vocabulary remains the great Index of Bonitz, which forms the concluding volume of the Berlin Academy edition of Aristotle's works. The recent Aristoteles-Lexikon of Kappes (Paderborn, 1894), founded upon the Bonitz Index, but put into an extremely compendious form, is a serviceable vocabulary of Aristotle's technical terms, intended for the use of the student who is finding his way into Aristotle. Wallace's Aristotle also contains brief definitions of a large number of Aristotelian terms. Aristotle himself, especially in the logical treatises, and in the Metaphysics, has done much to render definite the task of studying his terminology, by discussing extensively the various meanings of terms. He was in fact, as we have seen, the first writer upon terminology.

(11) To pass to still more special aids to terminological study, we may mention a few specimens of the literature dealing with particular terms, or groups of terms. Here the most prominent place will be given to examples of the literature of Aristotelian terms. The English editions of the individual dialogues of Plato often contain discussions of the terminology of the dialogue, or comparisons with other dialogues. To limit ourselves here to two very recent cases: -- In an edition of the Philebus, by Bury (Cambridge University Press, 1897), there is an appendix upon 'to apeiron in Early Greek Thought,' followed at once by another upon 'to apeiron and to peraV in Plato' (see op. cit., 178-95). In a later appendix (201-11), Bury discusses the Platonic and, incidentally, the general Greek conception of truth (alhqeia). In his edition of the Timaeus (London, 1888), Archer Hind, in his lengthy introduction, discusses a part of the Platonic ontological vocabulary, in various dialogues, as well as in particular in the Timaeus itself, and in his notes discusses also many points of Platonic terminology. On Aristotelian terminology, one may here first mention Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden bei Aristoteles (1862), an account of the Aristotelian ontological concepts and terms, with especial reference to the concepts of actual and possible being, and of the categories. Of standard importance is Trendelenburg's Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, in his Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, i. See also Newman's edition of the Politics.

Of the same subject Schuppe has treated in his little book Die Aristotelischen Kategorien (Berlin, 1871). The ontological vocabulary of Aristotle is dealt with in the two standard editions of the Metaphysics, that of Bonitz, and that of Schwegler. See also the dissertation of Bernard Weber, De ousiaV apud Aristotelem Notione eiusque Cognoscendae Ratione (Bonn, 1887) -- a very clearly stated account of all the principal fundamental concepts and terms in question. On the Aristotelian concept of anagkh there is a much older dissertation by Eug. Pappenheim (Berlin, 1856), entitled De Necessitatis apud Aristotelem Notione, which contains also a study of the terms to dunaton and to endecomenon, and of the related terminology. A Berlin dissertation of 1866, by Oscar Weissenfels, discusses Chance and Matter in their ontological relations, under the title De Casu et Substantia Aristotelis, but contains fewer terminological comparisons. An important matter of Aristotelian usage is included in the topic of a dissertation by Johann Schmitz (Bonn, 1884), De fusewV apud Aristotelem Notione, eiusque ad Animam Ratione. The terminology of Aristotle regarding the Intellect, active and passive, in its relation to all the much-debated problems of Aristotle's doctrine upon that subject, comes under consideration in Brentano's Psychologie des Aristoteles (Mainz, 1867); and the later history of the question (down to 1882) is summed up in an essay by Zeller, originally published in the Berlin Acad. Sitzungsberichte for 1882, under the title Ueber die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Ewigkeit der Welt. See also Eugen Eberhard, Die Aristotelische Definition der Seele und ihr Werth für die Gegenwart (Berlin, 1868). An important topic, both of Platonic and Aristotelian psychology, bearing upon the usage of a difficult term, is treated in the dissertation of Peter Meyer, o qumoV apud Aristotelem Platonemque (Bonn, 1886). The same term, together with other psychological terms in Aristotelian usage, forms the topic of Dembowski's dissertation (Königsberg, 1881): (1) De koinou aisqhthriou Natura et Notione; (2) De Natura et Notione tou qumou quatenus est Pars orexewV. Another important psychological term is the subject of an essay by J. Freudenthal, Ueber den Begriff des Wortes fantasia (Göttingen, 1863), who on p. 52 ff. compares the fantasia with other related mental processes, and so discusses also, in a measure, the terminology of these processes. Both psychological and epistemological terms, especially, of course, the latter, receive treatment in Kampe's Erkennetnisstheorie des Aristoteles (Leipzig, 1870). Upon the systematic terminology of Aristotle's zoological writings there is a dissertation by Ludwig Heck (Leipzig, 1885), entitled Die Hauptgruppen des Thiersystems bei Aristoteles und seinen Nachfolgern, which also gives space to the classifications and terminology of Pliny and Albertus Magnus. The fundamental concept of Aristotle regarding the elements, together with this side of his terminology, is treated, in its relation to later thought, by Lorscheid, Aristoteles' Einfluss auf die Entwickelung der Chemie (Münster, 1872).

These form a few examples selected from the literature of the more difficult or less accessible portions of the Aristotelian terminology. The philosopher's ethical vocabulary has been very extensively discussed, but is perhaps sufficiently treated in various standard editions of the Nicomachean Ethics.

The need of a systematic treatment of the whole range of Greek terminology is made only the more obvious by these fragmentary notes of the literature; and it may be hoped that due attention will ere long be given to this need. (J.R.)

Green, Thomas Hill. (1836-82.) An English philosopher, born at Birkin, Yorkshire; died at Oxford. His father was rector of Birkin. He was educated at Rugby, and at Balliol College, Oxford. In 1860 he was elected Fellow of Balliol, and in 1862 won the Chancellor's prize for an essay on novels. In 1866 he became a tutor at Balliol. In 1872 he was re-elected Fellow, and in 1878 Whyte Professor of Moral Philosophy. He was the leader of the Neo-Hegelian movement in England.

Gregarious Instinct [Lat. grex, a flock]: Ger. Herdeninstinkt; Fr. instinct grégaire; Ital. istinto d'aggregazione. The instinct to go in companies. The alternative theories of this instinct are those of INSTINCT (q.v.) generally.

Literature: see titles given under COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY, and SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. (J.M.B.)

Gregariousness: see GREGARIOUS INSTINCT, and SOCIALITY.

Gresham's Law: Ger. Gresham'sches Gesetz; Fr. loi de Gresham; Ital. legge di Gresham. The principle that the worse currency drives out the better, so far as its quantity will permit.

Observed as long ago as Aristophanes, but more distinctly formulated by Sir Thomas Gresham in the 16th century. The proviso in the last clause of the definition was emphasized by Ricardo.

A man will tend to use light coin for paying his debts, and heavier coin for export or melting. If there is enough of the light coin to meet the demand for the former purpose, the heavier coin will disappear from circulation. (A.T.H.)

Grief [Fr. grief, grievance, from Lat. gravis, heavy]: Ger. Kummer, Weh (woe); Fr. chagrin, peine; Ital. pena, dolore (morale). Painful EMOTION (q.v.) accompanying consciousness of loss or other misfortune to self or others.

It is manifested in a relatively passive way, by disturbance and depression of organic functions, by cries, complaints, and movements which give relief by drawing off nervous energy, rather than by specific motor attitudes towards environing conditions such as characterize fear, anger, &c. Grief is the analogue on the perceptual and ideational level of mere physical suffering on the sensational level. Indeed, there are border cases in which it is difficult to draw a line between the two: the bodily expression is similar in both cases. This is true to a large extent of fear as well as of grief; but in fear there is a further complication, which gives the emotion its distinctive character: there is a more or less imperative demand for practical adjustment, in view of an emergency, together with more or less of felt incapacity to deal with the situation effectively. Extreme conditions of grief are distress and woe.

Literature: Grief has had little independent treatment. For its depressive effects on circulation, &c., see the experimental titles under EMOTION, and in BIBLIOG. G, 2, k. (G.F.S., J.M.B.)

Groot, Geert de, Gerhardus Magnus. (1340-84.) French philosopher, educated in Paris, who taught philosophy in Cologne with success. He suddenly decided to become a popular preacher, and founded the Brotherhood of the Common Life. He was a disciple of Ruysbroek, the great practical mystic. Thomas à Kempis was reared under the influence of the Brotherhood founded by Geert de Groot for the purpose (among others) of attracting the common people to a religious and church life, by using the vulgar tongue in church and in translations of the Bible.

Groot (Hugo de): see GROTIUS.

Gross Earnings: Ger. Brutto-einnahme; Fr. produit brut; Ital. guadagno lordo. The total income from an industrial process, or group of processes, without deducting for things destroyed in the work.

Gross earnings may be measured, either by the means of satisfaction which a person receives in a certain time; or by the money which comes into his hands, as a result of things which he does for others. The aggregate of gross receipts of all members of the community constitutes the 'societary circulation' of Newcomb. See CIRCULATION, and cf. NET EARNINGS. (A.T.H.)

Grote, George. (1794-1871.) English historian and philosopher, born at Clay Hill, Kent, and died in London. He became vice-chancellor of London University, and later president of University College.

Grote, Nikolay Jakovlevic. (1852-99.) Educated at St. Petersburg. He was professor of philosophy at the Historical-Philological Institute of Niezhin (1876), and full professor at the universities of Odessa (1883) and Moscow (1889). Became president of the Psychological Association of Moscow (1889), and editor of the Voprosi Philosophii from its foundation (1889). He wrote in Russian and French.

Grotesque [Ital. grotta, and artificially made grotto]: Ger. grotesk; Fr. grotesque; Ital. grottesco. A species of the fantastic, including an element of caricature or humour, unconscious or intended. Cf. CARICATURE. (J.H.T.)

The grotesque seems to stand to the formal element in the requirement for beauty much as the comic does to the material or 'meaning' element. As the comic is the aesthetically distorted in respect to meaning, so the grotesque is the distorted in respect to form. In both cases the effect is possible psychologically only when the aesthetic is not only possible but is actually suggested. (J.M.B.)

Literature: SYMONDS, Essays Speculative and Suggestive; H. SCHNEEGANS, Gesch. d. grotesken Satire (1894), 1 ff.; the general works cited under AESTHETICS and BEAUTY; see also BIBLIOG. D, d. (J.H.T.)

Grotius, Hugo (Hugo de Groot). (1583-1645.) An eminent Dutch jurist and theologian, born at Delft, educated in Leyden. He accompanied the Dutch embassy to Paris in 1598. In 1613 he became pensionary of Rotterdam, but in 1618, upon the defeat of the liberal party, he was imprisoned. Escaping from prison, he went to Paris, where he was well received, and in 1634 appointed Swedish ambassador by Oxenstiern. Died at Rostock on a journey. He is best known for his work De Iure Belli et Pacis: Libri Tres.

Ground [AS. grund]: Ger. Grund; Fr. raison, fondement; Ital. ragione, evidenza. Any objective condition of BELIEF (q.v.). (G.F.S., J.M.B.)

Ground (in philosophy): see WORLD-GROUND.

Ground (logical): see REASON (sufficient).

Group [Fr. groupe]: Ger. Gruppe; Fr. (as above); Ital. gruppo. A plurality of individuals apprehended or treated together, yet with recognition of their individuality.

The second clause of the definition marks off the group-idea from the GENERAL CONCEPT (q.v.). The group-idea embraces all the individuals at once, with their peculiarities; so no single individual can represent or stand for the group. The recognition of likeness in the individuals is not necessary to the group, as it is to the general; nor is there of necessity any abstraction from their qualities. Yet both of these characterize some groups. For example, a horse, virtue, and a bag of diamonds may constitute a group; but the character of value may not (1), or may (2), be the reason for grouping them, and they may not (1), or may (2), be apprehended as a group of three. These two cases may be known as (1) the 'simple or concrete,' and (2) the 'numerical or abstract' group respectively.

The concrete group is probably first in the child's mind, and also in the mind of primitive man, before the rise of counting. Children and savages have groups which are only these fingers, these stones, &c., not these objects nor so many objects. Yet since the perception of likeness comes very early, and requires direct motor adaptation, the groups which are generalizations of like particulars are soon most important. And on the basis of this general sameness the idea of substitution arises, which is the nucleus of the notion of the numerical unit -- the first stage in the evolution of the notion of NUMBER (q.v.). The numerical group, however, involves a further step, i.e. the dropping of all concrete marks in the units; the abstracting from all particularity. The unit must become not only liable to substitution for any other in the same group, but also for any other in any other group. This is aided probably by the direct comparison of groups, by which a group of groups is secured. It is on account of this extreme abstractness, no doubt, that the idea of number is so late an achievement. The mathematical use of the numerical group is illustrated in connection with NUMBER (q.v.).

The grouping tendency seems to be fundamentally connected with activity. The need of treating things in groups creates a practical interest in their apprehension in groups. Furthermore, there is a direct  resort to grouping in all rhythmical performances -- a breaking up into three notably -- which serves to create 'measure' and 'tempo' in music and dancing. The subjective accentuation of certain terms of a series -- due possibly to adjustments of movement or of the attention -- serves to make primitive groupings, and may possibly account for all of them. The subjective grouping of active impulses would seem to make the transition to the idea of the unit -- both the unit of substitution, and the abstract numerical unit -- easier, seeing that a unit of action is capable of direct manipulation, and is also free from the compelling characters attaching to concrete external objects.

Literature: apart from the topics RHYTHM and NUMBER (see those terms), the group has had little discussion from the psychological point of view. (J.M.B., G.F.S.)

Group (in mathematics): see MATHEMATICS, and NUMBER.

Group (social). Any specific collection of individuals, e.g. family, community, state, &c., considered as preserving concrete relationships. When the concrete relationships are abstracted from, we have an AGGREGATION (q.v.) of neutral units.

It is interesting to note that the social group illustrates the transition from the 'concrete' to the 'numerical' GROUP (see the distinction made under that term). It is based on likeness, and involves generalization with the possibility of substitution; but it has not reached the degree of abstractness in which the characters of individuals are subordinated to the notion of the numerical unit. Indeed, the older view of such a social unit or individual -- extreme individualism based on 'natural law' and 'natural right' -- is now exploded, and it is recognized that each social group has for its unit a social individual, of a definite character peculiar to the group, rather than a mere individual liable to substitution for a similar unit in another group.

For the purposes of a formal sociology which seeks to establish the modes of organization common to all social groups, the assumption of a social unit of a highly abstract sort, a quasi-numerical unit, is legitimate. The term AGGREGATION (q.v.) is suggested for such a group of groups, or for a group capable of substitution in the social whole for any other group. Any social group thus becomes, for purposes of investigation, an aggregation (or mathematical group). Such a formal treatment of social life results in a social logic, properly so called. Its most fruitful application, no doubt, is found in the statistical investigations of social life in which -- as in similar problems of biology -- sufficiently large aggregations of individuals are taken to get results true of the average individual or abstract unit. Such treatment is illustrated in Pearson's Chances of Death and Durkheim's Suicide, and put to practical use in Life Insurance. See UNIT, NUMBER, and VARIATION; and for literature, SOCIOLOGY. (J.M.B.)

Group Selection: Ger. Gruppenselektion, Gruppenauslese; Fr. sélection des groupes; Ital. selezione di gruppo (or fra gruppi). NATURAL SELECTION (q.v.) operative upon social groups. Cf. SELECTION.

The competition or struggle for existence is here between groups as such, not between individuals, except as individuals' success contributes to the success -- stability, persistence, survival -- of the group. It is seen in all sorts of tribal and national competition, brought about by migration, rival occupation of territory, &c.; and in war, and commercial and social rivalry, in which one form or type of social life is imposed by one group upon another, whose type thus tends to disappear.

Pearson distinguishes between 'extra-group' and 'intra-group' competition (Chances of Death, i. 113); and Gumplowicz, who finds the group the 'social unit,' uses the terms Rassenkampf and Classenkampf (Social. u. Politik, 37, 53; cf. Barth, Philos. d. Gesch. als Sociol., i. 245).

Literature: BAGEHOT, Physics and Politics; ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress; BALDWIN, Social and Eth. Interpret., 1st ed. (where the term is suggested), § 120; 2nd ed., Appendix H. 2 (in French and German eds., § 313 a). (J.M.B.)

Growth (mental) [AS. growan, to be green]: Ger. psychisches Wachsen (Wachsthum); Fr. croissance (développement) psychique; Ital. sviluppo psichico (or mentale). The progressive differentiation and integration of experience in the individual, due to the persistence of the after-effects of previous mental process as conditions of subsequent mental process; that is, to the production of more or less permanent DISPOSITIONS (q.v.). (G.F.S.)

It is convenient to limit the terms growth and development to what takes place in the individual mind. EVOLUTION (q.v.) is the term recommended for the progressive emergence of higher mental stages from the phylogenetic point of view. A useful distinction between growth and development may be observed; development meaning the gradual unfolding of mental powers, only in so far as this is predetermined by congenital constitution. The term growth is then used distinctively to mark the part played in the process by the special circumstances and the connected experiences of the individual. Croom Robertson says this view is 'rendered much more definite when there is coupled with it a reference to the bodily conditions of mental life. In particular, we are thereby helped to conceive of the individual as endowed originally with definite mental capacities. . . . Organized, however, as the nervous system is at birth, it is then but imperfectly developed, responding with a small number of reactions to a few simple impressions, or expending its energy in random movements. . . . As the development of the system is then known to proceed, through childhood and youth, in dependence upon its inherent powers, more than upon (though not without) the presence of soliciting circumstances, we may more distinctly comprehend how new phases of mental life should from time to time manifest themselves, for which no explanation is to be sought in the foregoing conscious experience. While, again, the growth of the nervous system as a whole, and of its various parts, at each stage of development evidently proceeds in relation to the physical circumstances, naturally present or artificially supplied, so may we more clearly see how the mind will expand and acquire this disposition or that, according to the nature of the incidental experience or express instruction it receives.'

To this distinction may be added the one made under ANALYSIS between PSYCHIC (or MENTAL) AND PSYCHOLOGICAL (q.v.). The consciousness of the processes of change which determine growth is 'psychic' or mental experience; the changes to an outsider or theorist are psychological. (G.F.S.- J.M.B.)

Growth (physical). (1) The natural process of individual development.

(2) That part of individual development which is due to particular conditions, such as use and disuse, variations in nutrition, temperature, &c.

The first use is more general. We speak of the growth of a tree, the hair, a boy; of impeded or retarded growth. The distinction between development and growth, however, recommended under the preceding topic, has much to commend it in biology, growth being reserved for the variations in ontogenetic development due to changes in conditions of life, to use and function, &c. Cf. DEVELOPMENT (biological).

Literature: see the topics referred to under DEVELOPMENT. For observations on the growth of school children by BOWDITCH, BOAS, and others, see WILSON, Bibliog. of Child Study. (J.M.B.)

Guilt (ethical) [AS. gyldan, to pay]: Ger. Schuld; Fr. culpabilité; Ital. colpa. The state of having committed a crime, or consciously offended against moral law. The absence of guilt is innocence.

The view of guilt differs according as the standpoint is that of law or that of morality. From the former point of view guilt means transgression of a positive law, though this view is often modified in the judgment passed upon the act by taking into account the transgressor's knowledge or ignorance of the law, and even his temptations to transgress. From the moral point of view, consciousness of duty is of the essence of guilt. From this point of view it has been regarded as the contrary of merit. 'Merit is only present when the moral action is performed in opposition to a psychically present immoral tendency; guilt is present only when the immoral action is performed is spite of a psychically present moral consciousness.' See Simmel, Einl. in d. Moralwissenschaft, chap. iii. (W.R.S.)

Guilt (in law): see IGNORANCE, and INTENTION.

Guilt (in theology): Ger. Schuld (often Sünde); Fr. culpabilité; Ital. (stato di) colpa. Theologically, guilt is always associated with sin, particularly with original sin, but under certain limitations. These limitations appear so early as Paul, who distinguished sharply between amartia and paraptwma. The former is the general condition of defect due to Adam's fall; the latter is actual transgression, and, as such, is accompanied by guilt. Or, again, the former is a state common to humanity; the latter implies acts of individual men.

Choice, then, is regarded as an essential antecedent of guilt; for guilt is possible only, not actual, under God's permission of the fall. Positive transgression of the law of righteousness involves guilt, which, in turn, is recognized by self-consciousness or by 'conscience.' Guilt, then, is a realized issue of the liability to sin; as such it stands on a different level from legal guilt, for it implies that man has put a false infinite (himself) over against the true infinite (God), and has chosen to serve the former. In other words, timeless issues are set in motion; hence the last importance of the question. See FALL, and SIN.

Literature: SACK, in Stud. u. Krit. (1869); ROTHE, Theol. Ethik, iii. 1 f.; Herzog's Real-Encyc., art. Sünde; any treatise on dogmatics. (R.M.W.)

Gustatory Sensation: see TASTE SENSATION.

Gyrus [Gr. guroV, circle]: Ger. Windung; Fr. circonvolution; Ital. circonvoluzione. See BRAIN (glossary).