Classics in the History of Psychology

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Christopher D. Green
York University, Toronto, Ontario

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Translated by Charles Hubbard Judd (1897)

2. GENERAL THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY

1.. The view that psychology is an empirical science which deals, not with a limited group of specific contents of experience, but with the immediate contents of all experience, is of recent origin. It encounters even in the science of today hostile views, which are to be looked upon, in general, as the survivals of earlier stages of development, and which are in turn arrayed against one another according to their attitudes on the question of the relations of psychology to philosophy and to the other sciences. On the basis of the two definitions mentioned above (sec.1, 1) as being the most widely accepted, two chief forms of psychology may be distinguished: metaphysical psychology and empirical psychology. Each is further divided into a number of special tendencies.

Metaphysical psychology generally values very little the empirical analysis and causal interpretation of psychical processes. Regarding psychology as a part of philosophical metaphysics, the chief effort of such psychology is directed toward the discovery of a definition of the "nature of mind" which shall be in accord with the metaphysical system to which the particular form of psychology belongs. After a metaphysical concept of mind has thus been established, the attempt is made to deduce from it the actual content of psychical experience. The characteristic which distinguishes metaphysical psychology from empirical psychology, then, is its attempt to deduce psychical processes, not from other psychical processes, but from some [p. 7] substratum entirely unlike these processes themselves: either from the manifestations of a special mind­substance, or from the attributes and processes of matter. At this point metaphysical psychology branches off in two directions. Spiritualistic psychology considers psychical the manifestations of a specific mind­substance, which is regarded either as essentially different form matter (dualism), or as related in nature to matter (monism or monadalogy). The fundamental metaphysical doctrine of spiritualistic psychology is the assumption of the supersensible nature of mind, and in connection with this, the assumption of its immortality. Sometimes the further notion of preexistence is also added. Materialistic psychology, on the other hand refers psychical processes to the same material substratum as that which natural science employs for the hypothetical explanation of natural phenomena. According to this view, psychical processes, like physical vital processes, are connected with certain organizations of material particles which are formed during the life of the individual and broken up at the end of that life. The metaphysical character of this form of psychology is determined by its denial that the mind is supersensible in its nature as is asserted by spiritualistic psychology. Both theories have this in common, that they seek not to interpret psychical experience from experience itself, but to derive it from presuppositions about hypothetical processes in a metaphysical substratum.

2. From the strife that followed these attempts at metaphysical explanation, empirical psychology arose. Wherever empirical psychology is consistently carried out, it strives either to arrange psychical processes under general concepts derived directly from the interconnection of these processes themselves, or it begins with certain, as a rule simpler processes, and then explains the more complicated as the result of the interaction of those with which it started. There may be various fun-[p. 8]damental principles for such an empirical interpretation, and thus it becomes possible to distinguish several varieties of empirical psychology. In general, these may be classified according to two principles of division. The first has reference to the relation of inner and outer experience and to the attitude which the two empirical sciences, natural science and psychology, take toward each other. The second had reference to the facts or concepts derived from these facts, which are used for the interpretation of psychical processes. Every system of empirical psychology takes its place under both of these principles of classification.

3. On the general question as to the nature of psychical experience the two views already mentioned. (sec. 1) on account of their decisive significance in determining the problem of psychology: psychology of hte inner sense, and psychology as the science of immediate experience. The first treats psychical processes as contents of a sphere of experience coordinate with the sphere of experiences which, derived through the outer senses, is assigned as the province of the natural sciences, but though coordinate is totally different from it. The second recognizes no real difference between inner and outer experience, but finds the distinction only in the different points of view from which unitary experience is considered in the two cases.

The first of these two varieties of empirical psychology is the older. It arose primarily through the effort to establish the independence of psychical observation in opposition to the encroachments of natural philosophy. In thus coordinating natural science and psychology, it sees the justification for the equal recognition of both spheres of science in the fact that they have entirely different objects and modes of perceiving these objects. This view has influenced empirical psychology in two ways. First, it favored the opinion that psychology should employ empirical [p. 9] methods, but that these methods, like psychological experience, should be fundamentally different from those of natural science. Secondly, it gave rise to the necessity of showing some connection or other between these two kinds of experience, which were supposed to be different. In regard to the first demand, it was chiefly the psychology of the inner sense that developed the method of pure introspection (sec. 3, 2). In attempting to solve the second problem, this psychology was necessarily driven back to a metaphysical basis, because of its assumption of a difference between the physical and the psychical contents of experience. For, from the very nature of the case, it is impossible, to account for the relations of inner to outer experience, or the so­called "interaction between body and mind", from the position here taken, except through metaphysical presuppositions. These presuppositions must then, in turn, affect the psychological investigation itself in such a way as to result in the importation of metaphysical hypotheses into it.

4. Essentially distinct from the psychology of the inner sense is the form of psychology which defines itself as "the science of immediate experience". Regarding, as it does, outer and inner experience, not as different parts of experience, but as different ways of looking at one and the same experience, this form of psychology can not admit any fundamental difference between the methods of psychology and those of natural science. It has, therefore, sought above all to cultivate experimental methods which shall lead to just such an exact analysis of psychical processes as that which the explanatory natural sciences undertake in the case of natural phenomena, the only differences being those which arise from the diverse points of view. It holds, also, that the special mental sciences which have to do with concrete mental processes and creations, stand on the same basis of a scientific consideration of the immediate contents of [p. 10] experience and of their relations to acting subjects. It follows, then, that psychological analysis of the most general mental products, such as language, mythological ideas, and laws of custom, is to be regarded as an aid to the understanding of all the more complicated psychical processes. In its methods, accordingly, this form of psychology stands in close relation to other sciences: as experimental psychology, to the natural sciences; as social psychology, to the special mental sciences.

Finally, from this point of view, the question of the relation between psychical and physical objects disappears entirely. They are not different objects at all, but one and the same content of experience, looked at in one case -- that of the natural sciences -- after abstracting from the subject, in the other -- that of psychology -- in their immediate character and complete relation to the subject. All metaphysical hypotheses as to the relation of psychical and physical objects are, when viewed from this position, attempts to solve a problem which never would have existed if the case had been correctly stated. Though psychology must then dispense with metaphysical supplementary hypotheses in regard to the interconnection of psychical processes, because these processes are the immediate contents of experience, still another method of procedure, however, is open since inner and outer experience are supplementary points of view. Wherever breaks appear in the interconnection of psychical processes, it is allowable to carry on the investigation according to the physical methods of considering these same processes, in order to discover whether the absent link can be thus supplied. The same holds for the reverse method of filling up the breaks in the continuity of our physiological knowledge, by means of elements derived from psychological investigation. Only on the basis of such a view, which sets the two forms of knowledge in their true relation, is it, possible for psycholo-[p. 11]gy to become in the fullest sense an empirical science. Only in this way, too, can physiology become the true supplementary science of psychology, and psychology, on the other hand, the auxiliary of physiology.

5. Under the second principle of classification mentioned above (2), that is, according to the facts or concepts with which the investigation of psychical processes starts, there are two varieties of empirical psychology to be distinguished. They are, at the same time, successive stages in the development of psychological interpretation. The first corresponds to a descriptive, the second to an explanatory stage. The attempt to present a discriminating description of the different psychical processes, gave rise to the need of an appropriate classification. Class­concepts were formed, under which the various processes were grouped; and the attempt was made to satisfy the need of an interpretation in each particular case, by subsuming the components of a given compound process under their proper class­concepts. Such concepts are, for example, sensation, knowledge, attention, memory, imagination, understanding, and will. They correspond to the general concepts of physics which are derived from the immediate perception of natural phenomena, such as weight, heat, sound, and light. Like those concepts of physics, these derived psychical concepts may serve for a first grouping of the facts, but they contribute nothing whatever to the explanation of these facts. Empirical psychology has, however, often been guilty of confounding this description with explanation. Thus, the faculty-psychology considered these class­concepts as psychical forces or faculties, and referred psychical processes to their alternating or united activity.

6. Opposed to this method of treatment found in descriptive faculty­psychology, is that of explanatory psychology. When consistently empirical, the latter must base its inter-[p. 12]pretations on certain facts which themselves belong to psychical experience. These facts may, however, be taken from different spheres of psychical activity, and so it comes that explanatory treatment may be further divided into two varieties which correspond respectively to the two factors, objects and subject, which go to make up immediate experience. When the chief emphasis is laid on the objects of immediate experience, intellectualistic psychology. This type of psychology attempts to derive all psychical processes, especially the subjective feelings, impulses, and volitions, from ideas, or intellectual processes as they may be called on account of their importance for knowledge of the objective world. If, on the contrary, the chief emphasis is laid on the way in which immediate experience arises in the subject, a variety of explanatory psychology results which attributes to those subjective activities referred to external objects, a position as independent as that assigned to ideas. This variety has been called voluntaristic psychology, because of the importance that must be conceded to volitional processes in comparison with other subjective processes.

Of the two varieties of psychology which result from the general attitudes on the question of the nature of inner experience (3), psychology of the inner sense commonly tends towards intellectualism. This is due to the fact that, when the inner sense is coordinated with the outer senses, the contents of psychical experience which first attract consideration are those which are presented as objects to this inner sense in a manner analogous to the presentation of natural objects to the outer senses. It is assumed that the character of objects can be attributed to ideas alone of all the contents of psychical experience, because they are regarded as images of the external objects presented to the outer senses. Ideas are, accordingly, looked upon as the only real objects of the inner sense while all processes not referred to external objects, as, [p. 13] for example, the feelings, are interpreted as obscure ideas, or as ideas related to one's own body, or, finally, as effects arising from combinations of ideas.

The psychology of immediate experience (4), on the other hand, tends toward voluntarism. It is obvious that here, where the chief problem of psychology is held to be the investigation of the subjective rise of all experience, special attention will be devoted to those factors from which natural science abstracts.

7. Intellectualistic psychology has in the course of its development separated into two trends. In one, the logical processes of judgment and reasoning are regarded as the typical forms of all psychoses; in the other, certain combinations of successive memory-images distinguished by their frequency, the so­called associations of ideas, are accepted as such. The logical theory is most clearly related to the popular method of psychological interpretation and is, therefore, the older. It still finds some acceptance, however, even in modern times. The association-theory arose from the philosophical empiricism of the last century. The two theories stand to a certain extent, in antithesis, since the first attempts to reduce the totality of psychical processes to higher, while the latter seeks to reduce it to the lower and, as it is assumed, simpler forms of intellectual activity. Both are one­sided, and not only fail to explain affective processes and volitional processes on the basis of the assumption with which they start, but are not able to give a complete interpretation even of the intellectual processes.

8. The union of psychology of the inner sense with the intellectualistic view has led to a peculiar assumption that has been in many cases fatal to psychological theory. We may define this assumption briefly as the erroneous attribution of the nature of things to ideas, to ideas. Not only was an analogy [p. 14] assumed between the objects of so­called inner sense and those of the outer senses, but former were regarded as the images of the latter; it came that the attributes which natural science ascribes to external objects, were also transferred to the immediate objects of the "inner sense", the ideas. The assumption was made that ideas are themselves things, just as the external objects to which we refer them; that they disappear from consciousness and come back into it; that they may, indeed, be more or less intensely and clearly perceived, according as the inner sense is stimulated through the outer senses or not, and according to the degree of attention concentrated upon them, but that on the they remain unchanged in qualitative character.

9. In all these respects voluntaristic psychology is opposed to intellectualism. While the latter assumes an inner sense and specific objects of inner experience, volunteerism is closely related to the view that inner experience is identical with immediate experience. According to this doctrine, the content psychological experience does not consist of a sum of objects, but of all that which makes up the process of experience in general, that is of all the experiences of the subject in their immediate character, unmodified by abstraction or reflection. It follows of necessity that the contents of psychological experience are here regarded as an interconnection of processes.

This concept of process excludes the attribution of an objective and more or less permanent character to the contents of psychical experience. Psychical facts are occurrences, not objects; they take place, like all occurrences, in time and are never the same at a given point in time as they were during the preceding moment. In this sense volitions are typical for all psychical porcesses. Voluntaristic psychology does not by any means assert that volition is the only real form of psychosis, but merely that, with its closely related [p. 15] feelings and emotions, it is just as essential a component of psychological experience as sensations and ideas. It holds, further, that all other psychical processes are to be thought of after the analogy of volitions, they too being a series of continuous changes in time, not a sum of permanent objects, as intellectualism generally assumes in consequence of its erroneous attribution to ideas of those properties which we attribute to external objects. The recognition of the immediate reality of psychological experience excludes the possibility of the attempt to derive the particular components of psychical phenomena from any others specifically different. The analogous attempts of metaphysical psychology to reduce all psychological experience to the heterogeneous, imaginary processes of a hypothetical substratum are, for the same reason, inconsistent with the real problem of psychology. While it concerns itself, however, with immediate experience, psychology assumes from the first that all psychical contents contain objective as well a subjective factors. These are to be distinguished only through deliberate abstraction, and can never appear as really separate processes. In fact, immediate experience shows that there are no ideas which do not arouse in us feelings and impulses of different intensities, and, on the other hand, that a feeling or volition is impossible which does not refer to some ideated object.

10. The governing principles of the psychological position maintained in the following chapters may be summed up in three general statements.

1) Inner, or psychological experience is not a special sphere of experience apart from others, but is immediate experience in its totality.

2) This immediate experience is not made up of unchanging contents but of an interconnection of processes; not of objects, but of occurrences, of universal human experiences and their relations in accordance with certain laws.

[p. 16] 3) Each of these processes contains an objective content and a subjective process, thus including the general conditions both of all knowledge and of all practical human activity.

Corresponding to these three general principles, we have a threefold relation of psychology to the other sciences.

1) As the science of immediate experience, it is supplementary to the natural sciences, which, in consequence of their abstraction from the subject, have to do only with the objective, mediate contents of experience. Any particular fact can, strictly speaking, be understood in its full significance only after it has been subjected to the analyses of both natural science and psychology. In this sense, then, physics and physiology are auxiliary to psychology, and the latter is, in turn, supplementary to the natural sciences.

2) As the science of the universal forms of immediate human experience and their combination in accordance with certain laws, it is the foundation of the mental sciences. The subject-matter of these sciences is in all cases of the activities proceeding from immediate human experiences, and their effects. Since psychology has for its problem the investigation of the forms and laws of these activities, it is at once the most, general mental science, and the foundation for all the others, such as philology, history, political economy, jurisprudence, etc.

3) Since psychology pays equal attention to both the subjective and objective conditions which underlie not only theoretical knowledge, but practical activity as well, and since it seeks to determine their interrelation, it is the empirical discipline whose results are most immediately useful in the invention of the general problems of the theory of knowledge, and ethics, the two foundations of philosophy. Thus, psychology is, in relation to the natural sciences, the supplementary, in relation to the mental sciences the fundamental, and [p. 17] in relation to philosophy it is the propaedeutic empirical science.

10a. The view that it is not a difference in the objects of experience, but in the way of treating experience, that distinguishes psychology from natural science has come to be recognized more and more in modern psychology. Still a clear comprehension of the essential charactor of this position in regard to the scientific problems of psychology, is prevented by the persistence of older tendencies derived from metaphysics and natural philosophy. Instead of starting from the fact that the natural sciences are possible only after abstracting from the subjective factors of experience, the more general problem of treating the contents of all experience in the most general way, is sometimes assigned to natural science. In such a case psychology is, of course, no longer coordinate with the natural sciences, but subordinate to them. Its problem is no longer to remove the abstraction employed by the natural sciences, and in this way to gain with them a complete view of experience, but it has to use the concept "subject" furnished by the natural sciences, and to give an account of the influence of this subject on the contents of experience. Instead of recognizing that an adequate definition of "subject" is possible only as a result of psychological investigations (sec. 1, 3a), a finished concept formed exclusively by the natural sciences is here foisted upon psychology. Now. for the natural sciences the subject identical with the body. Psychology is accordingly defined as the science which has to determine the dependence of immediate experience on the body. This position, which may be designated "psycho-physical materialism", is epistemologically untenable and psychologically unproductive. Natural science, which purposely abstracts from the subjective component of all experience, is at least in a position to give a final definition of the subject. A psychology that starts with such a purely physiological definition depends, therefore, not on experience but, just like the older materialistic psychology, on a metaphysical presupposition. The position is psychologically unproductive because, from the very first, it turns over the causal interpretation of psychical processes to physiology. But physiology has not yet furnished such an interpretation and never [p. 18] will be able to do so, because of the difference between the manner of regarding phenomena in natural science and in psychology. It is obvious, too, that such a form of psychology, which been turned into hypothetical brain-mechanics, con never be of any service as a basis for the mental sciences.

The strictly empirical trend of psychology, defined in the principles formulated above, is opposed to these attempts to renew metaphysical doctrines. In calling it "voluntaristic", we are not to overlook the fact that, in itself, this psychological voluntarism has absolutely no connection with any metaphysical doctrine of will. Indeed it stands in opposition to Schopenhauer's one-sided metaphysical voluntarism, which derived all from being from a transcendental original will, and to the metaphysical systems of a Spinoza or a Herbart, which arose from intellectualism. In its relation to metaphysics, the characteristic of psychological voluntarism in the sense above defined, is its exclusion of all metaphysics from psychology. In its relations to other forms of psychology, it refuses to accept any of the attempts to reduce volitions to mere ideas, and at the same time emphasizes the typical character of volition for all psychological experience. Volitional acts are universally recognized as occurrences, made up of a series of continual changes in quality and intensity. They are typical in the sense that this characteristic of being occurrences is held to he true for all the contents of psychical experience.

[1] Classics Editor's note: In the 3^rd Enlgish edition of Outlines (Judd, Trans, 1907), Wundt included the following short essays about sources for the various forms of psychology reviewed in this Introduction.

In their historical development many of these forms of psychology have grown up together. One may, however, mark off certain general sequences. Thus, metaphysical forms have generally preceded empirical forms; descriptive forms have preceded explanatory; and finally, intellectualism has preceded voluntarism. The oldest work which treated of psychology as an independent science was ARISTOTLE'S work entitled "On the Soul". This work is to be classified as belonging to the dualistic group in its metaphysics, and to the group of faculty­psychologies on the side of its empirical explanations. (The soul was treated as the living principle in the body. There were three fundamental faculties, namely, alimentation, sensation, and thought,) Modern spiritualistic psychology begins with DESCARTES' dualism which recognizes two distinct forms of reality: first, the soul as a thinking and unextended entity, and second, matter as an extended and nonthinking reality. The Cartesian system found the point of contact between these two forms of reality in a particular region of the human brain, namely, the, pineal gland. The founder of modern materialism is THOMAS HOBBES (1588­1679). (The ancient materialistic dualism of DEMOCRATES had not yet differentiated itself from spiritualistic dualism). HOBBES, together with LA METTRIE and HOLBACH developed in the 18th century a mechanical materialism, while DIDEROT and HELVETIUS developed a psycho­physical materialism which has representatives even in present times. Spiritualistic monism first arose in the monadology of LEIBNIZ. In modern times this has been taken up by HERBART and his school, by LOTZE, and others. The establishment of the psychology of the inner sense may be properly attributed to JOHN LOCKE (1632­1704). This form of psychology has been defended in modern times, to some extent by KANT, and with special emphasis by EDUARD BENEKE, (1798­1854), K. FORTLAGE, and others. Modern faculty­psychology arose with the work of CHRISTIAN WOLFF (1679­1754), who distinguished as the chief faculties, knowledge and desire. Since the time of TETENS (1736­1805) three faculties have been more commonly accepted than WOLFF'S two. PLATO named these three, as did also KANT. They are knowledge, feeling and desire. Logical intellectualism is the oldest of the explanatory forms of psychology. This corresponds directly to the popular interpretation of psychical processes. The earlier empiricists, as for example LOCKE, and even BERKELEY (1648­1753) who in his "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision" anticipates modern experimental psychology, are to be classed as representatives of logical intellectualism. This view is at the present time to be found in the psychological discussions indulged in by physiological writers, when they treat of such topics as sense perception. Among the philosophical representatives of this logical intellectualism in our day, one must mention especially FRANZ BRENTANO and his school. Association psychology is first found in the works of two writers who appear at about the same time, namely, DAVID HARTLEY (1704­1757) and DAVID HUME (1711­1776). These two writers represent, however, two different tendencies which continue even in present­day psychology. HARTLEY's association psychology refers the association processes to certain physiological conditions, while HUME's regards the association process as a psychological process. The first form allies itself, accordingly, to psycho­physical materialism; this is found in the works of such a modern writer as HERBERT SPENCER. Closely related to HUME's psychological associationism is the psychology of HERBART. HERBART's doctrine of the statics and mechanics of ideas is a purely intellectualistic doctrine. (Feeling and volition are here recognized only as certain phases of ideas). It is in agreement with associationism in its fundamental mechanical view of mental life. This similarity is not to be overlooked merely because Herbart sought through certain hypothetical assumptions to give his psychological discussions an exact mathematical form. There are many anticipations of voluntaristic psychology in the works of psychologists of the "pure introspection" school, and of the association schools. The first thorough-going exposition of this form of psychology was the work of the author of this Outlines of Psychology in his psychological treatises. It is to be noted that this psychological voluntarism, as, indeed, one can see from the description which has already been given, is to be clearly distinguished from metaphysical voluntarism as developed by such a writer as SCHOPENHAUER. Metaphysical voluntarism seeks to reduce everything to an original transcendental will, which lies back of the phenomenal world and serves as a substratum for this world. Psychological voluntarism on the other hand, looks upon empirical volitional processes with their constituent feelings, sensations, and ideas, as the types of all conscious processes. For such a voluntarism even volition is a complex phenomenon which owes its typical significance to this very fact that it includes in itself the different kinds of psychical elements.

References. Psychology of the inner sense: LOCKE, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, 169o. EDUARD BENEKE, Psychologische Skizzen, 2 vols., 1825­1827, and Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, 1833, 4th ed. 1877. K. FORTLAGE, System der Psychologie, 2 Vols., 1855. Faculty­psychology: CHRISTIAN WOLFF, Psychologia empirica, 1732, Psychologia rationalis, 1734; and Vernunftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, der Seele des Menschen etc., 1719. TETENS, Philosophische Versuche uber die menschliche Natur, 1776­1777. KANT, Anthropologie, 1798 (a practical psychology, well worth reading even at this late date because of its many nice observations).

Association psychology: HARTLEY Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duties, his Expectations, 1749. PRIESTLY, Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind on the Principles of the Association of Ideas, 1775. HUME, Treatise on Human Nature, 1734 ­1737; and Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 1748. JAMES MILL, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 1829, later edited with notes by Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill and others, 2nd ed. 1878. ALEXANDER BAIN, The Senses and the Intellect, 1855, 4th ed. 1894; and The Emotions and the Will, 1859, 3rd ed. 1875. HERBERT SPENCER, Principles of Psychology, 1855, 5th ed. 1890. HERBART, Psychologie als Wissenschaft, 2 vols., 1824­1825; and (English trans. by M. K. Smith 1891) Text­book of Psychology,1816.

Works which prepared the way for experimental psychology: LOTZE, Medizinische Psychologie, 1852. G. T. FECHNER, Elemente der Psychophysik, 2 vols., 1860. More extended modern treatises. Of the Herbartian School: W. F. VOLKMANN, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 2 vols., 4th ed., 1894. M. LAZARUS, Leben der Seele in Monographien, 3 vols., 3rd ed. 1883. Of the Association School (generally with a tendency toward psycho­physical materialism): KUELPE, (English trans. by E. B. Titchener, 1901) Outlines of Psychology, 1893. EBBINGHAUS, Grundzuge der Psychologie, 1st vol. only as yet 1897-1902. ZIEHEN, (English ~trans. by VAN LIEW and BEYER 1899) Introduction to the Study of Physiological Psychology, 6th Ger. ed. 1902. MUNSTERBERG, Grundzuge der Psychologie, 1st vol. only as yet, 1900. Works standing between association psychology and voluntaristic psychology: HOEFFDING, (English trans. by Lowndes, 1891, from the German trans. 1887) Outlines of Psychology, 2nd Danish ed. 1893. W. JERUSALEM, Lehrbuch der empirischen Psychologie, 2nd ed. 1890. Works representing a form of intellectualism related in method to scholasticism: BRENTANO, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, 1st vol. only, 1874. MEINONG, Psychologisch­ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, 1894; and Untersuchungen zur Gegenstands theorie und Psychologie, 1904. Works emphasizing the independence of psychology and based on an empirical analysis of conscious processes: Lipps, Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, 1883; and Leitfaden der Psychologie, 1903. JODL, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 2nd ed., 1902. The same empirical analysis, and on the basis of this analysis voluntaristic psychology in the sense above described, are presented by the author of this Outlines of Psychology in his other works also, namely, Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie, 3 vols., 5th ed. 1902­1903 (English trans. in preparation by E. B. Titchener); and (English trans. by E. B. Creighton and E. B. Titchener, 1894) Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology, 3rd Ger. cd. 1897. Works treating chiefly of the philosophical character of fundamental psychological concepts: UPHUES, Psychologie des Erkennens, 1893. J. REHMKE, Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie, 1894. NATORP, Einleitung in die Psychologie, 1888. American, English and French works all follow in the path of associationalisrn. Furthermore, they tend for the most part toward psycho­physical materialism or toward dualistic spiritualism, less frequently toward voluntarism. From among the numerous American works, the following are to be mentioned: JAMES, Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., 1890. LADD, Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, 1894. BALDWIN, Handbook of Psychology, 1889. SCRIPTURE, The New Psychology, 1897. TITCHENER, An Outline of Psychology, 1896. French works are as follows: RIBOT'S monographs on various psychological subjects are to be mentioned. (All translated into English: Attention, The Diseases of Memory, The Diseases of the Will, The Diseases of Personality, General Ideas, The Creative Imagination). Also, the works of FOUILLEE, which are related to German voluntarism, but contain at the same time a great deal of metaphysics and are somewhat influenced by the Platonic doctrine of ideas (L'evolutionisme des idees­forces, 1890, and Psychologie des idees­forces, 1893). Works on the history of psychology especially worthy of mention: SIEBECK, Geschichte der Psychologie, Pt. 1st, 1880­1884, and also articles in the first three vols. of Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. (these cover the ancient and medieval periods). LANGE, History of Materialism. DESSOIR, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie, 2nd ed. 1902 (including as yet only 1st vol.). SOMMER, Grundzuge einer Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie und Aesthetik von Wolf­Baumgarten bis Kant­Schiller, 1892. RIBOT, (English trans. by Baldwin) German Psychology of Today, Fr. ed. 1885, Eng. ed. 1886. W. WUNDT, "Psychologie" in the Festschrift for Kuno Fischer, 1904.