Classics in the History of Psychology

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Christopher D. Green
York University, Toronto, Ontario

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History of Psychology: A Sketch and an Interpretation
Volume II

PART V.

NINETEENTH CENTURY PSYCHOLOGY

Preliminary Survey. -- The nineteenth century has been called the "century of science." This is pre-eminently true, for the physical sciences proper -- physics, chemistry, and astronomy--came into their experimental heritage only in the first half of the century; and the biological sciences -- zoology, botany, and physiology -- acquired their independent position on receiving the impulse of the evolution theory in the second half. The motives already pointed out as naturalism and positivism came slowly into operation. The former involved the recognition of natural law in all the phenomena observed, and the latter the adoption of a strictly observational and experimental method. In the biological sciences the latter step was impossible as long as the "special creation " theory of species was entertained, making use, as it did, of logical principles of classification, and implying a philosophy of uncritical vitalism. The same influences held back the science of psychology -- in this case strengthened by the traditional claim of philosophical speculation to solve the problem of the soul. [p. 32]

The nineteenth century opened at a natural pause in the development of theories about the mind. In the flow of the great currents, certain eddies had formed late in the eighteenth century. The dogmatic movement in Germany had passed over into the critical; and Kant had attempted a new aesthetic reconciliation of the dualisms of "reason and practice," and "inner and outer." The Kantian psychology or anthropology is essentially a renewed subjectivism-that is, so far as it is critical. Neither scientific naturalism, nor positivism in the sense defined above, profited greatly from the work of Kant. Indeed, the explicit attempt to refute Hume, in the spirit of the logical critique, throws the weight of Kant as authority--to go no deeper--on the side of an obscurantist attitude toward facts. Historically, also, Kant led the way to what has been called the "romantic movement" from Fichte to Hegel. In Fries and Beneke a reaction sprang up in the direction of the empirical observation of consciousness.[l]

Again, in France an impulse was asserting itself away from the materialism of the sensationalists toward the frank and vital naturalism of J. J. Rousseau. Rousseau's return to the mental life, in all its fulness and immediacy, involved a truer naturalism than the view which ignored the significance of ideas and of the emotional functions in favour of sense-processes.

In England a science of psychology was clearly emerging at the openings of the nineteenth century. Locke had broached his subjective naturalism, which the French sensationalists, as we have seen, developed on one side only. Hobbes was a positivist, in much the same sense for our purposes as Auguste Comte later on. [p. 34] But it was in David Hume that the two requirements of a true science of psychology were consciously present. Hume treats mind as a part of nature: this is naturalism; and he also works at the problem of discovering the laws of mental change by actual observation: this is positivism. In both he is justified by his results; he is further justified by his extraordinary historical influence.

If, then, we are justified in saying that David Hume is one parent of the positive science of psychology -- in the sense of the word that places this subject in line with the other natural sciences, both as to its material and as to its method then we have to look for the other parent to France. Dropping the figure, we may say that Rousseau in France started an essential movement in the development of the science, vague and difficult of definition as Rousseau's personal influence is. Possibly, for reasons to be stated later on, this contribution should be called the Rousseau-Comte factor; as possibly, also, the British contribution should be called the Locke-Hume factor.

The influence of the Rousseau-Comte factor, to-day more undeveloped than the other but showing itself constantly more fertile, may be shown by a further appeal to the analogy with the individual's growth in personal self-consciousness. As an intimation of my meaning, I may refer to the Rousseau-Comte motif as the social or "collective," and the Locke-Hume motif as the personal or "individual."

Taking up the genetic parallel, we may remark that the positive method applied by Locke, Hume and the Mills in an individualistic sense, proved itself to be an inadequate instrument for the interpretation of the psychic material; since it not only neglected -- and still [p. 35] neglects -- the social side of life, but by so doing distorted the normal individual mind. In the development of the individual the thought of a separate personal "self" is a late outcome of reflection. The early stages of dualistic thought are thoroughly social. The mind-body dualism is an abstraction in both its terms; "mind " means many minds, and "body " many bodies. The material of self is, in its origin, collective, not individual. The immature child thinks of the self as a term in a social situation, as part of a larger whole.

If this is true, the science of mind must be one in which the concept of an isolated individual mental life is used as a logical abstraction, as an instrument of method rather than as a truth of analysis and explanation. Psychology should be a science in which the material is, so to speak, social rather than individual. This point has been worked out only in recent literature, and still only inadequately; but we may find the source of this type of collectivism in the French thinkers, Rousseau and Comte.

Besides these two great movements, credited respectively to Great Britain and France, modern naturalistic psychology has felt other important impulses. One of these came about the middle of the century in the rise of the evolution theory, anti from the side of biological science; another from German beginnings, and from the side of physical science. I shall speak of these respectively under the headings of Genetic Psychology, its pioneers being Lamarck and Darwin, and Mathematical and Experimental Psychology, founded by the Germans, Herbart, Fechner and Lotze.[2]

[p. 36] This properly scientific movement, however, did not supersede or discredit--for the philosophers at least--the rational type of interpretation. A new series of speculations, constituting the romantic movement following Kant, dominated German thought, and penetrated, in the form of Neo-Hegelianism, into England and the United States.[3] While the empirical and positivist movements of the nineteenth century have hallmarks of France-British origin, the new metaphysics of thought bears the label "made in Germany."

While these national distinctions are interesting, they cannot be made the headings of historical treatment; for it was the nineteenth century that saw the true internationalisation of science. We will, then, revert to the more intrinsic factors, using the national distinctions only incidentally, in treating of the nineteenth century development (not, however, always under these formal headings, which belong rather to the philosophical schools as such).

I. Philosophical Psychology since Kant--

II. Scientific Psychology in the Nineteenth Century, comprising-- [p. 37]

I. Philosophical Psychology since Kant. -- The flood of speculation immediately following Kant tended to subvert the empirical and scientific treatment of the mind. In this movement, however, the concept of the soul, considered as the self or "ego," underwent certain transformations. The recognition of reason as the synthetic and absolute principle asserted itself with variations in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

The pre-eminence assigned to the practical reason, by the author of the Critiques, led to the development of voluntarism in Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. In Schleiermacher and Schelling we see the affective motive struggling to assert itself. We have space only to single out the essential psychological conception of each of these philosophers, and state it in a few sentences.[4]

Fichte, J. G. (1763--1814), asserted the immanent, active, and teleological character of the self. It is immanent in all the empirical processes of the mind. This led to a rejection of the faculty conception of the [p. 38] mental powers, a functional conception being entertained in its stead; to the rejection of the association of ideas as adequate to explain the organisation of mental contents, an active synthetic process being substituted for it; and to the introduction of the genetic idea, interpreted in the sense of a teleological movement. The progress of mind was considered as the active working out of the absolute self-consciousness.

But this absolute self-consciousness is not individual; it is universal, Bewusstsein überhaupt. Its movement includes nature as a whole. Nature is a manifestation of free creative self-consciousness. Im Anfang war die Tat. The personal soul owes its individual character to the accidental nature of the relation of mind and body. The history of mental development is that of a series of oppositions between the self and the not-self, or "other," which the self posits. The other is a limitation set up over against self-expansion and self-realisation. This opposition shows itself in a series of stages issuing out of the unconscious--sensation, intuition, imaging, thought, and reason. In the active life there is a similar series of stages, from blind impulse up to free and absolute will. Body is the form which the limiting "other" takes on at the stage of sense-intuition. The original term, the fons et origo of all, is action, will. Fichte substitutes "I act" for the "I think" of Descartes and the "I feel"[5] of Hume.

In this we discern a psychological doctrine which allows for the results of observation and comprises a genuine genetic movement in the development of consciousness; but only, it is true, as the outcome of the rational presuppositions of absolute voluntarism. It has been called a psychology "from above," as that [p. 39]of the materialists is a psychology "from below." Mental processes are not observed, in the first instance, as facts, as scientific data; but as illustrations and evidences of the movement of a metaphysical principle of reality. As to its historical antecedents, we find here a renewal of the voluntarism of St. Augustine and Duns Scotus, and the development of the suggestion contained in the Critique of Practical Reason.

The same holds of the psychological views of Schelling and Hegel. They interpreted psychological processes heroically, romantically; life is an incident in the epic of the Absolute.

Schelling, F. W. J. (1775-1854), places greater emphasis on the evolution of nature, which is a sort of prehistoric chapter in the history. Unconscious spirit (Seele) has not yet passed into free and conscious mind (Geist): it slumbers in nature. The inorganic has in it the principle of self-consciousness, which goes on to be realised as consciousness in the organic and in man. The series of stages in the development of the mental principle are, with minor variations, those pointed out by Fichte.

The outcome of the teleological process of self-consciousness is, however, for Shelling, not thought or will, but their union in aesthetic construction and contemplation. Schelling carries further the hint given by Kant in the Urteilskraft, and which we have described above, using the term "pancalism." Art production to Schelling unites the theoretical motives of science and logic with the practical motives of life and conduct. Artistic creation goes beyond the mere reproductive and schematising imagination, and produces a work which fulfils at once all the partial ideals of the more special functions of the self. In it the oppositions of [p. 40] nature and mind, self and not-self, are overcome. Schelling gives to this aesthetic reconciliation an ontological value, rather in the spirit of Plato than in that of the experiential objectivity of Kant.[6]

In brief, Schelling teaches the radically functional nature of mental process. The inner life is a ceaseless movement of change, becoming (Werden). To this process the movement of the absolute self-consciousness gives teleological character: here is the refutation of all mechanical analogies and explanations. The consummation of the process, for psychology, is the production and appreciation of art.

In Hegel, G. W. F. (1770-1831), psychology both gains and loses ground. It loses by the development of absolutism into a theory of an impersonal rational principle. Mind interpreted as thought (Geist) objectifies itself in the world, and shows itself subjective in the individual mind. Objective mind, subjective mind, and absolute mind are the forms that the one principle takes on in the course of its evolution. For the interpretation of human history and natural history alike, a dialectical process of thought replaces the empirical laws of nature and mind. The saying of Schelling that [p. 41] the phenomenal event or law of consciousness is "only the monument and record" (Denkmal and Dokument) of the real, is literally carried out in the theory of Hegel.

Psychology loses by this in the sense that rational oppositions and logical rules are read into all the processes of the mind: the event means thought, whether or not it shows itself to be thought. The lower functions, even those of sense, are interpreted as embodying -- potentially, if not in actual form; implicitly, if not explicitly -- the character of logical process. Feeling to Hegel, as to Leibnitz, is a mode of obscure knowledge. This tendency has been brought out, free from all ambiguity, in the writings of the Neo-Hegelian school in England, led by T. H. Green of Oxford, who makes the essence of the real a "standing in relations" which are constituted by thought as well as cognised by it. Pre-logical consciousness is informed with self-consciousness. Sensation is immature thought.[7]

On this view, a genuine evolution, a creative evolution, in the historical development of the mind or in that of nature, is impossible. There can be merely a "becoming," which means a becoming explicit, an energeia already assumed to be present in dunamis.

But psychology gained through the work of Hegel as compared with that of Fichte. The very abstractness and absoluteness of Hegel's principle of thought renders it comparatively innocuous. Like Spinoza's substance, being incapable of definition, it is susceptible of all possible predications. A notion that becomes infinitely thin in intension becomes also infinitely broad in exten- [p. 42] sion. This shows itself en germe in Hegel's psychology as well as in his exposition of history. He works out, in the Phenomenology of Mind,[8] a genetic psychology in the sense of the schemes of Fichte and Schelling; but it is more free from the intrusion of rationalistic assumptions. He is able to recognise the results of empirical research--the laws of association, the modes of origin and development of thought, etc. -- since the presuppositions of the entire movement are not material, but formal and teleological.[9]

Once acknowledge that, whatever may happen, thought is realising itself by an inner dialectical law of its own nature -- and anything may happen![10] Hegel himself was more hospitable to scientific and positive psychology than are many of his followers, who are unable to tolerate the suggestion of an actual empirical derivation of the forms of thought. With them, as with Fichte and Schelling, thought has not entered into its full Hegelian heritage of abstractness.

Nevertheless, Hegel held that such a psychology, anthropological and phenomenal, was in no sense explanatory.[11] The teleological movement of thought, [p. 43] through the entire series of modes of mental process, is third alternative for him the only explanation. No exists between the purely mechanical and the teleological interpretations. The theory of radical evolution, according to which novelties may be produced, new genetic creations, in the course of a purely natural movement of development, was not then in evidence. To Hegel and his followers formal cause -- using the terms of Aristotle -- is necessarily associated with final cause. The only explanatory psychology to Hegel was that which deals with the third and highest stage of mental development, the stage of freedom, which is the synthesis of idea and will. In this the absolute principle of thought, the immanent cause of the entire movement, achieves its end.

In the modern psychology of "form-quality" and "complexes,"[12] however, and in the recent development of genetic logic, the problems of the nature find origins of form are isolated from those of finality. In biology, also, morphology is no longer committed in advance to a teleological view of the life-process. So also in the "opposition " made the motive of advance from mode to mode of mental life in the Hegelian dialectic, we may [p. 44] see a formal rendering of the experiences of embarrassment, perplexity and urgency of adaptation, made much of in the modern genetic theories.

In short, Hegel's psychology presents to us a sort of shadowy, abstract and formal simulacrum of the positive genetic movement of the mental life. It permits science, but it hardly advances it. The kinship of Hegel's genetic view to Aristotle's is plain[13]; but to many minds there is no question that the latter's biological interpretation of the relation of matter and form is more fruitful than the purely logical one of Hegel. Throughout this, the heroic period of German speculation, certain psychological points of view were incidentally placed in evidence. The genetic conception came to supersede the theory of faculties in both its forms, critical and dogmatic. The conception of the one ultimate and irreducible psychic function replaced the notion of an original "element" or content. For Fichte, this function was will; for Schelling, synthetic intuition or feeling; for Hegel, thought. Thus the alternatives of later functional theory were all suggested--those of intellectualism, voluntarism and affectivism.

The theory of unconscious mind anticipated later views, both psychological and metaphysical.

Moreover, the teleological conception went with the functional, in opposition to the mechanical and structural. In this the modern issue between apperceptionism, in its various forms, and presentationism, also in many forms, was clearly drawn. But these questions were not discussed for themselves. They were resolved incidentally in the development of deductive systems.

Schleiermacher, F. E. D. (1768-1834). Later German [p. 45] views consisted largely of re-statements of these positions.

Schleiermacher drew attention again to the actual concomitance of mind and body, and founded the distinction between receptive and active or "spontaneous" functions upon the physiological distinction between excitation and movement. In tracing the two sides of the mental life, knowledge and practice, he distinguished in each the aspect which refers to external objects from that which refers to the self; and under the latter heading gave an important place to feelings and sentiment. Sentiment is the sphere in which the powers are no longer held to concrete objects, but establish the ideals of art, morals, and religion. Art production is a free autotelic development on the side of the spontaneous powers. The analysis of religious emotion into feelings of dependence and feelings of awe or reverence has remained a contribution to the psychology of religion.

In Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) the priority of will becomes fixed in a metaphysical system of voluntarism. Unconscious will is the active principle of nature. Intelligence enters into consciousness as an accompaniment of brain organisation. It is only in E. von Hartmann (1842-1906), however, that the voluntaristic theory allies itself positively with science, seeking systematic confirmation of the presence of will in nature. It is found in the show of instinct and animal impulse throughout the living world. With von Hartmann, as with Schopenhauer, the doctrines of will and the unconscious go hand in hand.

Spiritualism in England. -- While in Germany the Kantian criticism dominated thought, being the weapon of the opposition to Hume, in England and France this opposition took on the form of a new spiritualism. [p. 46] The "moral philosophy" of England, the "natural realism" of Scotland, and "psychological voluntarism" of France, all made use of a spiritual concept of the mind. The soul was a personal principle, not a mere bundle of states.

The English moral philosophy took up the problem from the point of view of ethics, attempting to point out the original springs of action and to define certain native "instincts " and "propensities." This set a new fashion: it brought into disfavour the treatment of the moral life in a subordinate way and as secondary to the intellectual. The questions of the moral end, the moral motive and sanction, moral sympathy, etc., suggested an investigation of passion and sentiment in all its range. In the writings of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Clarke, and Adam Smith this investigation was conducted with fruitful results for psychology no less than ethics. By this examination of the practical and emotional life the foundations were laid in psychology for the utilitarian and intuitional ethics. For both of these moral systems are empirical and psychological, in contrast with the rational and formal theories which had been developed in Germany.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), met the adversary by a direct mental analysis. He showed, as against Hobbes, that sensation was not the only source of knowledge; and as against the disciples of Hobbes, that all action was not prompted by self-love. On the other hand, the analysis of sympathy and of the altruistic impulses by the utilitarian thinkers (Adam Smith, Bentham) carried on the tradition of self-love descended from Hobbes. In later utilitarianism (Spencer, L. Stephen) the moral imperative was grounded in habit and racial custom, by an [p. 47] analysis which made a beginning in the direction of social psychology.

The same interest in the practical life led to the distinction of the moral from the aesthetic and intellectual sentiments. Home pointed out the contemplative character of aesthetic enjoyment, by which it was contrasted with the active movements of the passions; and Hutcheson worked out a theory of the beautiful. The resort to immediate intuition corresponded, in the intellectual life, to the recognition of these original instincts and tendencies in the affective life, practical and sentimental, and became, under the name of "common sense," the catch-word of the Scottish school of spiritualistic dualists.

Scottish Natural Realism. -- The Scottish realists restored, in a sense, the "faculty conception" in psychology, by their doctrine of common sense or mental "instinct"; for the multiplication of the sources of original intuition, primitive knowledge, direct apprehension, etc., closed the door to more thorough analysis, and left each "power " or faculty standing on its own feet. The direct appeal to consciousness, however superficial the scrutiny of consciousness might be, came to have the value of finality. Only the most compelling results of preceding analysis -- such as the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter -- were reckoned with. The Scots gained a certain breadth and liberality of observation from this; but at the cost of being led to take things for what they seem, and of running the risk of the pitfall of superficiality --the one crime in philosophy![14] [p. 48]

Thomas Reid (1710-1796), the founder of this school, has the significance of having restored--for a considerable career -- a dogmatic dualism. Psychology profited by this in that it awoke from its dream of extreme subjectivism. One immediate result was the further extension of the theory of association of ideas. In the works of Thomas Brown and Dugald Stewart, together with those of James Mill and his son John Stuart Mill, not to go further, the laws of association were extended in detail to feelings and states of activity. It was brought out in the course of refined and fruitful analyses Of the "cognitive powers" and "motive powers" -- a two-fold classification of functions which restored that of Aristotle. Brown, treating association under the heading of "suggestion," made common elements of feeling the link between associated ideas.

Later Associationism in England. -- James Mill (1773-1836) developed a systematic psychology on the basis of sensation, the single original mental element; and association, the single principle of organisation, of which contiguity was the fundamental form. In this James Mill supported the sensationalism of Condillac with great breadth and accuracy of observation.

Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856)[15] reduced the laws of association to one, that of "redintegration"; the parts of an original whole tend to be re-integrated again, or restored to their original form, on being [p. 49] separately revived; each part calls up other parts. This is substantially a repetition of the formula of Christian Wolff. Hamilton, also, having a knowledge of the German idealists, recognised more adequately than others of the Scottish school, to which he belonged, the subjective factors of perception and knowledge.

In John Stuart Mill (1806--1873) a new departure appears in British thought, inasmuch as in him the influence of Comte began to show itself. Stuart Mill absorbed the philosophical agnosticism of the Comtean view, and led the British Positivist movement; but his psychology failed--more than his logic and ethics--to absorb the social or collectivist motive with which the teaching of Comte was informed. The influence of Stuart Mill upon English thought has been enormous -- perhaps second only to that of Hume -- but his positive theories are in the realms of scientific method and inductive logic, and of the utilitarian ethics; not in that of psychology proper.[16]

French Spiritualism. -- The movement in France took on at first a more original form than in England--that of a voluntarism proceeding upon the psychology of the active life.

[p. 50] Pierre Laromiguiere, Maine de Biran, and T. S. Jouffroy analysed volition and found a primitive "sense of effort," much in the sense of that pointed out by Locke. With this weapon they combated the sensationalistic analyses of Condillac and Berkeley, and opposed the prevalent agnosticism.

Laromiguiere (1756-1837) supplemented the narrower view of sensation by the recognition of feeling, which extended, as he said, to the consciousness of cognitive and volitional processes. He isolated " feelings of relation" and "moral feelings." The sense of mental activity resided in the attention, on the intellectual side, as well as in the original effort or impulse, on the voluntary side. It is in the attention that the cognitive processes of comparison and judgment take place.

The beginning of the study of the attention by Condillac and Laromiguiere is noteworthy. The attention is the citadel of spiritual and activity theories of mental process in modern psychology; and it is astonishing that it remained so long outside the range of interest. Condillac interpreted the attention in terms of the inhibition of other sensations by the high intensity of the one attented[sic] to; an anticipation of the "intensity" theory of attention as held to-day. Laromiguiere, on the contrary, asserted the active character of attention, giving the cue to later functional and "motor" theories. From these beginnings the role of attention has become one of the central problems of modern philosophical and descriptive psychology.

Maine de Biran (1776-1824) followed with a definite psychological voluntarism. He proceeded from the Augustinian postulate volens sum, founding this intuition upon the opposition felt in experiences of voluntary effort against resistance. He went further than Laro-[p. 51] [figure] [p. 52] miguiere in developing what have been called the "dynamic categories"[17] -- force, cause, substance, etc. -- from these original experiences of personal activity. This is, in its results, in sharp contrast with the Humian derivation of these ideas; but it employs the weapons of Hume, since it reposes upon the activities which Hume summarised in his theory of habit. If we say with Hume that habit is that element by which psychic contents are bound together in unity and connection, then we may go on to a further analysis of habit on the functional side. This is the procedure of certain modern psychologists who agree with Hume that habit results in a solidification of contents; by these psychologists, habit in turn is analysed into modes of synergy and assimilation in "motor processes," to which perhaps the attention itself is originally due.

In Jouffrey (1796-1842) a further development followed, not so much in the way of increased system as in that of increased vitality, through the presence of a certain romanticism and impressionism. Jouffroy might be called the Rousseau of spiritualism, so similar is his call "back to life" to that of the great thinker of Geneva. Both uttered the sentimental equivalent of the logical demand of the formalists, "back to Kant." And the two movements, sentimental and formal, stirred up the positive spirit of science in the person of Auguste Comte. The same spirit had been stirred up similarly in the person of Francis Bacon.

In this interesting departure of French voluntarism, a contribution was made to psychology different from that made by the British moral philosophers, although they have points in common. Both emphasise the [p. 53] affective and volitional life, both suggest functional considerations over against structural, and each implies in a certain way a faculty theory. But the French development was perhaps more profound and lasting in its influence, since it issued in points of view more important for psychology than those of natural instinct and common sense. The most fruitful result, indeed, of the moral-sense movement in England was the laying of the psychological foundation of utilitarianism; but this was a departure from the spiritualistic assumption in the direction of naturalism.

In France the period closed with an Eclecticism [18] which borrowed directly from the natural realism of Scotland. In France, too, as in England, this was made the ecclesiastical weapon against free thought.

[1] On these two men see the notices given in Dessoir, loc. cit., pp. 180 ff.

[2] An interesting work on the German group is G. S. Hall's Founders of Modern Psychology, 1912. See also Ribot's German Psychology of To-Day.

[3] In England it produced an extensive school--Green, Caird, Bosanquet, Bradley; in American its most prominent representatives are W. T. Harris and John Watson.

[4] Among general works, Hoffding's History of Philosophy, Vol. II, is a late and able exposition.

[5] Understood as "I sense," or "I have a sensation."

[6] Dessoir (loc. cit., p. 65f.) gives a full note on this position of Schelling; he says: "The theoretical and the practical, reason and sense, nature and mind, unconscious and conscious, lose their oppositions in art, which is the highest activity of the self. Above and beyond theoretical knowledge and practical need is the spiritual environment of beauty, just as beyond both forms of striving, the artistic phantasy proceeds, a heavenly faculty, which has nothing in common with the prosaic 'imagination' of the old psychology." In the present writer's volume, Interest and Art (Vol. III of Thought and Things), a detailed research is instituted in the psychology of the aesthetic experience, and the results are interpreted in an empirical pancalistic theory (to be developed in Vol. IV) which gives support to these speculative conclusions of Schelling. Cf. also The Psychological Review, May 1908.

[7] The works of Edward Caird in philosophy and of Hobhouse in psychology show this rationalising of the lower functions of consciousness.

[8] Hegel, Die Phenomenologie des Geistes.

[9] Schelling, on the contrary, considered the soul as material, no less than formal and final cause (cf. Harms, loc. cit., p. 360) of the entire cosmic process, of which it became the "microcosmus," a picture of the whole.

[10] If in accordance with the famous saying of Hegel, Sein gleicht Nichts, "being equals nothing," then no " something," no phenomenal fact, can contradict being. But this is to say that, for scientific and psychological purposes, the pure Hegel equals Hume. This tendency of absolutism to become abstract appears in later forms of voluntarism also (as in Rickert and Munsterberg), in which full dominion over the world of fact is given to science, the philosophical reservation of an absolute value not interfering with it.

[11] Anthropologie was for Hegel the science of the mind as interpreting the first level, that of feeling, which included all that
feeling might imply individually and in racial culture (the mind in its relation to body). Phenomenologie was the theory of mind in the second stage, that of "subjective mind," i.e., consciousness, together with its explicit mode self-consciousness, and the functions of intelligence, knowledge, and reason. The third stage, that of freedom, is the matter of Psychologie, as is noted further on in the text. Over against all this, the history of "subjective mind," there is that of "objective mind," active in nature and embodied in social institutions, in morality, in the state, etc. Finally, we come to "absolute mind," realising itself in art and religion, and in their synthesis in absolute knowledge. This last is the domain of the free development of science and philosophy.

[12] Developed by the Austrian school of psychologists in recent years. See Hofler, Psychologie.

[13] Cf. the citation from Hegel (Encyclopadie, Par. 378) made by Klemm, loc. cit., p. 70.

[14] It appears that the theological interest in natural realism and the philosophy of common sense had much to do with their currency. Dogmatic spiritualism was the theory of the soul taught by Christian theology. This appears especially in the form in which philosophy and psychology were imported from Scotland to America and maintained there up to about 1880. Noah Porter and James McCosh were exponents of official psychology in the Universities, and both were Reformed clergymen.

[15] Hamilton's erudition was remarkable, His pages retain a further value by reason of their very full--if not always accurate--historical summaries and citations.

[16] It is a sorry fact for psychology in Britain that both the movements of philosophical thought by which speculative and practical interests have been recently directed -- Comteism and Neo-Hegelianism -- were foreign importations, which obscured for the time the clear British psychological vision and deadened its sound tradition. Only just now, after much travail, has psychology found a place in the universities, and it still lives on the crumbs that fall front the table of logic and metaphysics. It is extraordinary that the country of Bacon, Locke, and Hume should not have been the first to welcome the experimental treatment of the mind. The empirical tradition in its descriptive form was, however, maintained by Bain and Shadworth Hodgson, both referred to again.

[17] Cf. Ormond, The Foundations of Knowledge, Chaps. V and VIII, who carries out the same sort of analysis with great power.

[18] Imposed with authority upon official French thought by Victor Cousin and Paul Janet until the rebirth of speculation in Renouvier.